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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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26 JANUARY 1987

WORLDWIDE REPORT

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: U.S. WANTS SDI FOR AGGRESSION, NOT DEFENSE

PM101646 Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 50, 5-11 Dec 86 (Signed to Press 4 Dec 86) p 9

[PRAVDA Political Observer Yuriy Zhukov "Commentary written especially for ZA RUBEZHOM": "A Story Meant for Simpletons"—capitalized passages within slant-lines printed in boldface]

[Text] The U.S. Administration has made truly incredible efforts to white-wash its aggressive plan for preparations for "Star Wars," which prevented an agreement being reached in Reykjavik on the elimination of nuclear weapons.

U.S. newspapers have calculated that U.S. leaders headed by the President have held more than 70 briefings in the wake of the Reykjavik meeting at which they tried to prove that space weapons are supposedly just a means of defense, an "impenetrable shield to protect the population from the nuclear missiles" with which the perfidious Russians allegedly want to attack them. And as a result of this "brainwashing," many Americans, and even some people beyond the U.S. borders, have started to believe these fabrications.

When conversing nowadays with Americans who have come to the USSR, you often hear it said: "Why are you so intransigent toward SDI? After all, these systems do not threaten you in any way. They will never be used unless the United States is attacked. And even if a nuclear war were to be launched contrary to our expectations, even then the combat means created [sozdannyye] under the SDI program will bring no harm at all to your people—they will strike only missiles flying toward the United States."

Very well then, let us examine this issue carefully.

The U.S. General's Tales

A stenographic transcript of the latest propaganda action by Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, director of the organization for SDI's implementation, was distributed 13 November. Speaking on an international television network, property of the U.S. Foreign Policy Propaganda Service, he answered questions from West European scientists and journalists, many of whom make no secret of their fears as regards the program for preparations for "Star Wars."

With a persistence worthy of better application, the U.S. general attempted to prove for the umpteenth time that the space weapons being created [sozdavayemoye] in the United States are supposedly suitable only for destroying "enemy" nuclear missiles. Admitting that a laser beam from space "might be able to (!) reach the Earth's surface," he nonetheless said in an attempt to reassure his audience: "I cannot think of a dumber military strategy than aiming a laser at every (?) street in a city and try to use this technique to destroy a city. After all, we already have weapons that are much more efficient than that. They are called nuclear-armed ballistic missiles."

Let me say at once that the talkative general can only be thanked for this "after all": He involuntarily let it slip that the United States, in creating [sozdavaya] space weapons, intends to use them in combination with nuclear ballistic missiles designed, as he unceremoniously declared, "to destroy" our cities. The follow-up question is: What is the worth of the U.S. President's deliberations about readiness to destroy all ballistic missiles?

But let us revert to the main topic of Abrahamson's deliberations--the fact that the space weapons being created [sozdavayemoye] under his leadership are intended only as a means of defense. Contradicting him, Italian scientist Enrico Jacchia, director of the Strategic Studies Center in Rome, said: "You said that with nuclear weapons it is possible to hit targets on Earth. But you know well that laser weapons operating at the speed of light, with extraordinary precision in hitting targets, are much more efficient and can be used instead of nuclear weapons."

In reply Abrahamson launched into protracted and unintelligible arguments to the effect that SDI envisages the creation [sozdaniye] of various weapons systems, "some" of which will be in space while others will be "similar to what we (in other words the United States) have now." Moreover, he went as far as to say that these weapons will supposedly be altogether incapable of causing any damage at all to people.

Just listen to this. "At present," Abrahamson declared, "there are several types of weapons which could be deployed in space. These include rockets or projectiles with very high acceleration during the boost phase of flight.... When flying with such high acceleration, the shells could burn up (!) during deep penetration in the atmosphere. In this way, kinetic energy weapon systems of this kind do not threaten people on Earth."

And how about lasers? No need to worry, the general prophesies with assumed naivety, "the laser is a very inefficient weapon (!!). The amount of explosive power that a laser will place on a target, particularly a target that is thousands of kilometers away, is equivalent to the explosive power of two or three sticks of dynamite."

The follow-up question is: Why then should the United States spend many tens of billions of dollars on the creation [sozdaniye] of such "inefficient" weapons? Just so as to be able to hit nuclear missiles flying in space? But, after all, the U.S. Administration vows and swears that it intends to

deploy space weapons only after all ballistic nuclear missiles are destroyed!

No, the propagandist in general's uniform just cannot make things add up when he narrates tales to his European audience on satellite television!

It is no wonder that after this even the U.S. bourgeois press has been increasingly often voicing doubts whether SDI envisages just the creation [sozdaniye] of a "defense shield" against a mythical Soviet aggression.

A short while ago I read an interesting article by a competent expert on military-political problems—J. Oakes, former Senior editor of THE NEW YORK TIMES—entitled "Breaking Loose From 'Star Wars' and Getting Down to Earth."

Explaining why "the Russians" have taken an intransigent stance on the question of preventing the militarization of space, Oakes wrote: "They see that unrestricted implementation of the 'strategic defense initiative' would open up a completely different sphere in the development [razrabotka] of /BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE/ (author's emphasis—Yu.zh.) weapons. Now that they have approximate military parity with us, they have absolutely no need for a new arms race which would divert for military purposes the vast capital investments needed to satisfy the growing demand for consumer goods and to raise living standards in the Soviet Union."

I met Oakes on many occasions during the years when he set the political line of THE NEW YORK TIMES, and remember well how, for several decades on end, he held anti-Soviet positions. His present admission of the aggressive nature of space weapons is that much more interesting.

Statements along similar lines can be seen in several other U.S. press organs. For example, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR wrote recently that "the Soviet Union cannot be convinced that the end product of SDI development [razrabotka] will have only a defensive nature." Noting that laser beams could hit "ground targets" from space, the newspaper recalls: "It is well known that the most ardent champions of SDI in the Reagan administration include the most inveterate Russophobes, usually emigres from Eastern Europe, who advocate a policy incorporating attempts to overthrow the present regime in the Soviet Union."

Scientists' Authoritative Voice

But let us turn to the evidence of competent scientists. Not so long ago the Washington Institute for Space and Security Studies published a book under the typical headline "Star Wars: Defense or 'Death Star?'" In order to make it easier for the reader to understand what they are talking about, let me explain that "Death Star" was the name given in the sensational U.S. movie trilogy "Star Wars" to a space platform, equipped with fantastic weapons, one burst from which was enough to destroy the entire population of the imaginary Planet of Alderon.

The book's author is the Institute's president, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Robert Bowman. He served in the U.S. Air Force for 22 years, heading the space

development [razrabotka] program there. In particular, he was in charge of long-range scientific projects which were later included in the "strategic defense initiative" program, including the development [razrabotka] of powerful space-based lasers. Bowman was later in charge of the General Dynamics Corporation's space program, and afterward became vice president of the Space Communications Company, which controls an important satellite system. To put it briefly, a highly competent specialist.

But what does he write? Here is what: /"I WOULD LIKE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ABM SYSTEM BEING CREATED [sozdavayemaya] WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE 'STAR WARS' PROGRAM WILL NOT BE DEFENSIVE.' IT WILL BE A 'DEATH STAR.'" FROM A PURELY MILITARY POINT OF VIEW," HE NOTES, "SPACE WEAPONS," ANTISATELLITE SYSTEM AND ABM SYSTEMS MUST BE EXAMINED AS A SINGLE WHOLE, STATIONED ABOVE A POTENTIAL ENEMY'S AIR SPACE THEY ARE CAPABLE OF HITTING NOT ONLY AN OBJECT IN SPACE (AND SATELLITES IN PARTICULAR) BUT ALSO THE ENEMY'S TERRITORY."/

The advocates of space weapons, Robert Bowman goes on, attempt to present them as the sole alternative to the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. They claim that the "Star Wars" program offers mankind the only opportunity to avoid nuclear destruction, declaring that the creation [sozdaniye] of such weapons is justified not only by military but also by moral necessity. In reality, however, this program will lead to the point where "certain stability will be replaced by total instability of the situation, fear--by panic, and mistrust--by terror."

"In the years to come," he goes on to write, "we will look in the sky and be able to see small orbiting lights: These will be either space structures ensuring people's prosperity or 'death stars.' The choice is ours. We can use outer space to ensure flourishing life on Earth or to destroy it. Acting together, we can conquer the hostile space and then the inhabitants of the planet will use the knowledge and riches gained in space to improve life. Or we will deploy means of destruction beyond the Earth's boundaries and will thus release forces which will ultimately lead to the planet's destruction. A sensible choice must be made."

Pay attention: This has been written by someone who previously worked in the Pentagon on the creation [sozdaniye] of military space systems and knows well the essence of the matter. One must also add that approximately the same viewpoint is held by hundreds and even thousands of U.S. specialists taking an active stance against the "Star Wars" program.

I will mention just those who have rallied within the ranks of the Federation of American Scientists and the Union of Concerned Scientists, including Nobel Prize winners H. Bethe and C. Sagan and physicists R. Garwin and W. Panofsky. Other competent figures are also opposed to SDI including, for example, former U.S. Secretaries of Defense R. McNamara and J. Schlesinger, former advisers to the U.S. President M. Bundy and G. Wisner, and other famous experts in military-political problems and eminent figures like G. Kennan, G. Smith, and C. Clifford.

Finally, the most eminent Soviet scientists, who have published a number of serious scientific works exposing the myth of the "defensive" nature of the

"Star Wars" program are in solidarity with them. This subject was covered, in particular, by the report "Strategic and International Consequences of the Creation [sozdaniye] of the Space ABM System Using Beamed Energy Weapons," published in 1984 by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat, and the report "Strike Space Weapons and International Security," published by the same committee in 1985.

Finally, quite recently the "Mir" Publishing House published a new collective work by Soviet scientists: "Space Weapons: The Security Dilemma" [Kosmicheskoye Oruzhiye: Dilemma Bezopasnosti].

Confirming the conclusions drawn by their U.S. colleagues and backing them with their own theoretical elaborations, the Soviet scientists conclude: "Being accurate enough and powerful enough to destroy parts of ballistic missiles in flight, space weapons could also be used to hit other types of strategic weapons like, for example, aircraft at airfields even prior to take off.... Strike space weapons could hit a whole range of ground targets like command centers, communications and command junctions, major floating targets, and economic installations (petroleum, gas, and chemical industry enterprises, power stations, and so on). The space echelon of an ABM system using different types of missile weapons is perfectly capable of playing the role of a weapon to hit ground targets from space."

The myth that SDI is supposedly only a shield and not a sword is also exposed by the most farsighted people in West Europe. A Belgian group for peace studies and information published an anthology of material on SDI under the title "Star Wars--The Big Lie" [Zvezdnyye Voyny--Velikiy Otman]. It says: "If certain types of beamed energy weapons are created [budut sozdany] they could also become an offensive weapon capable of swiftly destroying civilian targets (cities)."

This is the truth which cannot be covered up by the disinformation which is being so actively disseminated in Washington. The Pentagon needs space weapons not for defense but for aggression.

In the light of these obvious facts, the words spoken by M. S. Gorbachev on Soviet Television 22 October sound particularly convincing:

"Only political simpletons could agree to eliminate nuclear weapons as a means of deterring American aggression and to receive a threat from space in exchange. There are no such simpletons in the Soviet leadership!"

Returning to this subject in his 27 November speech in Delhi, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee convincingly showed again that SDI is a manifestation of the flawed concept of strength. "And as practice shows," he emphasized, "the arrogance of power inevitably turns into political sterility."

"SDI," M. S. Gorbachev declared, "is by its nature an inhuman and anti-people concept. It is the main obstacle in the way to disarmament. Its implementation means transferring the arms race to a new sphere, it means a new spiral

of the arms race with extremely dangerous and unpredictable consequences. It destabilizes the military-strategic situation. It undermines confidence in international relations. It does not strengthen but diminishes security, including the security of America itself. SDI thwarts the quest for the improvement of the world situation. It is a destructive political line. We must speak about this bluntly, at the top of our voices, for the whole world to hear. The world must know, all the peoples must know what is actually hidden behind SDI."

The Americans must seriously ponder this warning advice before it is too late!

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CSO: 5200/1204

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: U.S. SEEKS TO EXPLOIT ALLIES' RESOURCES FOR SDI

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Nov 86 p 5

[Article by A. Kireyev, candidate of economic sciences: "Obedient Moors Needed: How, With the Help of SDI, Washington Is Pumping Money, Brains and Technology Out of Its Allies"]

[Text] The farther Reykjavik recedes into history, the clearer an indisputable fact becomes: the reason for the obstructionist course of the U.S. leadership at the summit meeting is in its very great dependence upon the military-industrial complex, which has transformed the arms race into a lucrative business and a means for the receipt of fabulous profits.

The latest creation of the military-industrial complex is the infamous SDI. This deformed creation is hardly three and a half years old but around it has already arisen a unique "star complex," an insidious interlacing of the defense industry, state power, militarism, military science and the propaganda machinery called upon to establish the most favorable conditions for its development. In addition, the White House, having become the "godfather" of SDI, is striving to hire not only American but also foreign nursemaids for its favorite child under the principle: "the more there are, the lower is the price."

Back in March 1985, U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger sent an official letter inviting the NATO countries as well as Japan, Australia and Israel (a total of 18 capitalist countries) to take part in the dividing of the "SDI pie." The message, which, as the magazine DEFENSE SCIENCE expressed it, reminded one of a "commercial project for investments in a new enterprise," demanded of the allies in the tone of an ultimatum that they urgently define their own attitude toward the SDI program and inform Washington of the possible areas of their participation. Gen G. Abrahamson, director of the organization for the implementation of SDI, hastened to state that it is not foreseen that the allies need to make any financial contributions. He apparently was saying that the Pentagon will pay for everything. In addition, the administration itself hinted strongly through BUSINESS WEEK, the journal of business circles, that the allies could receive one-third of the \$26 billion that it was intended to spend on SDI in the first 5 years of its realization.

What was the reason for such generosity? Let us leave aside military and political considerations and calculations. Let us look at the economic side of the matter.

In the first term of its rule, the current American administration increased military expenditures without restraint, thus driving the budgetary deficit to a record level. The government had to go more and more into debt, selling securities to private banking and industrial corporations. The great demand for credit on the part of the federal government as a result of the militarization produced a sharp jump in interest rates, which, like a magnet, began to attract the capital of other Western countries.

Through such a transfer of funds, the United States was able in the years 1981-1985 to finance a large part of the military preparations and to support relative high rates of economic growth. During this time, the free-spending administration was already allocating the first billions of dollars to SDI but there was still no talk involving its allies in it.

This course, however, led to an abrupt increase in the foreign debt of the United States and voices of alarm were already being heard in the Federal Reserve System. The Rubicon had been crossed in February 1985, that is, a month before Weinberger's letter: the sum of foreign assets in the United States exceeded American assets abroad. From the point of view of international accounts, the United States was now becoming a "net debtor." It became not only dangerous but impossible to continue to maintain interest rates at such a high level to ensure the steady flow of funds from abroad.

In this way, the "faucet" of foreign financing was shut off, which was fraught with the decline in the rate of renewal of fixed capital with all the consequences flowing from this. The situation became threatening but here a new doping was found.

At the urging of SDI lobbyists, the administration decided to give American industry a saving injection of the latest technology. Under this scheme, the closest allies were to be the donors. The most acceptable screen for this infusion could only be SDI, which the American propaganda machine actively began to "sell" to West European public opinion as a means of defending the entire "free world" against the so-called "Soviet threat."

The tone was set by the master of the White House himself and his closest staff members, who diligently "worked on" the leaders of the main Western countries at economic summit conferences and during bilateral meetings. Secretary of State Shultz and Pentagon chief Weinberger were extremely active in the course of the traditional "Atlantic marathons." Without awaiting the decisions of the governments, the military-industrial corporations began to look for the most amenable foreign subcontractors.

Considering the nature of the "star wars" plans, Washington's partners were in no hurry to make a decision. France, Canada, Norway, Greece, Denmark and Australia expressed their unwillingness to join SDI at the state level. After lengthy negotiations, England, Italy, the FRG and Israel joined the Pentagon's military space team. Japan is being very tentative about SDI. The remaining

allies of the United States did not clearly define their attitude toward the new strategic program.

The conditions of the memoranda signed with the countries where "mutual understanding" was reached turned out to be so strict that the subcontractors were essentially deprived of all rights. The magazine STERN wrote in connection with the bringing of West Germany into SDI: "The FRG has now become the 51st state of the United States. The only bad thing is that its citizens cannot elect the president upon whom their fate depends."

It became clear that the United States was in no hurry to give large orders to non-American firms prior to the signing of the corresponding agreements between states. They needed documented guarantees that the technological innovation falling into the spread nets will not be utilized by anyone besides the American military-industrial complex. In this connection, one recalls the history of the Manhattan Project that resulted in the building of the atomic bomb. For its realization, Washington brought in English and French scientists but before bombarding Hiroshima and Nagasaki it simply expelled some of them from the research laboratories and forced others to renounce their own countries so as to have the possibility of continuing to work on the project. "The same thing can happen with SDI as well," observers think.

As soon as several of the allies put on the contractual collar, some Washington officials put forward new pretensions, demanding that all scientific results belong to the United States. Congressman N. Johnson made himself clear on this account: "The results obtained in the research process must not flow away without payment, whether it be Japan, the FRG or some other country."

In brandishing the bogaboo of the "Soviet threat" over the Western world and appealing to its allies to unite, the United States is in fact planning their technological backwardness. "The SDI label hides the true goal of making a technological leap that will give the United States technological superiority over the rest of the world, especially over its allies," wrote the newspapers TIMES OF INDIA.

SDI has added fuel to the blazing fire of contradictions between the United States and its allies. Some sober-thinking politicians of the West European countries and Japan are indicating directly that Washington is striving to transform their nations into a mere appendage of the American military-industrial complex, into a "firm to serve the American apparatus."

The allies are realizing more and more clearly that they are being drawn into the next militaristic cycle, which the United States intends to use as a screen to solve its own economic problems at the expense of others. The "Atlantic solidarity" raised into space is giving America's partners neither the promised billions in orders nor access to the latest technology nor, most importantly, greater security.

If they do not find in themselves the strength to resist transatlantic dictates, then they risk being technological vassals of "big brother" for many years. And the United States answers those who express their dissatisfaction with this situation, saying: "Do not worry. We are among ourselves. We will work it out sometime...."

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: U.S. ORBITAL SPACE PROJECT SUBORDINATED TO SDI

LD201428 Moscow TASS in English 0934 GMT 20 Dec 86

[Text] Washington, 20 Dec (TASS)--An American orbital space station planned to be built will from now on be subordinated to the aims of the Star Wars programme, according to the Pentagon's decision.

This is reported by the newspaper WASHINGTON POST with reference to well-informed representatives of the Defence Department.

The Department of State announced that negotiations on the project which the United States held with the European space agency, Japan and Canada, had been postponed for "an indefinite period of time." American military circles do not want even the closest allies to get an access to the Star Wars newest technology.

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CSO: 5200/1204

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS NOTES PENTAGON CHIEF OF SDI PROMOTED

LD230659 Moscow TASS in English 0616 GMT 23 Dec 86

[Text] Washington, 23 Dec (TASS)--Air Force Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, the chief of the Pentagon's organisation concerned with the fulfillment of the SDI programme, will get promoted: his immediate superior, Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger, announced on Monday that President Ronald Reagan had decided to make Abrahamson a four-star general for his direction of the "Star Wars" programme.

The decision is meant primarily to raise the status of that Pentagon subdivision, which will now be actually equivalent to the U.S. basic military commands.

/9274

CSO: 5200/1204

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S VELIKHOV LAUNCHES SPACE WEAPONS BOOK; COPY FOR REAGAN

LD171641 Moscow TASS in English 1539 GMT 17 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow, 17 Dec (TASS)—The world has overstepped the boundary behind which further stockpiling and perfection of nuclear armaments is not only dangerous, but is also senseless, said Soviet Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov.

He made a speech today at the press centre of the USSR's Foreign Ministry at a ceremony of launching the monograph "Space Weapons: Dilemma of Security." Yevgeniy Velikhov said that the issue of the monograph had been prompted by considerations of concern for the destinies of the world.

Realisation of the SDI concept of security will not help remove the nuclear impasse, but will make nuclear war more probable, he said. The U.S. desire to establish a broad-scale ABM system is viewed in the monograph as an attempt of attaining military superiority. But the Soviet Union will find various possibilities of ensuring its security, of preserving the world's military-strategic parity. The USSR shall never follow the path which is being imposed upon it by U.S. adventurist circles. The Soviet Union has a broad range of comparatively cheap measures and systems of opposing the new threat to security of the USSR and its allies. The cost of a comprehensive system of such measures and systems of opposition might account for only a few percent of the SDI's cost.

In our opinion, said Academician Velikhov, it is not "equilibrium of fear," but mutual reduction and destruction of nuclear arsenals, normalisation of the political situation, solution of all disputable issues through negotiations that will help preserve peace.

Yevgeniy Velikhov said that a group of authors of the book "Space Weapons: Dilemma of Security" had decided to send it in English to the U.S. President, the secretary of state and the defence secretary. We are confident, he said, that realisation of the programme of a broad-scale anti-missile system, the multipurpose space strike complex would be a great error, fraught with heavy consequences to international security, including security of the United States itself, to strategic stability. We are urging the American leaders once again to give attentive consideration to all aspects of the given problem, to see into the research of the group of Soviet scientists the results of which are set forth in the above-mentioned book.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S GEN VOLKOGONOV ATTACKS SDI 'FANTASY'

Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian 30 Oct 86 p 3

[Article by Col Gen Dm. Volkogonov, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Fantasy and Star Wars: No Place in Space for Weapons"]

[Text] At the turn of the century, in 1898, Herbert Wells wrote his novel "War of the Worlds." An artistic imagination helped the writer draw a picture of a horrible war that came to earth from limitless space.

It is not difficult for anyone who ever read this book to remember its pages about "ominous explosions" on Mars, "fiery lines" in space.... And the "cylinders" falling to earth from Mars brought to the earth beings practically "all head" and having a tremendous intellect. An intellect that, being completely devoid of feelings, was capable of using space for transportation (rockets, apparently), of creating deadly rays (laser cannons, of course) and poisonous gases (probably binary technology), of exchanging thoughts without the use of physical organs (possibilities of telepathy), and of creating working machines that were not controlled by anyone (are these not robots)?

Some of the author's nebulous prophecies of coming catastrophes became the frightening reality of the end of the 20th century, including the reality that today threatens humanity from space. But Wells could not imagine that the threat from space would come not from Martians or other extraterrestrials but from the earthlings themselves.

Everything ended happily in the novel "War of the Worlds." The visitors from space were simultaneously and suddenly defeated by bacteria, against which they had no immunity. As Wells wrote, "after all of humanity's means of defense were exhausted, the strangers were destroyed by the most insignificant creatures.... Death came just in time. Having paid with billions of lives over his thousands of years of evolution, concluded the visionary in his philosophically profound and contemporary thinking, man bought the right to live on the earth and this right belongs to him despite anyone else.

Today the "Strategic Defense Initiative" is not merely some remote idea.

The center with the code name "Sigma Tau" is located in the rocky canyons of the Santa Susanna Mountains not far from Los Angeles. There, reports the NEW YORK TIMES, they are developing a laser weapon that could be deployed on "shuttles" and space stations. Scientists and designers from the Martin Marietta Company are working on an electromagnetic cannon capable of utilizing powerful magnetic fields for the launch of projectiles along metallic rails into space, where there is no friction. At Livermore Laboratory (state of California) founded by E. Teller in the 1950's, they are, as they say in the United States, close to solving the problem of the creation of an X-ray laser utilizing the energy of a nuclear explosion in space. The firm Thompson-Ramo-Woolridge is working on the problem of building supercomputers for SDI capable of performing very complex operations in the tracking, control, coordination, aiming and firing of destructive elements at targets. This list could be greatly expanded. The SDI financial pie promises to be fantastically rich and a struggle has already developed among numerous firms, corporations and scientific laboratories working within the system of the military-industrial complex.

By the way, even optimists think that the SDI system will be established no earlier than the year 2000. But a Space Command already exists. The Space Command of the United States Air Force was established 4 years ago, on 1 September 1982. Its staff is located in the mountains of Colorado Springs (Colorado). The Space Command has more than 10,000 specialists working on the development of a concept for the waging of "star wars," the processing of intelligence data on the missile and space facilities of the Soviet Union, the coordination of the systems being created within the scope of the SDI, and the preparation of its utilization for strategic purposes. Numerous bases in Greenland, Alaska, Hawaii and many other regions of the world are giving the Space Command the necessary conditions for the control and utilization of space strike systems. And the number of these bases is increasing all the time.

Washington's adherence to SDI promises huge profits. More than \$70 billion have been allocated to research work on the SDI program. We recall that \$14 billion were appropriated to the Manhattan Project (the creation of the atomic bomb--D. V.) and \$30 billion to the Apollo Project. Specialists estimate that SDI will require hundreds of billions of dollars. We will not forget that the current U.S. administration represents the interests of many unseen rulers of America. In the magazine STENN, the West German journalist Klaus Lidtke wrote that "one can find 28 millionaires and 22 multimillionaires among the President's 100 key staff members." Their political face and extremely conservative views are largely determined not only by their ideological views but also by the size of their bank accounts.

For the realization of SDI, America needed (as so often!) the myth of Moscow's "superiority in space." "If this enemy did not exist," said Z. Bzhezinskiy candidly, "our generals would simply have had to invent him."

Many, from the secretary of defense to the editor of the sensational newspaper and the commercial theater, are constantly feeding, "enriching," modifying and cultivating this variant of the legend about the "Soviet military threat."

The screens of the United States and other countries are showing films suggesting to viewers that the space theater of military actions and fronts in the universe is a matter that has already been decided. The counters of bookstores are full of "space novels" of the type "Star Wars" by D. Lucas, "Master of the Galaxy" by D. Hill, "Visitors from Other Worlds" by M. Cousins, etc. In the majority of such films and books, of course, the cosmic vampires always have a five-pointed red star on their spacesuits.

The deployment in earth orbit of space strike weapons capable of hitting targets in all areas threatens to destroy for good the ABM Treaty signed by the USSR and United States in 1972. These actions cannot be seen any other way than as an extremely serious destabilizing factor capable of putting the arms race on a qualitatively new plane with consequences that are difficult to foresee.

This is how the hawks are reacting to the proposals of the USSR on the prohibition of the use of force either in space or from space in relation to the earth.

In speaking of what is high, noble and triumphal, people with a right to be proud of progressive humanity used expressions that have become proverbial: "fateful hour," "bright star of hope," "star of captivating happiness"....

The romantic and lofty attitude toward the surrounding reality is linked with the stars, man's eyes in the universe. For man, there never was the question of whether or not to go out into space or whether or not to strive for the far stars. The expanses of the universe always compelled human reason to seek to understand its endless secrets. And something dangerous and unpredictable--"star wars"--has violated this great harmony of the human spirit--truth, goodness and beauty. They are not the fantastic star wars about which H. Wells wrote and not those that flash on Western screens like a kaleidoscope but those that can become a reality in the form of an apocalypse. And only the economic and military power and political will of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community can prevent the worst, to which the world is being pushed by those who are setting "star wars" against world peace.

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SOVIET MILITARY JOURNAL ON SDI, MILITARY INDUSTRY

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 8, Aug 86 (Signed to press 7 Aug 86) pp 9-14

[Article by S. Shumilin, Candidate for Economic Sciences; "Imperialism: Military-Space Partnership"]

[Text] Reactionary forces, joined in the U.S. military-industrial complex, are not abandoning attempts to hinder the humanitarian movement of relaxing international tension. In trying to stop the onward march of history and accomplish imperialism's class goals, primarily America's, these forces are trying to strengthen all levels of Washington's military preparations, aimed at siezing domineering positions in the world. As such, the big wigs of the U.S. military-industrial complex attach primary importance to implementing the "Star Wars" program, proposed by President R. Reagan in 1983, or as it is officially called at the Pentagon, the "Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)".

This program, the official hypocritical name of which only camouflages its aggressive nature, has the goal of protecting the United States with a "shield" comprised of a wide-scale antimissile defense system having space-based components, thus giving them the capability to deliver with impunity the first nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. (1) The Pentagon is sparing no efforts to achieve this goal. Enormous resources are being allotted to implement SDI. For example, according to information in the March edition of the journal, INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, it is planned to allocate 4.8 billion dollars to the Pentagon in FY-87 alone, approximately 75 per cent more than in the preceeding year, and in 1988, it is planned to increase the appropriations to 6.3 billion dollars for these purposes. More and more American firms and scientific-research organizations are, for the first time, being enlisted to work on the program. According to foreign press reports, more than 260 companies and laboratories were participating in SDI by the beginning of 1986. The military mechanism, intended for carrying out "Star Wars", is being developed and tuned up: a joint U.S. Armed Forces Space Command was organized on the basis of the Air Force and Navy Space Commands and began to operate on 23 September, 1985: a joint space operations control center is under construction near Colorado Springs. The issue regarding the formation of a military space force is being considered. In spite of the past assurances by the American leadership concerning the non-nuclear nature of the antimissile defense system, being developed within the scope of the Strategic

Defense Initiative, tests of nuclear devices for pumping X-ray lasers are being carried out, which, as is known, are an important component of this system.

Having chosen the course toward the militarization of space, fatal both for the U.S. and for all of mankind, Washington is trying to rally other countries behind it, above all, the leading NATO partners and also Japan, Australia, and Israel. As the Western press reports, approximately two dozen foreign governments were "given the honour" of being officially invited to participate in SDI.

The U.S. must not be the only one on the path to "Star Wars." In the American military-political leadership's opinion, this is an indisputable requirement and item for the program's success. Such a great interest by Washington in enlisting the partners to carry out SDI is easily explained. First, it is considered, that even the semblance of "wide approval" of SDI by the allies, not even to mention its actual presence, helps successfully to sell the program to public opinion in the United States. Second, the White House and the Pentagon unconditionally want their activities, aimed at undermining Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreements, to be concealed by a certain similarity to the West's system of "collective responsibility". Finally, the mercenary interest of the "Star Wars" initiators include using the partners' scientific-technical potential in the best way for themselves. It is well known, that several U.S. allied powers have achieved marked successes in solving a number of large-scale scientific-technical problems. In particular, a case in point, is the successful work in Great Britain to develop fifth-generation computers, computer program support, military purpose control systems, synthetic aperture radars, missile technology (The Edinburgh University Harriet-Yoto, the firms British Aerospace, Marconi, Plessey, Systems Designers, Software Science and others; in the FRG, tracking satellites for ground targets, radar and laser technology (in particular, lasers intended for destroying missiles in terminal flight phase), optical sensors, mirrors and reflectors, superlight materials (the firms Dornier, Leitz, Messerschmidt-Belkov-Bluem, Zeiss, etc.); in Japan, electro-optical devices, lasers, fiber-optics (including new-in-principle missile control systems), robotics, coatings which absorb radiowaves and make coated objects "invisible" to radars (Mitsubishi, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, Sumitomo Electric Industries, TDK, Hitachi). The U.S. considers the results of these and several other activities, being carried out abroad, to be important both for the successful implementation of SDI, and for strengthening its own positions in the capitalistic world market.

Washington employed an extensive propaganda campaign for the purpose of enlisting the partners in the program. Immediately after the publication of the president's SDI directive at the beginning of 1984, representatives of the right-wing administration were sent to the capitals of United States allies in Western Europe and the Pacific for the purpose of acquainting the partner countries' leaderships with the program and clarifying its main aspects. In the same year, 1984, high-ranking U.S. officials held a meeting with the NATO leadership concerning SDI problems. American politicians and military personnel, including Pentagon Chief C. Weinberger and the leader of the organization included in this department responsible for implementing the

"Strategic Defense Initiative," J. Abrahamson, are still conducting discussions with the allies concerning their possible participation in SDI.

In all such discussions and meetings, the partners were earnestly persuaded using various means. They intimidated them with the mythical "Soviet military threat" and convinced them that the "Star Wars" program will help block this threat. Thus, the program is presented in an alluring "defensive" wrapping, making it, as they believe in Washington, "morally justified." The belief is widely held that SDI is only an "answer" to the supposedly similar work being carried out in the Soviet Union to develop a space-based antimissile defense.

In referring to the program's present enormous scales and the prospect of their rapid growth in the future (it is considered that for the period from 1984 to 1993 alone, SDI will absorb more than 70 billion dollars; over all, as they believe, the issue concerns the expenditures, reaching from 500 billion to 1.5-2 trillion dollars), they are promising the allies a large economic gain from participation in it, not only directly, but indirectly, in the form of "similar results" from the work, suitable for use in non-military spheres of the economy. These promises are reinforced by the arguments, that at its basis, SDI hardly embodies a program of basic research, but that the ideas, put forth in it and already in effect, in a majority of instances, are sufficiently universal to be used in both the military and in the civilian sector. As a result, according to the U.S. administration's assertions, apart from ideas, technical systems and materials which may be used for non-military commercial purposes, will "result" from the program. Such directions in SDI, as the development of communication and control systems, lasers, optical instruments and devices, fifth-generation computers, new materials, and robotics are especially mentioned as prospects in this regard. It is emphasized, that "economic wars" along these directions, will be carried out in the West into the 21st Century and those governments, which are ready and able to engage in the research in the given directions, will have the right to claim an important advantage within the the civilian production markets' competitive plans.

The intense "brain-washing" of their potential clients by Pentagon bosses is yielding the results desired by Washington. Official circles in a number of countries, acting in the narrow economic interests of the national-military industrial complexes and demonstrating allied solidarity with the United States, are speaking of joint activities with in the U.S. in SDI issues and are recklessly being drawn into a dangerous space adventure.

Primarily, it was Great Britain's leadership, which was the first to give approval for its country's participation in the program. In December, 1985, a corresponding "memorandum of cooperation" was signed between the U.S. and Great Britain, and in February, 1986, there were a series of agreements for its development. The terms of the English firms' participation in this program, formulated in these documents, are kept in strict secret. However, according to the reports of the newspaper GUARDIAN, it became known, that the U.S. Defense Department is planning to subject the given firms to a thorough check and to hush up their work, which can be used in the "Star Wars" preparation program. Although similar steps are being undertaken according to U.S. legislation, the question is the nature of imposing the actions of

American laws on Great Britain. As they report, in London they display the concern for possible political scandals in connection with such violations of the country's sovereignty. But no more than that.

Work on the program is unfolding in Great Britain in many directions (in the "memorandum of cooperation" referred to, 18 areas were identified in which English technology could be useful for SDI). With the goal of coordinating these activities, a special department was also created in the British Ministry of Defense.

SDI also found high ranking admirers in the FRG. The Bonn leadership not only affirmed "political support" of the program, but followed Great Britain's example in concluding an intergovernment agreement with the United States to enlist West Germany in the work to militarize space (U.S. Secretary of Defense, C. Weinberger, and FRG Economic Minister, M. Bangemann signed it in Washington in March 1986). Moreover, FRG Defense Minister, M. Wörner, called upon West European countries which are members of NATO, to join efforts and supplement the American "Star Wars" plans with a program to develop a combined air defense and antimissile defense system for Western Europe, the so-called European Defense Initiative (EDI). In Bonn, they consider that this program, conceived of as an adjunct of SDI, but less ambitious in comparison with it regarding the objectives and means of its achievement (to a limited extent, in the initial stage), serves in its own right as an intermediate stage on the course to the implementation of the entire "Strategic Defense Initiative" complex and is more acceptable for several wavering allies, than the American "Star Wars" scenario. But in any case, through EDI, they will be tied to SDI. Thus, Bonn is not only participating in the latter, but is taking upon itself improper role of its expediter in Western Europe.

Japan expressed its "understanding" of the Reagan "Strategic Defense Initiative". It has not yet reached an official government decision to tie the country to the American plan to militarize space. However, the first concrete steps to actual participation in SDI have already been made. For example, the firm Hitashi Magnetics supplied powerful magnets for combat lasers being developed in one of the Los Alamos scientific centers. A protocol was signed (28 December 1985) concerning the transfer of production technology to the United States for a "surface-to-air" missile guidance system based on the new principle of inputting information on the general target type into the computer memory. As they assert, the search and guidance system, being developed on this principle, provides high accuracy for target destruction and, with only slight modification, can be used for the purpose of developing weapons for "Star Wars".

Such support is a logical extension of the Ya. Nakasone cabinet's entire policy, directed at strengthening the military, including the military-economic, collaboration with the U.S. Lately, with Prime Minister Nakasone's arrival to power, the Country of the Rising Sun is actively helping to forge weapons abroad by its deliveries of military products. For example, according to information from the newspaper, THE WASHINGTON POST, 80 per cent of the silicon components now used in complex American military equipment are of Japanese origin. It is obvious, that under these conditions, the official participation of Japan in SDI, which Washington is soliciting, will promote

its rapid transformation into one of the U.S.'s main contractors under the leadership of General Abrahamson.

The Italian government gave a "green light" to the participation of national industrial companies in SDI. This decision was reached in the spring of this year at a conference of a special intra-ministerial committee, headed by the President of the Council of Ministers, B. Craxi.

Government support of SDI is being enjoyed in Tel Aviv, which officially joined the program in May, 1986. In this case, the question is not merely concerned with the usual coordination of military efforts for the strategic allies (the U.S. and Israel). The Israeli press emphasizes that Israel expects to assert its military superiority over Arab countries for a long time and to develop a simple guarantee for accomplishing its territorial ambitions by means of participation in implementing the "Star Wars" project. "Tel Aviv's participation in the program (SDI-U.S)", writes the Jordanian newspaper Al RAI, "further intensifies its refusal to take any steps aimed at achieving progress in establishing true peace in the region."

However, according to a number of foreign military specialists' opinions, even with such successes of the United States, to speak out concerning the simple adoption of SDI by the American allies, serves to turn the Pentagon's wishes into reality. The understanding of this indisputable truth is emerging in many countries allied to the U.S., that SDI is not advantageous to any one from either a military, or a political point of view. The program's military aspect especially summons great doubts in the allies. The point here, as they figure, is that it would be absurd to rely on the development of an antimissile defense system within the limits of SDI, which is adequately effective in respect to the intercept of ballistic missiles (especially on relatively short flight paths). A number of other types of nuclear weapons and their delivery means (for example, cruise missiles) are outside the limits of this systems influence. As a result, the American allies are apprehensive, that the antimissile defense system "shield" being developed within the framework of SDI, will extend only over U.S. territory. "Reagan thinks primarily about the North American continent, and the security requirements of Western Europeans are not his problem," the West German journal SPIEGEL wrote regarding this. French experts, in summarizing all the "pros" and "cons" to the given side of the issue, come to the conclusion: "the military advantages (SDI-U.S.) for Europe are zero. We are not convinced for a minute, that it will be feasible" In turn, Great Britain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, J. Hay, compared the "Star Wars" concept with the French attempt to insure its own security before the Second World War by means of constructing the "Maginot Line," implying that, as with the latter, the new "irreproachable defensive line" will in fact turn out to be the same catastrophic failure.

It is also important to note, that many U.S. partners realize all the more clearly; the SDI concept is by no means defensive, but is for the development of an additional component of the U.S.'s offensive potential. The program's defensive intent is fiction, as is the assertion that SDI is a reaction to similar plans existing in the Soviet Union to conduct military operations in space. The understanding of this fact is growing; that the implementation of

the SDI program clearly contradicts the ideas of maintaining the strategic balance of forces in the world.

The participation in SDI stirs up, in the allies, great anxiety for their political independence and security in the military-economic realm. It is evident, that in employing its military industry in the plans for the militarization of space, the U.S. partners place this realm, to a great extent, under American control, closely attach it to the American "death industry," and place new levers of influence for its political policy into U.S. hands.

Economic arguments in favor of participation in SDI are unconvincing to many. According to a number of Western experts' opinion, although Washington is glad to involve the allies in the preparations for "star wars" and is really ready to give them part of the orders for the program, this will yield dividends to only a narrow circle of military-industrial companies involved in the military-space business, and by no means compensates for the participant countries' loss for "the transfer of intellect" to the U.S. and also from the diversion of resources from the civilian RDT&E realm.

In addition, the hopes for the by-product results of SDI, for its high "commercial potential" are highly doubtful. First, the nature of the program provides the basis for these doubts. It is all the more obvious that research within its limits will be advantageously applied, having the purpose of developing models, prototyped weapons, military equipment, and also their subsequent non-laboratory developments and trials. As the organ WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE of FRG business circles, writes, the U.S. Defense Department's conversion, by FY-84, of all designs connected with SDI, and others, from the category of RTD&E 6/1 "Research" in which basic research prevails, to the 6/2 category of "Experimental Development" and 6/3 "Design Work", testifies to the applied nature of SDI. This feature of SDI essentially limits the commercial potential of the ideas arising during its development.

It also pointed out that specific technical equipment, developed within the limits of SDI, does not bear appreciable uses being developed for the civilian sphere. This is evident, above all, with the specification of requirements, laying claim to the consumer characteristics of these articles, which will be developed during the implementation of the program. Many Western experts consider that the given requirements in a majority of cases either completely preclude the use of SDI "products" in civilian realms, or makes it possible only with series modifications of the developed items, requiring large expenditures (in particular, this relates to control systems being developed within the limits of SDI, which, as the Western press asserts, in principle can be adapted for the control of air traffic, automobile service, factories, and flexible industrial systems, etc. But, even if these articles could be directly used in the non-military spheres without any modification, they are more often non-competitive because of the high cost, stipulated by the high and usually redundant requirements to their quality for the given realms. In connection with these, the West German newspaper FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE wrote, that the technical innovations for civilian industry, being developed directly in its realms, are ten times cheaper than the same innovations "originating" from military work. For this, they consider the number of researchers and

official persons in the West, and the entire practice of carrying out and patenting the results of military RTD&E in the U.S. refutes the principle of the growing degree of the "coincidental use" for new technology (in particular, space technology) in the civilian and military spheres, extensively proclaimed by the Pentagon. For example, studies from the FRG by I. Eisbach and R. Rieling, show that of 328 patents, resulting from the NASA research program through 1963, only 16 per cent had "commercial potential." According to the poll results of a large number of representatives from American military-industrial firms, only approximately one tenth of all the inventions, which were made by these firms in connection with fulfilling military orders, were used commercially. At the same time, of the general number of patents issued in the U.S., the commercial use is on the average approximately one-half.

However, according to many Western experts' opinions, if even it were assumed that the principle which is pointed out works, (although in concept, the possibility of such "potential use" grows), an opponent can suggest that the American government lift the restrictions, imposed due to "national security" considerations, and authorize the transfer of SDI results to the U.S. civilian economic sphere, not to mention foreign governments. The impracticability of a similar kind of supposition is being directly affirmed by statements of responsible American persons. For example, R. Perle, Assistant Defense Secretary, figures that the program's results will not have separate parts, and thus, access to them will be extremely limited. The practice of embargo, to which the U.S. administration repeatedly has resorted in past years, raises large doubts on its account.

But all these waverings, as life shows, will not hinder Washington too much in harnessing the partners to a military-space team. As is known, several U.S. allied countries, not accepting the cock-and-bull on the "space shield" seriously, are clearly able to avert a nuclear war and officially decline from cooperating with the United States on an intergovernment level in SDI work. Australia and Greece indeed showed a decisive "No" to participation in the American plans to militarize space. Other allies are taking both sides of the issue. For example, France, as President F. Mitterand recently reaffirmed, is officially against participation in the U.S. military space program. At the same time, highly influential forces in the country are placing a great deal of freedom in the hands of national military-industrial firms and research organizations in this area. And Prime Minister, J. Chirac already announced, that France must not stay on the side lines in SDI research, which he approves in the military plan.

All this shows, that the U.S. military-space partnership with foreign countries is acquiring a totally practical shape. The apologists of "Star Wars" have never once clearly justified it; the socialist countries are faced with the highly dangerous threatening expansion of imperialist forces' collective activities into new spheres of the arms race. Imperialism is resorting to the use of its "joint military power" in space, and it is the duty of peace-loving peoples to stop it.

(1) For more details on SDI, see "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye," 1986, No. 4, pp. 5-9, ed.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS WRITERS DISCUSS SDI DANGERS, COUNTERMEASURES, U.S. REPORT

Technical Drawbacks

LD241448 Moscow TASS in English 1430 GMT 24 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 24 TASS — TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

SDI is bringing nearer nuclear apocalypse for humankind. War may break out as a consequence of the deliberate decision taken by the leaders of a country with an anti-missile "shield." Illusory notions of invulnerability and the ability to deliver the first nuclear strike from behind that "shield" and avert retaliation or at least weaken it to acceptable levels could contribute to such a reckless decision, which could be fatal to the world.

War can also break out accidentally. Since the strategic balance would be unstable, it would be hard for both sides to forecast development. In any crisis or near-crisis situation then each side would have to make decisions as fast as possible, decisions with fatal consequences for world peace. The world could find itself plunged into an abyss of nuclear catastrophe as a result of blackmail, one side's misunderstanding of the other's intentions or actions, or a reckless move caused by a sudden aggravation of the situation.

War can break out by chance, as a consequence of an error or malfunction in sophisticated computer systems. Any "Star Wars" system will have computers rather than people and there will be no time for human intervention since the computers will have to react instantaneously. When space strike weapons are deployed, decisions of major importance with irreparable consequences would actually be taken by computers, without the participation of human reason and political will and without respect for the norms of morality. In this situation mankind will become a hostage to machines and therefore technical malfunctions and errors. The Challenger disaster showed the world the dangers that are in store. Meanwhile, it was a reliable system, tried and tested on many occasions. SDI will be far more sophisticated and a technical malfunction in it may cause the peril of the huge spaceship called earth with mankind as its crew.

USSR Countermeasures

LD271040 Moscow TASS in English 1037 GMT 27 Dec 86

["The Answer to SDI Will Be an Effective One"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 27 Dec (TASS)—Follows commentary by Vladimir Chernyshev, a TASS military news analyst:

Official Washington is trying to describe as contradictory the stand of the USSR declaring that it "is not afraid of SDI", but is at the same time strongly opposing the militarisation of outer space. Yet there is nothing contradictory about that stand. The USSR is firmly convinced that the aims set by the "Star Wars" adventurists of ensuring strategic superiority for the USA and the opportunity to unleash a nuclear war and go with impunity are unrealistic. In real fact, SDI is equally dangerous to all countries and peoples, including to the USA and the USSR. It is a danger to the whole civilization. That is why the USSR opposes in principle the "Star Wars" program.

The statements by the Soviet leadership lay down the main principles in accordance with which our country will take counter-measures to create means of countering the space strike weapons, should the USA start deploying SDI. Soviet specialists have carried out a detailed research into that issue. Among the counter-measures there can be first and foremost a build up of the potential of strategic offensive weapons, in particular, through an increase in intercontinental land-based ballistic missiles and the number of warheads in these missiles. The USSR could build up such weapons (in particular, cruise missiles of various types of basing, and submarine launched ballistic missiles fired on flat trajectories), for the interception of which there are yet no adequate means.

To restore the balance of forces, measures can be taken to ensure a perfection of the capability of missiles to "penetrate" through the shield due to their protection from the effects of laser radiation, the use of maneuvering warheads, etc. For the barrage jamming of the ABM system; and misleading it, use can be made of a multitude of special equipment to camouflage missile launchings and the flight of warheads on trajectory (dummy targets, clouds of metal, aerosol clouds, etc.) and also devices for electronic jamming of the equipment and tracking of targets of the ABM system.

At last, but not at least, weapons can be created to destroy and neutralise the ABM system and its elements. The system of combat space platforms, which is created under the SDI program, will be highly vulnerable to various types of weapons. To hit the platforms use could be made of small missiles of various types of basing, laser weapons installed on earth and outer space, satellite "mines" put into orbits close to the orbits of combat space platforms and equipped with a sufficiently powerful charge detonated on order from the earth.

According to calculations, a complex system of measures and weapons of counteraction will cost a mere several percent of the cost of large-scale ABM system with space-based echelons.

But the main thing is that the counter-measures will parry the danger of a unilateral upsetting of the military strategic balance as a result of the deployment of SDI, and will ensure, in any type of nuclear attack, the remaining capability to launch a retaliatory counter-strike against the aggressor.

Washington's calculations that the implementation of the "Star Wars" programme will enable the USA to restore for itself the old times is nothing else but an illusion, an obvious miscalculation. The United States will not succeed in ensuring superiority for itself.

Pentagon Drafting SDI Document

PM171556 Moscow KRASHAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Dec 86 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Drafting Completed"]

[Text] New York, 10 Dec--The Pentagon has practically finished drafting one of the most important documents of the "Star Wars" program, defining the activity of the U.S. military department until the beginning of the next century. As the weekly AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, which is close to military circles, reports, the main task set by the American military department in this document is the creation [sozdaniye] of technology to ensure the "survival of space devices" which will be put in orbit under the "Star Wars" program. In the opinion of the U.S. military leadership, such devices "will play a critically important role" in its planned wars in space.

The document, which is due to be signed soon by U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger, draws attention to the need to expand programs for the launch of unmanned means of delivery of "military payloads into orbit and the development [razrabotka] of new, more powerful rockets for these purposes." The Defense Department's "space policy" also provides for the improvement of "military spaceships and Pentagon satellites so that they can be put in near-earth space" with the help of various delivery systems.

Another very important Pentagon objective formulated in the new document is the increasingly active use of astronauts in space militarization plans. Re-usable spaceships and orbital space stations, the Defense Department believes, offer new opportunities for the military use of near-earth space.

Report Defending SDI Decried

LD252033 Moscow TASS in English 2013 GMT 25 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 25 TASS — TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

The U.S. Administration made another attempt to mend the spoilt reputation of the American "Star Wars" program by inspiring the publication of a new report of American ABM "experts." One of the "specialists" recruited to compile the report is a vice-president of the military-industrial corporation McDonnell Douglas and the rest employees of various research centres financed by the Pentagon.

The report seems to be the Pentagon's reaction to a recent poll of the Cornell Institute for Social and Economic Problems among members of the American Academy of Sciences who specialize in SDI-related fields. As many as 78 percent of the polled scientists rated the chances of the development of dependable and large-scale ABM defenses in the U.S. as low or exceptionally low.

Most of the American scientists, including those working under Pentagon contracts, cite stronger and stronger arguments that Reagan's "Star Wars" program is technologically fallacious. Unbiased economists point out the unprecedented costs of the program.

Politologists [as received] say that the Strategic Defense Initiative," giving the aggressor a leaky ABM "umbrella," is creating the real risk of the catastrophic destabilization of the military and political situation and dramatically escalating the danger of nuclear catastrophe, inter alia, because of possible malfunctions in ABM control computers, warning systems and communications and also because of the higher risk of mistakes in reading the intentions of the other side.

Yet six employees of different institutions of the U.S. military-industrial complex and the Pentagon, groundlessly claiming objectivity, argue that they tried but failed to find proof of the common beliefs about the major ABM system that is being developed in the U.S. They make fresh recommendations on accelerating the deployment of the American ABM defenses and claim that in the early periods spending on it could be kept within 121 billion dollars.

It is symptomatic that even the authors of the report done with the Pentagon's money do not guarantee the Americans the 100 percent defense against retaliation. According to their clearly overoptimistic estimates, the planned ABM system will be unable to defend U.S. territory from 7 per cent of the enemy nuclear warheads.

The McDonnell Douglas vice-president and his colleagues refrain, for obvious reasons, from explaining to the American readers the effects of the infiltration of even one per cent of retaliation nuclear warheads, especially if they hit atomic reactors.

The new "Pentagon-McDonnell" report is addressed not only to the American opponents of the "Star Wars." One more target may be the Soviet Union. The American advocates of the arms race are hinting, as it were: look, it is not very costly but very efficient. Recently a zealous advocate of the cold war and even shooting war, Edward Teller, the "father" of the American hydrogen bomb, said, clearly hinting at the economic consequences of the ABM arms race, that if the USSR followed the U.S. example and began to develop its own extensive ABM defenses, SDI would be justified.

The hopes to exhaust the Soviet Union in an arms race, including a race in ABM weapons, are built on sand. As the Soviet leaders have stated on more than one occasion, the Soviet reply to the development of vast ABM defenses by the U.S. will be efficient and less costly and will take less time. The Washington strategists are mistaken in believing that the Soviet Union will follow the Pentagon's scenario to guarantee its security.

On the other hand, billions upon billions of dollars set aside already now to develop an ABM umbrella can really aggravate both economic and security problems for the U.S.

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CSO: 5200/1204

CANADIAN COMMENTATOR ON SOVIET SPACE DEFENSE ACTIVITY

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 6 Dec 86 p B15

[Article by George Grande]

[Text]

To listen to the Soviets constantly blasting Star Wars, one would think they themselves weren't at all interested in pursuing the same "evil" aims.

Not so at all.

Not much is written about Soviet space defence research.

A recent U.S. summary of Soviet activities — some going on since the late 1950s — makes essential reading for those who want to have a balanced view of the state of the art.

Recent advances in the so-called Soviet Strategic Defence Program (SSDP) — let's call it Red Wars — include upgrading the ABM system around Moscow and building the Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile detection and tracking radar, an apparent violation of the ABM treaty.

In addition, there is extensive Soviet research being carried out into advanced technologies for ABM defence including lasers, particle beam weapons and kinetic energy ones.

The Soviets operate the world's only anti-satellite (ASAT) system.

They are modernizing their air defence forces and improving passive defence as well.

The latest twist in the Soviet anti-Star Wars battle features Europe.

The little-known European Defence Initiative was recently singled out by the Warsaw Pact for special attention.

All states included in projects having to do with the EDI were advised to stop doing so and concentrate instead on the peaceful uses of outer space.

General Bernard Rogers recently explained the need for an anti-tactical ballistic missile defence for Western Europe.

NATO's Supreme Allied Commander explained that while NATO was countering the Soviet SS-20 threat by putting cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe, the Soviets did not stand idly by.

They forward-deployed SS-21s and 22s in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

And "soon we expect the forward deployment of SS-23s."

All three systems have a conventional, a chemical and a nuclear warhead. Their accuracy will be extremely good by 1990.

Said Rogers: "Having taken account of the SS-20s, now we have the SS-21s, 22s and 23s that can or will be able to strike our nuclear assets with conventional warheads with great accuracy, strike our command control facilities, our ports, our airfields."

"We would obviously lose some of our conventional capability from the attack of those conventional missiles, which then means that we have to resort to escalation with nuclear weapons sooner than we otherwise would."

"But at that vital moment, we would look around and some of

our nuclear assets would not still be there because they were struck by conventional warheads on Soviet surface-to-surface missiles."

The question is, should we do something about those 21s, 22s and 23s?

West German defence minister Manfred Woerner raised the subject with his NATO colleagues last May.

They then agreed to look at the threat and see whether there was a need to have a defence against air-breathing aircraft and cruise missiles as well as theatre ballistic missiles.

Rogers revealed that the U.S. SDI organization had given some funds to European countries "to develop an architecture for an anti-tactical ballistic missile system for Western Europe."

This week U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger announced in Brussels that SDI contracts had been awarded to seven European consortia to study ways to defend Europe against that very same threat.

Among others, French, German and Italian companies are involved.

This would be a kind of European Star Wars because space would be one element in which techniques and systems would be researched to develop intercept capabilities at the boost phase, the mid-course and the terminal one — just like the real thing.

If Moscow doesn't like this and considers Europeans immoral for entertaining such ideas, it should withdraw all its SS-20s, 21s, 22s and 23s — the threat that induced Woerner to raise the subject in the first place.

The answer to strategic defence is not to try to make it a moral issue, or to deceive others about research in the field.

It is for the Russians to engage in an open dialogue with the U.S., as originally proposed by President Reagan, about how strategic defence can be melded with strategic offence co-operatively so that stability is maintained throughout the process.

And so that the threat to each is minimized as mutual trust and confidence become a necessary habit.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR ROCKET FORCES CHIEF ON ICBM'S, TESTING, SDI

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 51, 26 Dec 86 pp 12-14

[Article by General of the Army Yuri Maximov, commander of the Strategic Missile Forces and deputy defence minister of the USSR]

[Text]

The morning the commander of the missile forces received our correspondent began as usual with a situation report by the officer in command of the combat duty team. General Maximov's reply was brief: "Report accepted. Carry on."

That day the general had returned from an inspection of troops during which he checked their combat readiness and training. His schedule for the day included three conferences with senior officers of the missile command to analyze the results of his inspection. The day-to-day duties of all soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals are subordinate to one aim: to keep the huge striking power of nuclear arms in a state of high combat readiness, ensuring accurate blows at targets of a potential enemy in any situation. The men of the rocket forces are on round-the-clock combat alert and for this reason alone resemble the frontier guards who protect our borders. It is only that in the missile forces the strain and responsibility are still greater.

A strategic missile is a sophisticated flying vehicle both with regard to design and functioning in flight. Its range in practical terms is unlimited and its combat use does not depend on weather conditions or the time of day or season of the year. The more sophisticated the strategic system, the higher the combat training of the crews and the more reliable their performance of their task.

Every strategic missile has a "brain"—an instrument controlling its movement

in the three planes of its flight trajectory: up and down—pitch, right and left—yaw, and roll. To ensure the missile's accurate flight, the crew perform scheduled maintenance, constantly checking the reliability of its various units and systems, and the systems and devices of the launch complex. In this respect their work resembles that of ground crews at airfields without which not a single combat plane could take off. The daily routine of the missile forces includes excellent maintenance of the ground equipment which ensures high homing accuracy, and exemplary execution of practice launchings which put all systems, services and crews to the test.

The Headquarters of the Strategic Missile Forces can be called the "heart" of these troops. So my first question to the commander was:

What worries you?

I am worried by the persistent desire of the United States to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union and secure the possibility of delivering a first nuclear strike at our country with impunity.

In these conditions the preservation of strategic nuclear parity acquires special importance. And we missilemen regard this as one of our paramount tasks. It is our duty to prevent the other side from acquiring superiority over us in technology, combat readiness and the training of personnel. We are working on this.

What are the guarantees of strategic systems' reliability?

First of all, their high combat preparedness and ability to perform their tasks in any conditions, that is, to repel the aggressor, no matter what kind of strategic armaments he uses, space ones included.

Our country stands for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and for reducing military potential to reasonable limits. But the character and level of this ceiling continue to be restricted by the attitudes and actions of the United States and its partners in NATO. As was said at the 27th CPSU Congress, under these conditions "the Soviet Union lays no claim to greater security than that enjoyed by others but it will not settle for less."

What is the role of serviceman in handling modern automated control systems?

The more sophisticated the arms, the greater the automation of control processes and the more significant the role of the human factor. And here the question is not only one of raising the level of knowledge and skills of military experts.

Automated systems have greatly accelerated the process of controlling weapons, and have at the same time made them collective weapons in the highest degree, when the successful fulfillment of the combat task depends on the sense of responsibility of every serviceman. So everything depends first of all on people, on crews.

Everything has been switched to electronics. So what are the functions of the Commander?

Missiles are controlled by men. Electronic devices are part of the technical means employed by the troops. This equipment can quickly collect, analyze and generalize information in any given situation and make correct decisions.

But electronics cannot take into account the full diversity of problems to be solved, especially in what concerns the training and education of the men, their mastering of new and complex types of equipment, and using and servicing it, and, most important, electronics cannot adopt a correct and responsible decision depending on the situation. So the use of electronics does not minimize the role of the men or that of the Commander.

The Strategic Missile Forces are entering the 27th year of their existence. Will you please comment on their development.

The creation of the Strategic Missile Forces was a forced necessity and served one purpose—to prevent a third world war.

In the past 26 years the rocket forces have passed the initial stage of their development and become a secure shield for our Motherland. They are armed with highly accurate intercontinental missiles, medium-range missiles, fail-safe launching pads, and a reliable automated system of control and communication. The standard of training of personnel has risen greatly over these years.

What is your perception of strategic balance? Is it sufficient at present for our country's reliable security?

As we see it, the strategic balance means a rough parity of strategic arms, both in terms of numbers and combat might, between the U.S.S.R. and the United States necessary for maintaining mutual security.

An equal reduction of Soviet and American strategic arms will not upset the balance, and we stand for this, on condition, of course, that the American side does not press for advantages and military superiority for itself.

What are the chief requirements put to modern ICBMs?

High reliability and invulnerability at all stages of preparation, launch and flight as prerequisites for the performance by the missile forces of their combat task. At present our ICBMs have an adequate standard of reliability and all-round invulnerability. And this is our constant concern, with due account taken of changes in the potential of the probable enemy.

How is the invulnerability of our ICBMs maintained?

By a set of organizational and technical measures intended to ensure their high combat readiness and their protection on earth and in flight.

Will not the vulnerability of our ICBMs increase with the development of the American "star wars" program?

Yes, it will increase if we do not take countermeasures. Although intended as an anti-missile defence system, SDI can also comprise strike space weapons targeted on our strategic installations, including ICBMs, and capable of destroying them within

minutes. In effect, this will be a new component of U.S. strategic offensive forward-based arms deployed in outer space over the Soviet Union's territory.

Our reply to the "star wars" programme can be incomparably simpler and cheaper. At his press conference in Reykjavik, Mikhail Gorbachev said: "There will be an answer to SDI. An asymmetrical one, but there will be one. Moreover, we will not have to sacrifice much."

There exist effective ways of preserving the invulnerability of our ICBMs in the event of the implementation of SDI as well.

In the opinion of Soviet scientists, for instance, an effective counter-measure is offered by such a tactic as launching ICBMs intended to "exhaust" the space-based ABM defence, through its early alerting by means of a specially devised return strike routine. These can be combined launches of ICBMs and dummy missiles, launches of ICBMs with a wide range of trajectories, etc. All this leads to the squandering of energy resources of orbital ABM echelons, to the discharging of x-ray lasers and electromagnetic guns, and other premature losses in the firepower of the ABM system.

In addition to this, an increase in the number of ICBMs will create several additional difficulties for the enemy's detection systems and cause a drastic decline in the efficiency of the interception and targeting systems. A similar result will also be achieved by using more warheads per missile.

What reliability do nuclear warheads have without nuclear tests?

Our 30-year record of developing and testing nuclear warheads corroborates their high reliability.

There is no denying that our unilateral moratorium makes perfecting armaments rather difficult but we have to accept this for the sake of the common goal—ending the arms race and preserving peace on Earth.

The United States needs nuclear tests to create fundamentally new, more destructive munitions as well as nuclear-pumped laser weapons. And this poses a new danger to peace.

Will not the survivability of our early warning system decline if the United States starts deploying its ASAT system?

The ASAT system is intended to intercept artificial earth satellites on high orbits and does not extend to our early warning spacecraft. Besides, we have other warning systems.

What do you mean by sufficiency of strategic forces?

The sufficiency of strategic forces stems from a state's military doctrine. For our country it is determined by the equal security of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

The main objectives of the strategy of "direct confrontation" between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., announced by the head of the Pentagon in June 1981, are as follows: to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, and ensure the readiness of the United States to wage war to force the U.S.S.R. into immediately stopping military operations on U.S. terms.

It is also noted that, by opening "new fields of military rivalry," the United States can change the alignment of forces in its favour.

Is a crippling nuclear strike possible in present conditions of strategic parity?

The United States wants to achieve this by deploying MX ICBMs, stationing Pershing-2 medium-range missiles in Western Europe, equipping submarines with Trident-2 ballistic missiles and also by developing SDI components with their subsequent deployment in outer space. But in existing conditions of strategic parity a crippling strike is impossible. All attempts to achieve unilateral advantages can always, and will be parried by the opposite side, and not necessarily by simply building up weapon systems. The level of economic development attained by the U.S.S.R. allows for this.

Do you subscribe to the concept of offensive and defensive nuclear forces? I subscribe to the concept, if it can be so called, of ensuring our country's security regardless of the development of the military-political situation in the world. Soviet military doctrine is of a purely defensive nature and is designed to protect the country from attack, from aggression.

As for the American concept of offensive and defensive nuclear forces, this classification, to my mind, is purely conventional and serves to justify the arms race and the pursuit of military superiority.

When questions of limiting and reducing nuclear stockpiles are being tackled the division of these arms into offensive and defensive ones does not fit in with the concept of equal security.

What, in your opinion, makes SDI illusory?

The fallacy of SDI is that it is impossible to create a failproof system of

repulsing a return strike by our strategic forces. On the other hand, we have no doubts as to SDF's offensive capabilities.

Have you seen a nuclear explosion? What was your impression? What do you think about the future of mankind in the nuclear-space age?

As a World War II veteran, I saw conventional explosions on battlefields, in the towns and villages of our country, and this is sufficient for me to imagine all the horrors and losses brought by nuclear war. The aftermaths of the atomic bombings of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the Americans without any necessity whatsoever make every decent person shudder even now, more than forty years later.

If unleashed, nuclear war will affect everyone, no matter where it begins. And today, as never before, we link mankind's future with the struggle for peace.

Tension between the nuclear powers is growing and the arms race is not slowing down. Is there a way out of this situation?

There is only one way out—to sit down at the negotiating table and at the same time not to press for unilateral superiority. This is a logical and understandable path along which to advance to the solution of the crucial problems on which the very survival of mankind depends. The package of Soviet proposals submitted in Reykjavik makes this a realistic proposition.

What, in your view, is the role of the troops under your command in averting nuclear war?

The Strategic Missile Forces are called the nuclear-missile shield of our Motherland. Their might, their high degree of readiness to repulse at any moment an aggressor's attack are an important factor in restraining the militaristic ambitions of imperialism and averting nuclear war.

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CSO: 5200/1206

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS MILITARY WRITER REVIEWS POST-REYKJAVIK SCENE

LD291340 Moscow TASS in English 1340 GMT 29 Dec 86

["To Preserve What Has Been Achieved in Reykjavik" — TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow December 29 TASS — TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachov comments:

Consistency and continuity typical of the Soviet Union's course on problems of war and peace presuppose rather than exclude the Soviet side's willingness to look for mutually acceptable decisions, compromises which would not upset the established parity of the military-strategic forces, would diffuse the apprehensions of either side, remove the existing threats to peace and, certainly, would not create new ones. The Soviet package of accords put forward during the summit meeting in Reykjavik was based on the provisions of the Soviet programme for ridding mankind of nuclear weapons by the end of the current century, announced on January 15, 1986. The Soviet side received with satisfaction the U.S. President's readiness to phase out all nuclear explosive devices, among them bombs, battlefield systems and cruise missiles, as early as the end of the ten-year period. However, right after his return to Washington from Reykjavik the White House announced that what it meant as all nuclear devices were only ballistic missiles. Later Washington spelled out that the abolition of all ballistic missiles within the next ten years was not the U.S. objective.

During the discussions on medium-range missiles held in Reykjavik the Soviet side made substantial concessions to the United States by agreeing in part to putting aside the nuclear armaments of the U.S. allies, even though Britain and France keep building up their nuclear arsenals and all their military activities are coordinated within the NATO framework. The USSR met the United States halfway also on medium-range missiles in Asia when it stated that in phasing out U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, only 100 warheads will be left on similar missiles in the USSR and 100 warheads on delivery systems of this class in U.S. territory. The USSR's proposals on medium-range missiles made in Reykjavik were accepted by the U.S. side. Later, however, the United States actually revised these understandings too, alleging that the NATO European countries do not want any longer the "zero option" or the "dual-track" decision on medium-range missiles, that only the current high level of missile confrontation on the continent suits it.

The sole problem of disarmament discussed in Reykjavik on which the U.S. stance remains invariable is the issue of space militarization. In Reykjavik the Soviet side did not insist on the halt by the United States of all research conducted under the "Star Wars" programme. The USSR delegation declared for starting already in the near future top-level talks with an eye of specifying what work on anti-missile defence is allowed by the treaty and what is banned by it. Despite the USSR's readiness to look for

mutually acceptable solutions as regards anti-missile defence, the United States sought in Iceland to secure cost what it may from the USSR a consent to the abrogation of the ABM Treaty after a ten-year period during which the Pentagon would be preparing a system of strike weapons for deployment in space. Certainly, the Soviet side could not agree to this. For it is utterly senseless to reduce nuclear armaments on the relatively limited space of the earth's surface while opening virtually boundless expanses of outer space for the arms race. If the U.S. side desires not in word but in deed to make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, it should abandon the attempts to revise the positive arrangements of Reykjavik and display the readiness to carry on work on disarmament from the level reached at the last summit meeting.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: 'TOP PRIORITY' ON SALT II, SDI

LD141549 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 13 Dec 86

["Top Priority" program presented by Vladimir Posner with Dr Radomir Bogdanov and Dr Sergey Plekhanov, not further identified]

[Excerpts] [Posner] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. This is Vladimir Posner presenting "Top Priority." With me on the panel, Drs Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov. The subject today clearly will be one that is very much in the news. We have already spoken about it: the American decision to scrap SALT II, actually a decision that was taken back in May but that was implemented just recently and which met with great concern all over the world, including the American allies. Of course, the Soviet Union feels very strongly about this, and there was a statement, an official statement on the subject made by the Soviet Government. Perhaps we should, at least in brief, inform our listeners as to what major points that statement underlined, because I'm not all that sure that this was brought to them by their own media. Who would like to start? Please, Dr Plekhanov.

[Plekhanov] In the past, bringing the United States into compliance with the treaty, in connection with the deployment of new strategic systems, meant scrapping some of the old systems, so the United States, I assume, can still do that.

[Posner] Yes, of course it can, but there is a rationale to the United States' decision. Of course, they say that we've been violating the treaty. Let's not even go into that. Clearly we have our complaints and grievances that we spoke of last time we discussed this subject, and the whole idea of advancing, or shall we say pointing your finger at the other side so as to make it possible for you to break out of something, is as old as the world. However, there is a kind of logic to this American decision to break out of SALT II, is there not, Dr Bogdanov?

[Bogdanov] Yes, I agree with you, Vladimir. There is a very, you know constant logic in that decision. But let me be quite frank with our American listeners. When we have discussed that problem last time some things were not clear to me, you know.

[Posner] For instance?

[Bogdanov] For instance, it was not clear to me why this administration took such a serious decision at that particular time, you know. Now I believe we have all the ground to clarify two points to my very major point explaining the rationale, what you call the rationale of that decision, the rationale of that decision, you know. [as received]

As you are aware that this administration got into very serious trouble with the so-called Irangate, and of course in the White House people feel a little bit insecure and they may be afraid, or they are suspicious that the other side, the Soviet Union, may believe that they are so weak now that they're not able to, you know, to take serious action. Just to prove that they're not as weak as one can imagine, they have taken that very dangerous and very irrational decision at this moment.

But there is another point, which is to my mind more serious than the first one, which came to my mind after some major developments in USA. You know, in the statement of the Soviet Government it is very clearly said that it's a provocation, and that I would call our listeners' attention to. That's really a provocation which has a lot behind it. In that situation when this administration really is facing a lot of trouble, and I'm afraid that nobody at the level of the White House and down do not know what will happen to them tomorrow, you know. They're taking desperate actions to divert attention from that, you know, scandal to something else. That's why they take this decision expecting that the Soviet Union will react in such a harsh way, with such, you know, drastic actions, that they will be able to say: Americans, there is another Soviet danger, there is growing Soviet aggressiveness; forget about law-breaking in this country. There is more dangerous, you know, enemy than that. Unite around the White House. That, if you can call it irrational, it's irrational.

[Posner] You use the word provocation. If we look back over the very recent past, we see the Soviet Union not only being very restrained but in taking concrete steps that show its tremendous interest in lessening tension, in moving away from confrontation, towards arms control and towards arms reduction.

You take the SALT II affair now, again you use the word provocation. One would think that that would indeed be the aim to force the Soviets to react, to slam the door and get up and walk away and all the rest of it. Do you see this as a calculated policy, as something that is done as a matter of a strategic approach to the world, to world affairs?

[Plekhanov] Yeah, I think that reflects several underlying premises of this administration's policy. I don't think that they believe that restraint in armaments and arms control, not to mention arms reduction, is in the interests of the United States. They very clearly are interested in continuing and stepping up the arms race. But, you know, it takes two to have an arms race, and so they really need Soviet cooperation in that sense. By trying to compel the Soviet Union to forget about those restraints, to forget about those unilateral steps designed to stop the arms race, the United States is really provoking another round of the arms race. The same goes, too, for the, for the ABM Treaty which the United States feels constrains the "Star Wars" program.

[Bogdanov] Sergey, but I'm afraid it's not the whole story. There is another point of mine, I would call it a third point explaining the decision of that administration. They have only 2 years to go, some 2 years and some months to go, and they now, of course, think in long-term policy and they are creating such a situation that the next administration, whoever comes to the White House, will inherit from them just a ruined, you know, structure of arms control. If you like, no more structure of arms control. So they force the next administration just to go along their own way, means no arms deals with the Soviet Union, no arms control deals with the Soviet Union, and I believe that is the strategic, you know, design which is behind that decision. You may not agree with me, but that's my very strong feeling.

[Posner] What I'd like to ask both of you, whoever prefers to answer: How do you explain this, I would have to call it, extreme kind of policy on the part of the United States after Reykjavik? What I mean by that is that at Reykjavik the tone seemed to be that although we are disappointed, and I say we--both sides--we did manage to reach a major agreement in certain areas, even if we could not agree on SDI. Then the Americans went home. They began by talking about the success of Reykjavik, and in the following short period of time it's turned completely around. Everyone's forgotten about Reykjavik virtually, and the whole idea of what was spoken about at Reykjavik has been turned inside out, or upside down. Now there's the SALT decision. Why this sudden swerving away? Do you think it had to do again with Irangate, or something else?

[Bogdanov] I believe that's a very good question because you, you formulated it in such a way that everybody at our end and at the American end, of course they have this question and they have to answer it even for ourselves, you know. [sentence as heard] My view is that the president was genuinely believing that at the final end it would be very useful if the world will get rid of the nuclear arms, and he came to that conclusion in very concrete terms at Reykjavik because they have solved two very major problems of arms reduction.

[Posner] They could have solved....

[Bogdanov, interrupting] They could have solved, but actually they agreed. Then my feeling is that his crowd he brought to Reykjavik--of course, that's my guess, that's my speculation--they were so much scared by his [as heard] own president's behavior that they pressed on him (?a deliberate) number of arguments including one that when you come back home what you will face over there? How people will, you know, take your decision, should we not think about that, Mr President? I (?was) not present, of course, but that, but that's my guess.

Then I believe that the president's political instincts overweighed his, you know, desire to deal with the nuclear arms and (?he) came to, this very shrewd American politician. He came to the conclusion that it would be better, you know, to scrap what they have agreed upon with the secretary general, because he was not sure how back home people will react to his decision. And when he came back home, you know, people around him and what we call his political base were really revolting against dealing, getting rid of nuclear arms and the president felt, to my mind, very insecure. That's

why they have reversed that decision, you know, and with every day passing by it becomes more and more clear that the American side—if you like, American political establishment—was not psychologically ready for that kind of breakthrough, for that kind of new political thinking. That's why the secretary general said several times: Let America think, let America take a decision, we are not pressing you. You have on the table our proposals, very revolutionary, very radical proposals.

Now, if you like, Vladimir, I understand our American counterparts. For this last 40 years they were used to living with that, not only live but almost every second presidency they were inventing a new strategy to employment, how to employ nuclear arms. They were living on that, I mean literally speaking, making handsome money, if you like. Then, then all of a sudden they felt that they might be deprived of this, and they might be deprived of their income. That's my ver...[Bogdanov seems to start to say "very"] maybe very simple explanation.

[Posner interrupting] Well, I think it's a interesting one.

[Bogdanov] But that's my feeling, you know.

[Posner] Well let me, let me ask you the following question. At this point we see the entire structure of Soviet-American relations in the area of arms limitation, control, disarmament and whatnot is actually being destroyed. The ABM Treaty is on the verge of being destroyed, what with SDI. SDI, as we now know, is no longer a bargaining chip and probably never was, probably never would be. As far as we know today, SALT II is dead. The United States will not, it seems obvious, join the Soviet Union in a nuclear test ban. Where does that leave the Soviet Union?

[Plekhanov] Well, it's leading us all, I think, into a very, very dangerous world. A world of strategic chaos, of a very unpredictable future, of the two greatest nuclear powers going about their own ways without an ability and a mechanism to try and stabilize their relationship. I don't think that we have had such an unpredictable and non-negotiable situation ever since the sixties, so that makes the world very, very dangerous. And the Soviet Union does recognize, the Soviet Government does recognize the dangers which this world would be pregnant with, and so we will not give up. I mean you can exhibit unilateral restraint, you can take unilateral steps only so far. There comes a point where you will have to, no matter how much you may hate it, but you will have to take steps to improve your defenses, to prevent the other side from gaining an advantage, and this is what we are determined to do, to prevent the other side from getting military superiority over the Soviet Union.

[Posner] And on that note let me wish all of our listeners goodbye. I am going off on vacation. My two partners here have already had their annual vacation, I have not. So I'll be back only in a month, but "Top Priority" will go on, of course. So I'm saying goodbye but tune in next week.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CANADA: REAGAN COMMITMENT TO DISARMAMENT DEAL QUESTIONED

Vancouver THE SUN in English 19 Nov 86 p B5

[Article by Bruce Hutchison]

[Text]

This is the sixth of a series from Ottawa and Washington by the Sun's editor emeritus.

WASHINGTON

RONALD REAGAN'S ambitious strategic defence initiative is the main though not the only obstacle to any disarmament pact between the two superpowers.

But in the upper regions of the United States government and the Congress, the president alone, and a few of his courtiers, believe that science can devise a leak-proof shield against enemy missiles. With him this project, or fantasy, has become an obsession, his gift of permanent safety to the American people and the endangered human species.

Such faith is not echoed among the most ardent hawks of the Pentagon or the leaders of science. Recently some 4,000 scientists signed a document warning that space weaponry cannot work effectively, or, if by chance it did, then Soviet cruise missiles, planes, and submarines operating within the earth's atmosphere could carry nuclear warheads to any target.

Philip Anderson, winner of a Nobel prize in science, finds the president's dream of a safe world "absolutely chilling, since it means the administration has accepted the concept of a space-based war." Rebecca Blank, a distin-

guished economist at Princeton University, adds that the SDI venture, seriously pursued, will cost \$10 trillion to \$20 trillion over the next two decades.

If it is indeed unworkable, why should the Russian government be so frightened of it? Why does Mikhail Gorbachev keep reminding the world public that the antiballistic missile treaty of 1972 forbids the signatories to "develop, test, or deploy" space-based weapons?

Since Reagan has reinterpreted the treaty to give him a free hand for experiments outside the laboratory, Gorbachev's real dread is not that the SDI will work. He fears that in researching it the U.S. will discover some deadly new weapon outdating all others, or some industrial technology unknown to the backward communist economy of Russia. And while Reagan has promised to share any space secrets with all nations, Gorbachev is not impressed, since the president will retire in 1989 and the U.S. has refused "to share with us even equipment for dairy plants."

Three events have cut through the president's strategy.

After the Iceland summit, Gorbachev said Reagan had offered to eliminate all nuclear missiles, by joint agreement, over 10 years. Reagan said he had discussed only ballistic missiles that speed through space. When he would not abandon or modify his SDI, the summit collapsed, and with it the world's great but premature expectations.

Second, the American people elected a Democratic Congress almost certain to cut back research funds for the SDI and other defence projects.

Third, the fiasco of Reagan's hostage deal with Iran has gravely damaged his prestige at home and undermined his leadership abroad.

Something else, less understood in Canada, has diminished the president's international authority. His apparent willingness at Reykjavik to consider the abolition of all nuclear weapons not only appalled his friends in the Congress but frightened the governments of Britain and Western Europe nearly out of their wits.

What many Canadians have forgotten is that those governments asked for the installation of American missiles on their territory to deter a Russian attack. Not many Canadians realize now that the European peoples, devastated by the conventional weapons of two world wars, are horrified by the prospect of a third if Russia's huge ground forces march westward. The European governments insist, therefore, that the U.S. retain its deterrent, the nuclear umbrella, as the only reliable safeguard of peace.

Even in the preliminary euphoria at Reykjavik there was never any real chance of a nuclear-free world. Neither the U.S. nor Russia is ready for it, whatever they say at the perpetual Geneva bargaining table.

Until the giants learn to trust each other — a distant hope — the present generation must live with weapons of unimaginable destructive power. But it does not follow that the U.S. and Russia need to deploy enough of them to end civilization and even all human life several times over.

When fewer weapons would mean fewer risks of accident or miscalculation, the balance of terror can be maintained on a much smaller, cheaper, and less dangerous scale. A gradual reduction will be the realistic goal of disarmament negotiations in the visible future.

SDI research is scheduled to continue for at least a decade, long after Reagan's retirement. Meanwhile the U.S., obeying the treaty of 1972, may instal ground-based antimissile missiles, as Russia has done around Moscow.

The treaty allows each nation to protect no more than one site and the American government abandoned that opportunity as a waste of money. But if the treaty is violated, and the policy reversed to permit protection of several areas, Russia undoubtedly will build more missiles to make sure that some could reach their targets. The armament race will speed up instead of slowing down.

Despite frequent threats and counterthreats, the superpowers are aiming at the same political objective. Since neither can hope to win a decisive margin of military strength, both are trying to win the goodwill of mankind, and so far both have failed.

The U.S. receives little gratitude for protecting its allies, and occasionally scares them with its blunders. Russia is a superpower only because of its raw military might, not by the measurement of its politics, technology, economics, and individual freedom.

Behind these calculations and miscalculations stands the paramount fact that weapons, however dangerous and mad in purpose, are simply the overt expression of a struggle between two ideologies or views of human life. Since the struggle seems certain to last for a long time, Americans and foreigners ask the same question: Is Reagan prepared to make a disarmament deal on any negotiable terms? Or is he so instinctively dominated by his original view of Russia as the untrustworthy "evil empire" that no deal can be made?

For some two more years he will have the chance to answer a question momentous in mankind's experience. But his unknown successor's answer may be entirely different. □

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR & SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG SCHOLAR ANALYZES IMPLICATIONS OF REYKJAVIK FOR EUROPE

Frankfurter/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 9 Dec 86 pp 6-7

[Article by Dr. Karl Kaiser, Professor of Political Science at the University of Cologne and Director of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy: "Is a World Without Nuclear Weapons Possible? On the Discussion About the NATO Strategy after the Reykjavik Summit Meeting." The article is an abridged version of a lecture delivered by the author on the occasion of the 1986 Atlantic Award ceremony in Brussels. The first paragraph is a FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE introduction.]

[Text] Never before has a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting caused such a heated, confused and possibly grave discussion on future NATO strategy as did President Reagan's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Both statesmen talked about radical and comprehensive disarmament and arms control measures which are unparalleled in the postwar history of the East-West negotiations without, however, reaching agreement in any point. In public discussions and in those with the governments in the West since the summit meeting, the theoretical attempts at solutions of Reykjavik are, however, treated as if they were political reality. Depending on the point of view, they are presented either as an attack on the foundations of the postwar strategy of both pacts, as a devastating blow to the security of the West or as one of the most important steps towards disarmament and progress that leading statesmen have ever seriously discussed.

Various differences of opinion on the summit meeting are discernible, namely among alliance partners, above all between Europeans and Americans; in some NATO states between government and opposition; finally also within the governments which are torn between considering disarmament demands of the population and serious worry over the consequences of the Reykjavik proposals on their own security.

The fact that Washington as well as Moscow referred to the formulas found in Reykjavik as achievements that were to become the starting point of future negotiations stirred up the discussion even more. Nevertheless it must be evident that the West gets entangled in disputes on options that represent nothing more than theoretical possibilities. The first of the

lessons to be drawn therefrom: The necessary strategy debate must not turn into the discussion on theoretical solutions which cannot be achieved in the real world. Rather it ought to determine the framework for possible developments which is defined by the existing interests of the West, the available means and the Soviet attitude that is to be expected. Because of the East-West rivalry and of the political conditions in Western democracies, the discussion on strategy questions, which comprises the military aspects as well as those of arms control, bears the features of a competition and increasingly addresses itself to the public. Lately the negotiating table has been moved from the backrooms to the limelight.

Reykjavik has dramatically intensified the growing asymmetry of the foundations of arms control, which has resulted from the increasingly public character of the East-West negotiations, to the disadvantage of the West. The Soviet Union submitted in Reykjavik broad ideas in principle as a result of which it could cause the opposite side, which is exposed to the pressure of the public to achieve progress in arms control, to make concrete concessions. Under the conditions of Western democracy such promises are effective and binding while the Soviet concessions remain subject to the negotiating process in that the Soviet negotiators as they wish can set up all possible obstacles to block progress without being pressed by parliament and public to fulfill earlier promises. Therefore it was easy to blame Reagan's refusal to give in to the Soviet demands as regards the SDI instead of the question of effective verification as an indispensable prerequisite of disarmament for the failure of the summit meeting. It is true the Soviet Union expressed its agreement in principle with verification measures but with great probability it would have prevented progress in the negotiations as it did in the forces reduction talks in Vienna or on chemical weapons in Geneva. The true target of the Soviet public relations strategy is not the United States. Actually the U.S. president at home found support of the majority for his conduct in Reykjavik. In reality the Soviet strategy is oriented on Western Europe where skepticism as regards SDI is widespread among critics of nuclear deterrence as well as among advocates of "flexible response." It is not without irony that therefore the Soviet Union could take advantage of the Reykjavik summit meeting to play West European worries off against the United States in view of the "flexible response."

The problems that the West actually faces are not necessarily those which are stressed in public discussion and propaganda. Therefore one should ask oneself the following questions: First of all, what fundamental proposals in the Reykjavik talks and in the subsequent discussion can be put on record? Secondly, wherein do the obstacles and the difficulties lie with respect to their implementation? As a result, what are the consequences for the NATO strategy?

President Reagan has made it his goal to free the world from nuclear weapons. He expressed this for the first time when he announced his SDI plan in March 1983. Many European politicians—at that time in the middle

of the controversies on the occasion of the dual-track decision and confronted with an antinuclear protest movement—reacted embarrassed and assumed that Reagan's rejection of nuclear weapons can be treated like the demand for abolition of sin. In Reykjavik Reagan not only avowed that aim once again (an aim that Gorbachev, too, had mentioned in his speeches in early 1986) but he went so far as to take into consideration the complete abolition of all nuclear longer-range intermediate range weapons and of all ballistic missiles within ten years. He made it clear that his final goal is the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Therefore Reykjavik has revived anew the discussion on a world without nuclear deterrence.

Is a world without nuclear weapons possible? The hope is as old as the knowledge of the horrible, destructive effect of these weapons. More than 40 years after the first nuclear explosion a complex structure consisting of weapons stockpiles, doctrines, political structures and alliance commitments has developed. This nuclear deterrence has become an essential structural element of the postwar world. The very fact that the extraordinary destructive power of these weapons has made their employment nearly unthinkable and has raised the costs of a war to such an extent that its function as an instrument of policy appears in a completely different light. In the prenuclear age aggression could lead to victory and defense could actually stop an attack. In the nuclear age the price of aggression has become unacceptably high and thereon rests the security of a state. It also continues to be true that East and West largely owe the four decades of peace since World War II to the caution determined by the nuclear factor. Conventional wars are carried on—and therefore continue to be conducted outside the system of nuclear deterrence—to conquer territory, to establish power, and to strengthen security. Under nuclear conditions war cannot under any circumstances strengthen security and thus one of the principal motivations of warfare now identifiable in earlier periods and in the Third World has been eliminated. The most extensive conflict in the history of mankind, the East-West conflict, with great probability would result in the use of force if nuclear deterrence were dropped. Nuclear deterrence could be relinquished only if the East-West conflict disappeared—and very little speaks for that in the foreseeable future.

Complete abolition of all nuclear weapons requires an inspection which, in view of the fundamentally different political systems of rule, cannot be attained. On the road to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the possession of a few systems would provide disproportionate power to the state that succeeds in keeping them. The effectiveness of verification basically assumes elimination of an existing inequality: here the self-control of democratic systems, there the opportunity for cheating and misleading in undemocratic systems. Complete and effectively controlled abolition of nuclear weapons in final analysis is imaginable only in a world in which the disarming parties are open and pluralistic democracies.

It is true, Gorbachev in his 1986 speeches and also in Reykjavik promised a change in principle, but the Soviet Union thus far has not taken any significant steps in the direction of the necessary kind of effective verification. Even though the general secretary in his speeches had offered on-the-spot inspections, the Soviet negotiators in the negotiations on reduction of forces in Vienna (MBFR) stubbornly refused to give even an inch. In the negotiations on chemical weapons the Soviet Union has not gone beyond inspection of the destruction of old stockpiles, which is inadequate in any case. Even the small concessions made by Moscow at the conference in Stockholm with regard to confidence-building measures constituted only a fraction of what is necessary when the purpose is to reliably verify real disarmament by inspection and verification measures that involve comprehensive and unavoidable interference.

The prerequisites for the creation of a nuclear-free world today exist as little as the prerequisites for general and comprehensive disarmament. This can be rightly deplored but politicians who profess pursuing of goals which in reality cannot be attained create expectations that are necessarily disappointed and they divert political energies from those limited and practical arms control measures for which there is a chance for success. Nuclear disarmament is a requirement but only in a framework for which the conditions can be created. There is a great scope for progress: the nuclear arsenals can be stabilized by reducing them in mutual agreement; crisis management can be improved and the conflict underlying the possible use of weapons can be eased by political efforts.

The fundamental measures discussed in Reykjavik on nuclear disarmament have revived the discussion on the strengthening of the conventional component of the NATO potential up to the point that wars are to be prevented above all with conventional means. Any fundamental movement from the present conventional-nuclear mixed potential to a primarily conventional potential would create a situation in which the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact would be structurally stronger. Many have forgotten that the long-range NATO conventional armed forces goals as formulated in Lisbon in the fifties have not become reality above all because the Western democracies were not willing and able to bear the social and economic costs of catching up with the Warsaw Pact as regards conventional armed forces. When NATO in the sixties made "flexible response" its strategy, the alliance did not achieve the measure of flexibility of the conventional capabilities which was then demanded because the democratically elected politicians considered themselves unable to do so.

Any thought of radically reducing the present role of nuclear weapons within the framework of "flexible response" by strengthening conventional weapons overlooks the fact that such an option may possibly not be available at all. Each of the four states that provide most of the conventional defense forces in the center of Europe is faced with considerable problems. In view of the demographic decline, the FRG will have to utilize all its available means to maintain the present strength

while simultaneously accomplishing a costly modernization of the equipment. The United Kingdom finds it difficult in view of the present budgetary limitations to maintain a defense force on a modern level. France has given priority to the further modernization of its nuclear Force de frappe—at the expense of an energetic conventional modernization. The United States is not only under pressure to cut its budget deficit, which rules out an expanded conventional involvement in Europe; the Congress could also reduce the U.S. presence in Europe to force the Europeans to become more involved.

At a time when the discussion is dominated by the term "disarmament," to expect European politicians to burden their voters with an increased defense budget would mean to conjure up a miracle as a condition for an improved NATO defense. There is also no simple way out as some would like to make us believe: So-called "alternative conventional strategies" (such as "defense in depth" or a militia system) are perhaps cheaper but they lead to a fundamental lowering of the threshold which an aggressor has to overcome and could make Germany the theater of war—a completely unacceptable idea. A purely conventional defense—and even one that comes close to it that would maintain only a small nuclear element—presumably would increase the probability of a war in Europe. How is it possible to believe that in a situation of obvious Warsaw Pact superiority and of limited risk for the Soviet Union that West Berlin would remain a free city, that other limited conventional military conflicts could be avoided? Even "strategies of the middle course" between a nuclear and a conventional defense, such as, e.g., the older, now revived policy of renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons, would presumably increase the probability of a war, since these strategies would establish guaranteed zones of conventional warfare and thus would reduce the risk for an aggressor.

Some believe that they have found a simple way out of the dilemma caused by the present Warsaw Pact conventional superiority and demand that this superiority be eliminated by arms control negotiations. But why should the Soviet Union give up what is rightly regarded by the West as a significant advantage and what moreover—even more decisive—the Soviet Union denies to possess? In 13 years of MBFR negotiations the West has not succeeded in wresting any admission of its conventional superiority from the Soviet Union. Therefore the chance to achieve a balance of the options by means of Soviet concessions is slight. Nonetheless the hope persists that the new Soviet leadership, because of its efforts for economic reforms, could be induced to reduce its costly conventional armament. That could also open up the possibility for the West to reduce its conventional armed forces.

From the above observations it can be said that a defense that replaces the nuclear element of war prevention by conventional means creates more problems than it solves. If strategies are applied that place the emphasis on the conventional component but retain a nuclear dimension,

then the picture becomes somewhat more complex. But it applies even in this respect that the prospects are poor for a shift from the nuclear to the conventional defense in view of the developments in most West European countries and in the United States as well as the experience from the negotiations with the Soviet Union to date. Even though the alliance has every reason to reduce its present dependence on a relatively early use of nuclear weapons by an expansion of its conventional strength, but in reality the existing trends all in all could lead to an even stronger reliance on nuclear weapons.

Of the various ideas discussed in Reykjavik, the proposed agreement regarding the longer-range intermediate range nuclear weapons (LRINF), which provides for their complete elimination in Europe, whereby merely 100 warheads each remain in the United States and in Asia, respectively, has undoubtedly caused the strongest controversies in the alliance, especially in Europe. The expectations prior to the meeting were great and were nourished by Soviet declarations, especially by Gorbachev's earlier readiness to decouple such an agreement from the SDI question. The failure because of the unexpected recoupling of an INF agreement with the SDI for different and contradictory reasons has led to continuous quarrels.

Most of those who want such an agreement criticize President Reagan for not giving in to the Soviet demands as regards to SDI; only a few criticize Gorbachev for having clearly raised his demands. Others find fault with the acceptance of a complete zero solution in Europe by Washington after a prior consensus had been reached in the alliance to leave some LRINF systems in Europe. Most worries are caused by the effects of such a zero solution in Europe on the "flexible response"—above all if the imbalances with respect to intermediate range nuclear weapons of shorter range and the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact are taken into consideration.

The critics of Reagan's proposal of a zero solution in Europe should remember that it was the European alliance partners themselves who had drafted and supported such an approach. If one looks for those responsible for the failure, moreover the question must be asked why Gorbachev recoupled an INF agreement with SDI and why he linked this with the demand for a change in the ABM treaty. Could this be an indication that he and Soviet military were not really serious with their offer?

Removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons systems with a range of over 1500 km would eliminate all weapons that can reach Soviet territory. In the past this very point had produced one of the most serious political crises for NATO and a number of West European states on the occasion of the dual-track decision. At that time the principle was involved that an aggressor would not be deterred by risks for his allies but only by risks for his own country. Complete removal of "Pershing II" and cruise missiles would considerably influence the Soviet risk calculation without reducing in

any form the possible damage to Western Europe: the remaining enormous potential of shorter range intermediate-range nuclear weapons should be borne in mind. Moreover, some of the SS 20 stationed in Central Asia can reach parts of Western Europe. (There is perhaps one new factor in this respect: After the Chernobyl disaster, in which only a fraction of the radiation escaped which would result from a nuclear weapons explosion on the earth surface, it might have become considerably clearer to the Soviet Union that even a single nuclear weapons explosion on the territory of its allies west of the borders would cause extreme damages to large parts of Western Russia.

A zero solution with regard to the LRINF moreover would leave untouched the overwhelming superiority of nearly 1400 Soviet SRINF systems in comparison to 170 Western ones. These remaining Soviet systems could practically cover all targets that can now be covered by the SS 20. This asymmetry threatens to undermine the effectiveness of the "flexible response," since such a superiority deprives NATO of the first use option. The agreement on negotiations concerning the remaining intermediate range nuclear weapons was discussed in Reykjavik as well as a Western "right to catch up" with the East's superior potential. But such a right is pure theory. Probably no Western government would dare repeat the controversy that occurred in the case of the first rearmament.

Even in 1981 at the time of the invention of the zero solution security reservations were dispelled by the political argument that the abolition of a dangerous weapon such as the SS 20 would represent a great gain for the West. The zero solution for the first time would have entailed the scrapping of a modern weapons system within the framework of the disarmament negotiations and therefore constitutes an important step. However, in the meantime a new gray zone of Soviet weapons has developed which, in conjunction with the planned elimination of a potential threat to Soviet territory by the West, would undermine the "flexible response" and weaken its deterrent value. Therefore it was a mistake to set as a precondition for a zero solution with respect to LRINF merely the obligation to conduct negotiations on the other nuclear weapons systems and a purely theoretical "right to catch up." To maintain the deterrent value of the "flexible response" it would have been more sensible to establish a firm coupling between reductions in the LRINF and the reduction of the imbalances in the other nuclear weapons systems—a result that can best be achieved by a reduction of the various categories of weapons in several coupled phases.

Complete abolition of the ballistic nuclear missiles by the two superpowers as it was introduced into the discussion by their leading politicians in Reykjavik would, if it could be implemented, completely change the character of nuclear deterrence and markedly raise its stability. In a world free of ballistic missiles the incentive for a preventive first strike would be absent. If nuclear deterrence were based exclusively on cruise missiles and bombers, the reaction time would be

considerably longer. Crisis management could be improved: The chance for negotiations, which is now only very slight under the conditions set by the fast modern missiles, could be clearly expanded. Such a development would be advantageous for Europe, too, since it would entail the elimination of the ballistic nuclear missiles with very short airborne time which now threaten Europe in large numbers. The U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe would take on another character but it would not disappear.

However, various conditions must be met if such a radical structural change of nuclear deterrence is to be attained. First of all, the Soviet Union, whose status as a world power is based primarily on being on an equal footing as regards highly developed nuclear missiles, must relinquish its position in this field and instead base nuclear deterrence on aircraft and cruise missiles. In this respect the United States has a technological advantage, which can be balanced only partially by the Soviet air defense. Moreover the question arises whether it can be expected of the Soviet Union and the United States that they renounce ballistic nuclear missiles while, e.g., China, Great Britain, and France keep theirs. In this connection a limited strategic defense would indeed be sensible. Furthermore, a system of nuclear deterrence freed of ballistic missiles raises the above-mentioned verification problem because even the possession of a small number of missiles provides the owner a disproportionate power head start. It need hardly be mentioned that also the differentiation between peaceful and military use of missiles—comparable to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes—is likely to raise serious verification problems. But the abolition of ballistic nuclear missiles would lead to such a considerable increase in the stability of nuclear deterrence that this proposal deserves not only persistent efforts of all parties involved but also justifies the considerable costs which it probably entails because of expansion or modernization of the air defense as well as of bomber or cruise-missile-based offensive capacities.

What conclusions can be drawn from the strategy discussion in the wake of Reykjavik?

1. The alliance should avoid internal disputes over theoretical options that are not really available.
2. It will not be possible to achieve a nonnuclear world for a long time. However, an evolutionary change of nuclear deterrence is necessary and possible. The abolition of ballistic nuclear missiles would promote the stability of nuclear deterrence and the reduction in the number of intermediate range nuclear weapons would also have a stabilizing effect provided that it would be based on the principle of approximate balance of the options in all ranges and coupled with a balanced conventional ratio

of forces without completely giving up a minimum capacity for tactical-nuclear reaction.

3. Because of the long-range political trends in the relationship of the superpowers to one another and of the domestic policy of the Western democracies, a shift of emphasis from the nuclear to the conventional sector is unavoidable and also desirable. But this will increase stability and reduce the possible damage in case of a failure of the deterrence only if the change is carefully controlled. The United States will no longer tolerate the imbalance of the defense contributions in the alliance and the Europeans would be better off if they get used to the idea to provide themselves a greater share for their own defense.

4. Even though the strengthening of the conventional dimension of the Atlantic defense in Europe is imperative, the alliance cannot renounce the nuclear foundations of the "flexible response." Every actual U.S. retreat from the nuclear commitment towards Europe will endanger the cohesion of the alliance.

5. Summit meetings cannot serve the purpose of making strategic decisions relating to the allies without their prior inclusion in the decision. It is high time jointly to consider the fundamental questions that have come out into the open more clearly as a result of the summit meeting and to decide what conclusions are to be drawn for the alliance as a whole.

6. The politicians will have to confront their voters with greater courage than heretofore with the real alternatives of decisionmaking. If the dependence on early use of nuclear weapons is to be reduced, a greater contribution of the conventional defense cannot be avoided.

7. Rarely has Europe's weakness been as clearly exposed as happened in Reykjavik. For the European members of the alliance the summit must therefore be a signal for intensifying their efforts to strengthen the European pillars of the alliance. A European alliance substructure which deserves this name is not only necessary to give better effect to the interests of the Europeans in all questions affecting them within the alliance but also for the purpose of better utilization of their tight defense funds. Such a development will require a probably difficult process of adjustment of the United States in practical dealings with the allies, but it should also be an expression of a strengthening of the alliance which corresponds to the long-term interest of the United States and of Western Europe.

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U.S-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG PAPERS LOOK TO CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS AFTER REYKJAVIK

Gorbachev's Advantage Termed Temporary

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 14 Oct 86 p 4

[Editorial by Josef Riedmiller: "Gorbachev Fights for All or Nothing"]

[Text] Mikhail Gorbachev brought a package along to his second meeting with Ronald Reagan. When he unwrapped it in Reykjavik, he first took out the glittery items; experts had polished them to a high gloss all summer long, in Geneva, in Moscow, in Washington. The result was worth seeing, and the chiefs went a step further in Iceland's capital. Not only a reduction of medium-range missiles in Europe--in itself remarkable enough--seemed now attainable, but their complete elimination: the zero solution which Moscow formerly had refused on the assumption that the NATO countries would perhaps be incapable of responding with catch-up armament to the increase in Soviet SS-20 missiles.

Now Moscow's surprising concession of renouncing medium-range missiles in Europe (not in Asia). And then the second one, from a global strategic aspect even more significant, i.e., to cut back by half, within 5 years, offensive missiles of intercontinental range. At times, the Soviet negotiators had tried to narrow the reduction frame, which is based on a proposal by Gorbachev, and to aim for a reduction of only 30 percent. This was done with a view to the still vague and distant possibility that the United States might be capable of repelling Soviet offensive missiles in space with their SDI system. If one can give credence to the participants in the pre-summit at Reykjavik, then agreement in principle had been reached on the reduction of medium-range and intercontinental missiles, although not all the details had been ironed out yet.

But then Gorbachev took the third present out of the package, and it proved to be a package deal of iron harshness: Moscow's concessions in two areas of the arms control negotiations could be had only if the United States were to cut down its SDI program in its present form and, according to the Soviet demand, would limit it for 10 years to laboratory research. Gorbachev wants to prohibit the testing and especially deployment of a U.S. missile defense. Since, according to Reagan, it will take 3 or 4 more years until it is known

whether SDI is even technically feasible (and can be paid for), he proposed an extension of the ABM treaty for at first another 7 years, then, in Reykjavik, for 10 more years—a concession to an agreement which can be cancelled with only 6 months' notice. In his speech to the UN General Assembly, the President had also offered to exchange research results with Moscow. The United States do not want to be hampered in researching and testing of the SDI system, while the Soviet Union wants to block U.S. efforts in this field; and there is the additional point that the government in Washington interprets the ABM treaty of 1972 differently and more broadly than does Moscow.

Gorbachev, however, must have been aware of the United States' refusal to "sell out" SDI and include it in a package deal on arms control. He or his advisers must have known that almost nothing is more unpopular in the United States than limiting research, progress, possibilities. Even before the pre-summit, the Reagan administration did not conceal its desire to negotiate with the Kremlin chief, primarily about implementation of human rights and checking regional conflicts. There is not a single indication that the United States considered putting SDI on the block.

That Gorbachev had no illusions on this point is proven by his precaution of meeting Reagan outside the United States and preceding the planned summit in Washington with the exploratory talks in Reykjavik. And since the Soviet leadership up to now demanded that one or two agreements would have to be reached in order to justify a summit meeting in Washington, why did they apparently clear the way for it, only to block it again with an all-or-nothing position on a third point? Or did Moscow only offer the concessions on medium-range and intercontinental missiles in the certainty that they would have no consequences, since the dissent over SDI would thwart the whole thing, anyway?

However, Gorbachev's insistence on "defusing" SDI also shows the deep concern of the Russians over being outdone by the United States in the scientific-technical race and to be relegated to a lower status militarily. He would be "crazy" if he agreed to that, the Kremlin chief said in Reykjavik, and also, that now a "point of no return" had been reached. This may be true for him personally, since it will probably be difficult for him to continue maneuvering between his promises and the expectations of his military. In large parts of world opinion, Gorbachev will probably be seen as the one who is more serious about disarmament than Reagan; but political gain is incalculable and spoils with time. The U.S. rival, however, stays, and Gorbachev will have to continue dealing with him.

Future SDI Negotiations Viewed

Bonn DIE WELT in German 14 Oct 86 p 2

[Article by Bernt Conrad: "Setback in Reykjavik"]

[Text] The West-East dialogue has suffered a setback. The chances for important disarmament agreements have dropped close to zero. A further summit meeting is not in sight. That is the Reykjavik outcome. It is clear to the Soviets whose fault it is: "Through his stubborn insistence on the SDI program,

the U.S. President has prevented significant progress in disarmament." But matters are not that simple.

In fact, the discussions proceeded more positively than had generally been expected. In a friendly atmosphere, the possibility of surprisingly comprehensive disarmament steps had evolved. At that stage, Gorbachev and Reagan decided to establish a work team which was to transform, overnight, the jointly envisioned disarmament goals into concrete texts. With this, the President went far beyond his original intention of only giving "impulses" to the arms control negotiators in Geneva, thus improving the prospects for a successful major summit in Washington. What was created during the night from Saturday to Sunday were not mere impulses, but precise plans with figures and dates.

The Soviet party chief appeared so eager for disarmament progress that he even followed Reagan's proposal to prepare, in a second working group, possible solutions for humanitarian issues as well as regional and bilateral problems. This was a remarkable concession, since it wiped out the original attempt by the Kremlin to have only disarmament on the U.S.-Soviet agenda and to leave out simmering centers of conflict such as Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and Kampuchea as well as the precarious situation of Jews and dissidents in the Soviet Union.

This is where Reagan garnered plus points. Lists presented by him with serious human rights violations and the names of Jews wanting to emigrate were accepted by the Soviet side. The subject was included in the prepared text of a concluding statement. Together with the planned disarmament steps—a 50 percent reduction of strategic missiles in 10 years, limitation of medium-range missiles to 100 each in the United States and Asia and their complete removal from Europe, as well as terms of procedures for limiting nuclear tests—it formed a package which could be called a "breakthrough" without exaggeration.

But Gorbachev had tied up this package only in order to get his hands on an unsurpassably attractive lever for the elimination of the SDI space defense program. In the last act of the drama of Reykjavik, he suddenly pulled the old Soviet deal out of the hat and confronted Reagan with the choice of either renouncing SDI, or the whole package is off. This was a clear setback since the Soviets in Geneva had been ready to consider an interim agreement on limitation of medium-range weapons without regard to SDI. An agreement appeared to be forthcoming directly. Now Gorbachev reversed it.

So much on the question of whose fault it was. Naturally, Reagan could have given in at that moment and renounced SDI on his part. Many Europeans would have applauded him. But just as Gorbachev with all his proffered, and then cancelled, concessions had only in mind to liquidate SDI, the President stuck to his intention not to make SDI an object of trade. Still, he was ready to make a compromise on one point: he extended the period during which space defense weapons were not to be deployed from seven-and-a-half to 10 years, thus coming even closer to the old 15-year period of the Soviets. In Reagan's view, during those 10 years even all offensive strategic weapons were to be abolished.

But then the question arises: why SDI at all? The Americans answer it with a dual argument: First of all, SDI could serve as a means of pressure for the observance of reduction obligations in the offensive area, and secondly, it would serve as a potential protective shield against "treason," that is to say, also against nuclear threats from a third party. With the verified removal of all offensive weapons, the first argument could be dropped, since a unilateral space defense on the U.S. side would then no longer be necessary. This would be even more valid for the defense against third nuclear powers. In other words: in case of removal of all strategic offensive weapons--and only in that case, not with a 5 percent reduction as Gorbachev proposed--contractual agreements on joint use of space defense would be possible, as Reagan had proposed to the Soviets earlier on.

Both East and West should think about this. At the least, Gorbachev and Reagan both praised the good atmosphere and the openness of their talks up to the decisive debate in the last hour. So these two men can really talk to each other, and from the failure of Reykjavik one should not draw the conclusion that such talks are superfluous. Most damaging would be a propaganda campaign of "peace forces," steered by the Soviets, which would devalue for some time to come all approaches found in Reykjavik.

Talks Seen as Clarifying

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 14 Oct 86 p 1

[Editorial by Bn.: "No Reason for Panic"]

[Text] "No reason for panic"--with this fitting remark, Soviet party chief Gorbachev circumscribed the failure of the pre-summit in Reykjavik. The door is still open for the real summit meeting in Washington, already agreed upon in Geneva, although no date has been set yet and even though that meeting must be better prepared in advance than the improvised meeting of Reykjavik.

The eleven-and-a-half hour talks of the two most powerful statesmen on earth have at least clarified the situation. The Soviet Union is willing to make considerable reductions in medium-range missiles, practically eliminating this category of weapons introduced by them into Europe, without insisting on the inclusion of French and British nuclear weapons, as they did formerly. Gorbachev also offers negotiations on short-range missiles, cutting the strategic nuclear weapons potential in half, and putting an end to all nuclear weapons testing.

These are greater concessions than ever before offered by the Soviet side, and the Soviet party chief, who lost no time showing off to the world press his "presents" which were turned down by President Reagan, knows full well what effect he would have on disappointed Europeans.

Of course, Gorbachev packed it all up again because President Reagan would not agree to the desired renunciation of testing his strategic space defense project, SDI. So Reagan again finds himself playing the role of the

international bogeyman who is blocking the disarmament chances of the present for a rather controversial project of the future. Whatever pertinent reasons the President may have for holding on to SDI, the question arises why he went to Reykjavik at all, since it was not difficult to foresee the alternative with which Gorbachev would present him. Reagan's "No" had to present the Kremlin chief at least with a "succes d'estime" by the world public.

The disarmament dialogue will continue, despite the failure of Reykjavik. Both sides confirm this, and without a doubt there will be continuing negotiations in Geneva on the interim agreement for the limitation of medium-range missiles, which is coming within easy reach. There is no reason to lament an alleged return to the Cold War, even though Europeans probably had hoped for something more from Reykjavik.

Negotiations Seen Complicated by Outcome

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 14 Oct 86 p 3

[Editorial by Karl Grobe: "The Consequences of Reykjavik"]

[Text] On late Sunday evening in Reykjavik, hopes came to an end, but not the world. The great crisis will come only if the United States' SDI program should become more concrete. Only then there would no longer exist what is called parity of the superpowers in technocratic German, that is their capability to destroy each other no matter who strikes first. U.S. President Ronald Reagan bet on this increase in strength, and no prospect of agreement in all other areas where disarmament or at least increased arms control seemed possible brought him to renounce the card which supposedly would trump all else.

This also shows the limit of trust which the two superpowers and their leaders are able to have in each other. Soviet party chief Mikhail Gorbachev must suspect that SDI will function, despite the objections of experts regarding its financeability and technical feasibility; U.S. President Ronald Reagan either assumes that he cannot trust the very far-reaching Soviet offers, or else he cannot sufficiently prevail over the hawks in his own nest and the military-industrial complex in his own country.

There will be more negotiations on everything that seemed to the two of them ready for agreement in Reykjavik, almost to the confirming handshake; negotiations not at the level of a summit or base camp, but in Geneva, Vienna or some other place. But in view of the really existing Soviet fear of the U.S. SDI supremacy, it would be naive to make any bets on it. The Moscow leadership certainly will not lightheartedly put down one single weapon, because it sees itself endangered in its existence by a greater threat, regardless whether or not this threat is already beginning to materialize. The failure in Reykjavik makes more difficult every individual round of negotiations at every individual place and on every individual subject.

It has even become doubtful whether the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev will continue in the way it began. First of all, his own military will accuse him of

illusionism; he wanted to achieve everything through summit diplomacy, but has not achieved anything for the time being. Secondly, the economically urgently needed armament stop at present is becoming politically impossible. The arms race continues. The Soviet economy must pay for it—at the expense of the desired goal of finally raising the people's standard of living, 7 decades after the October Revolution. Thirdly, Gorbachev's modernization program as a whole will go downhill. In short, the party chief returns as a petitioner whose hands remained empty.

But not only the prospects of the top Kremlin man have dramatically deteriorated; also those of smaller and medium-size powers. If Reykjavik has resulted in greater polarization between the two superpowers, it will not be without consequences for those dependent on them, particularly in Europe. Here, also, freedom of action decreases, and thus hope for detente.

And Reagan? His longing to be recognized by history as the peace president is not fulfilled in this manner; he leaves to his successors a strong United States that probably does not yet recognize its responsibility for world peace.

Editorial Says Failure Primarily Reagan's

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 17 Oct 86 p 1

[Editorial by Christoph Bertram: "The Bitter Truth About the Summit"]

[Text] Fog surrounds the reality of Reykjavik: although they both suffered a defeat, both superpowers act as if success could still somehow be brought to their side. President Reagan announces grandly that the United States and the Soviet Union are closer to an agreement "than ever before"—but he himself blocked it at the last minute. General Secretary Gorbachev celebrates a considerable political victory on points—but he did not get one step closer to his goal of bringing armament costs under control in order to ease the strain on the ailing Soviet economy. And the governments of West Europe, led by that of the FRG, pretend that everything is still in order, that now it is only a matter of getting down in writing the concessions of Reykjavik at the Geneva negotiating table.

But no one should be deceived. The opportunity of a century—to secure with one great throw [of the dice] the most comprehensive disarmament package of the nuclear age—was wasted. So much seemed possible on that weekend in Iceland: a drastic, almost complete removal of medium-range weapons, a radical reduction of intercontinental missiles, a new comprehensive disarmament scheme. It was too good to be true. That happened only once, it will never come again.

The major guilt for the fiasco lies with Ronald Reagan. True, Mikhail Gorbachev also has not acted without fault. Before the meeting in Iceland he had led the world to believe that the Soviet Union was ready for a separate agreement on medium-range weapons; now he made this agreement also dependent on the United States giving in on space armament. Gorbachev staked everything on one card in Reykjavik: with generous offers on offensive weapons he wanted to change the President's mind. But the card was not a trump.

When Reagan, irritable and tired, on late Sunday afternoon shut the folder in front of him and declared that there was no deal on SDI, the general secretary had no alternative ready. Now the hawks in the Kremlin, who had long been uncomfortable with the imaginative initiatives of their boss, will insist all the more that their beautiful, shiny nuclear weapons be scrapped only if the United States formally gives in on space armament. The general secretary, because he risked too much, has now lost maneuverability.

But the fault for passing up the decisive, historic opportunity lies with the U.S. President. He had the chance to be recorded by history as a great statesman; now he stands there as many of his critics have always seen him, although his long run of good luck sometimes made them doubt their judgment: as a provincial politician whose simple recipes may be good enough for administering the state of California, but not for leading a superpower and the Western alliance. Because he did not want to let go of the naive idea of missile defense in space—which, abracadabra, is to free mankind of the threat of nuclear weapons—the great deal of Reykjavik failed.

This, however, could only come as a surprise to those who, in the past, did not want to lend credence to Reagan's words. Many wishful thinkers in Europe, the United States, and also in the Kremlin, saw Reagan as a clever pragmatist who would bring in the harvest at the right time and thus would go into history as a great peace president. He was praised that, with SDI, he had brought back "the Soviets to the negotiating table;" but now he stands there, "with empty hands and empty pockets," as Gorbachev complained at his press conference, and bluffed not the Soviets but those who trusted in his statesmanship. When the moment of truth arrived, statesman Reagan was not there.

The appeasers are already speaking up: the President could not alienate his real followers, no one could expect that 3 weeks before congressional elections. And Mikhail Gorbachev even saw Reagan in the clutches of the "military-industrial complex." How so: of all people, the most popular and media-powerful President of the United States is supposed to have been pushed into a corner by the conservative communist baiters, although he could have returned home from Iceland with an enormous success?

If the President only had wanted that, he would not have lacked support in the entire country—including the military, incidentally, who for a long time have been watching with mixed feelings how the expensive SDI project is swallowing up the limited funds for research and development in the defense budget.

Reagan could have, but he did not want to: that is the bitter truth. Already in 1983, shortly after his famous star war speech, one of his closest associates stated: "That came from the heart." And whoever still did not want to believe it, could hear it from Reagan's own mouth on the night before Tuesday when he chanted the Song of Songs of SDI in justification of the Icelandic failure: that it is "the United States' life insurance," the "key to a world without nuclear weapons," a "guarantee for our security." Everything else simply had to take a back seat—a disarmament agreement which would have given Reagan almost everything he had ever hoped for, and also consideration

for the allies, who had at least expected a limitation of medium-range weapons to come out of Reykjavik.

There is little indication that there can be a new start before Reagan's departure from the White House. True, Europeans are trying to comfort themselves: did not both Gorbachev and Reagan stress that the dialogue would go on? It is said with stubborn optimism that the proposals are now on the Geneva negotiating table. Are the negotiators, dependent on instructions, to get the ball rolling again?

At best, they could succeed if the President would soften his "No" of Reykjavik. But there is little reason to hope for that. Even if the Soviets register a propaganda victory; even if the U.S. elections should weaken Reagan; and even if the European governments, who up to now so considerately took into account the favorite ideas of the old man in the White House, now should demand from him consideration of their interests—this President will not go against his heart. Ronald Reagan is completely and totally sold on SDI.

That is why the hope for reason cannot cling to the purposive optimism now being dished up in the West. Rather, it must hold on to something more reliable: the fact that technology is not at the unrestricted service of Reagan's visions, and the situation where not only the backward Soviet Union, but also the rich United States face financial limits. That much is certain—Reagan's space plans will not grow into the sky.

So the decisive question for the future is this: Will Mikhail Gorbachev, once the Soviets recognize this one day, still be able to uphold the offers which he spread out so temptingly in Reykjavik? The opportunity of Iceland will not return. But beyond all hopes and disappointments, realities push both world powers toward stopping the arms race. Once Reagan's time is past, realists can perhaps still salvage some of what was wasted so unnecessarily in Reykjavik.

Disappointing Conclusion Described

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 17 Oct 86 p 4

[Article by Hanspeter Born: "Balance Between Hope and Fear"]

[Text] Disappointment was written all over their ashen faces. Drained and with expressionless miens, Gorbachev's closest associates watched how their chief produced unsuspected energies from some psychic reserve tank in order to describe clearly and vividly the course of the negotiations, which were both intensive and significant, in which the United States and the Soviet Union had missed an unexpectedly far-reaching compromise on disarmament.

Shortly before, a battle-weary and dazed Secretary of State Shultz ("I don't even know how late it is") had described to journalists how, after shuffling around proposals and counterproposals and checking all possible solutions, the high hopes had come to naught.

A long road had been covered with enormous steps. And yet, at the end one had to accept that squaring the circle had not been found. The shattering upshot: so much effort, and at the end nothing in hand, not a scrap of paper, no date for a future meeting, no idea how it should continue between the superpowers.

There had certainly not been a lack of good will. Both parties knew that the hour was favorable. They wanted the comprehensive "deal" which was to reduce the senseless nuclear arsenals and stabilize relations between the superpowers for years to come. They put all their cards on the table.

One by one, the unspeakably complex questions, which for years had been a headache for the disarmament experts in Geneva, came up for discussion and were settled by the two statesmen with breathtaking boldness. As a beginning it was decided—and when Gorbachev discussed it in the press conference, he sliced the air with a decisive karate chop—to reduce all strategic long-range weapons by 50 percent, applied evenly to those deployed on land, submarines, and aircraft.

After an accord had been reached on this decisive point and, in a parallel development, total elimination in the long term of all strategic offensive weapons had been agreed on, they turned to the issue of medium-range missiles which has been poisoning the climate in Europe for almost a decade. Prior to the summit there had been talk about a possible interim solution, which would have allowed the Soviet Union and the United States 100 nuclear warheads each in Europe, with a further reserve of 100 each in Asia and the United States, respectively.

Now Gorbachev went a step further. Why, he proposed to the President, do we not return to the original U.S. proposal of a zero solution: "Why, Mr President, do you want to abandon your own child?" What about British and French nuclear weapons and their planned modernization? Gorbachev was willing to shut both eyes: let them improve and modernize! Let's talk about it with all parties concerned! What about the Soviet short-range missiles deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia? We'll freeze them and negotiate!

The offer was too good. They agreed on Gorbachev's proposal of a zero solution with a reserve of 100 weapons (warheads) each in Asia and the United States. Giving in was all the easier for the Americans since Gorbachev adopted their attitude in the question of verification (supervision and control) which was of particular concern to them. Outdoing the United States, he even endorsed a "triple verification." And finally, all differences still existing on the question of nuclear testing were settled.

However, if the Soviet Union should agree to such a far-reaching disarmament accord, then—according to Gorbachev—it must have the guarantee that neither side could secretly acquire a military advantage. What was needed were "barriers against the development of new weapons types," and they had to be "refined and strengthened." Therefore the ABM treaty, which tightly limits the deployment of antimissile systems, should be provided with a 10-year termination ban. Reagan accepted.

Then Gorbachev came to the heart of the matter. During those 10 years, no laboratory testing was to be allowed. Spelled out, this meant that Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI, his dream of a "defensive shield for the United States and the free world," would be downgraded to a stillborn research project. Or, as Reagan lamented in his television address of Monday evening: "They wanted to kill SDI."

SDI marks the parting of the minds. The viewpoints were so far apart that no mutual wrangling was possible. What is a shield to one, is the other's Trojan horse.

The Russians, and they made this clear in briefings and private talks before the meeting, do not believe in the feasibility of a defensive shield in space. They scoff at this idea and do not even believe in a spotty defensive shield which would be just strong enough to permit the United States a first strike. That is not where their fear lies.

Rather, they nurture dark suspicions that the gigantic research program connected with SDI could spawn new and dreadful weapons. Weapons of which even researchers today have only vague inklings, and which would have to do with things, mysterious to the layman, such as gamma rays, new forms of laser use, and similar things. The Russians are also afraid that the United States might develop non-nuclear warheads suitable for a first strike. They want to avert these evil intentions, of which they suspect the United States, by pulling SDI's teeth.

Gorbachev verbatim: "The Americans believe that they can attain military superiority through space. As a U.S. president once said, 'whoever controls space, also controls the earth.' It is still the same old imperialist endeavor." Gorbachev is also of the opinion that Reagan is not a free man, that he pursues his SDI dreams under the dictate of the "military-industrial complex." He had noted during the negotiations how Reagan, time and again, looked towards his advisers. He was quite aware what the military-industrial complex wants. Gorbachev remained suspicious, and he remained firm.

The same way that Reagan remained suspicious and firm. For the President, SDI is not devil's work and an instrument for world dominance, but rather an "insurance policy" guaranteeing that the intended liquidation of nuclear weapons is actually carried out: "SDI is the key to a world without nuclear weapons." U.S. government officials had already emphasized before the start of negotiations that SDI could not be a negotiable pawn.

"We need SDI for two reasons," a delegation member explained to me: "First, to prevent a breaking away from the disarmament agreements, and secondly, to protect us from third powers who have nuclear weapons."

How can the superpowers maneuver out of this stalemate? That is the question which will occupy world politics during the coming months.

Future Soviet Flexibility Questioned

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 18/19 Oct 86 p 4

[Editorial by Dieter Schroeder: "After the Poker Game of Reykjavik"]

[Text] One week after the summit of Reykjavik, it seems only a spectral aurora borealis on the northern sky; as unreal as a dream from which the world returned to harsh everyday life. Now all the questions are arising again which had been suppressed for a few hours by the hope for an opportunity which in reality never existed. The foremost question, so far answered unsatisfactorily, remains how the actors themselves fell victims to such a gigantic delusion. The expectation that the world's two most powerful men in 2 days could find solutions for all the disarmament problems which have eluded experts for years, was as unrealistic as some of the proposals which the two more or less pulled out of their sleeves like magic. Shortly before the end of the summit, they had both almost reached the heights of the utopia of eternal peace. The fall had to be all the deeper, which ironically was brought about by another illusion--namely, that for the preservation of peace, the existence or nonexistence of defensive weapons in space was decisive.

Devalued Point Advantage

So far, it remains Reagan's secret why he got involved in this adventure. Originally, Reykjavik was only meant to prepare a summit and to examine the question whether an agreement could be reached at least on that point. When the President nonetheless went all out, he was obviously deluded by the naive belief that the Soviets had come to the negotiating table only out of fear of SDI and urgently needed an agreement on the reduction of nuclear missiles. Especially if this assumption was not wrong, the United States should have had an inkling that Gorbachev would make tough efforts to forestall the SDI program. If one does not want to impute that Gorbachev arranged the Reykjavik meeting only as a trap for Reagan, he must also suffer the question what he intended with his tactic. He had to be aware that Reagan dislikes negotiating about SDI.

If Gorbachev really wants detente to ease the pressure on the Soviet economy, would it not have been wiser to start with smaller, more realistic steps, create trust, and prepare the ground for the big deal? True, he offered much for Reagan's renunciation of SDI, but the question remains whether he only did it because he knew that the President would not go for the offer. In that case, his tactic was risky. Such a doubt devalues the point advantage he initially gained in Reykjavik, with which he could turn Western public opinion against Reagan. But among his general staff at home the fear must be growing that the United States might some day take Gorbachev at his word. Just as some first voices are being raised in the United States, demanding that Reagan take back his last offer because Moscow might learn to like it. Before he got up from the table in Hoefdi House, Reagan offered to give up deployment of SDI weapons for 10 years, if all nuclear offensive weapons have been scrapped by then. If the Russians really believe that SDI is not functioning anyway, and if they listen to U.S. experts who claim that SDI will still be in its infancy

10 years hence, they still might accept Reagan's offer, as is feared by Democratic senator Nunn, for example. They would be rid of the U.S. deterrent weapon (and of their own, too), but would retain conventional superiority.

Although there are few indications that Senator Nunn's fear is justified, it does demonstrate how deepseated mutual distrust really is. And it was this distrust which ultimately thwarted the great success of Reykjavik. Reagan wants to build up SDI as a means of pressure so that the Russians will actually reduce their offensive weapons. The Russians ask what good defensive weapons would be if there are no longer any offensive weapons. They fear that defensive weapons in space could also be transformed into offensive weapons. The other side of the coin: as long as all offensive missiles have not been eliminated, also by the Chinese, French, and British, the Soviets must continue to be interested in defensive systems on which they have been working for some time, as they now admit. The deal proposed in Reykjavik makes one suspect that they have fallen behind, not that they have become innocent little angels.

If a kind of moratorium for the development of space weapons is to be agreed on, then it must be discussed in detail—what each side has or plans, and the correlation between defensive systems and offensive potentials, since there is a close connection between them because of the destabilizing effect of a unilateral SDI system on mutual deterrence. The Soviets are right on this point. But if there are to be more serious discussions on this subject, then the road is not blocked by the landslide of Reykjavik. It must go through the ABM treaty, whose interpretation is being disputed by both sides, but which is unequivocal on one point: if defensive weapons are created which are based on "different physical principles" (and this applies to ray weapons), both sides must renegotiate their limitation.

These talks could very well be carried out by the experts in Geneva. The possibilities for compromise have not been fully exhausted or completely blocked by the two heads of state. The first reassuring statements from Washington and Moscow after the summit also gave rise to the hope that the doors are not slammed shut. Meanwhile, however, the "package makers" in Moscow have gone to work, and what they have delivered to the West creates the impression that not only are the Geneva negotiations to be made more difficult, but also that Gorbachev's hands are to be tied. Initially he seemed to have taken the medium-range missiles in Europe out of the package deal with SDI. Now they are tied back into the package. Yet there is no justification for that. Medium-range weapons have nothing to do with SDI. If they are now being re-used as a means of pressure, this may be directed above all against Gorbachev whose offers may have appeared too risky and too generous to the Soviet general staff.

Appeal to Both Superpowers

At any rate, it is striking that, in contrast to Gorbachev's initially soliciting tone, Moscow's attitude has stiffened, the Kremlin thereby running the risk that part of the fault for the summit failure will be laid at its door. Because now the impression is created that the Russians did not want a deal at all and only looked for a pretext in order to cancel Gorbachev's

planned visit to the United States. According to everything said by both sides before the meeting, the zero solution for Europe appeared almost settled and possible as a separate agreement. Now Europeans must be all the more careful not to be roped in by Moscow against Washington. When Kohl travels to Washington on Monday, he certainly must persuade Reagan to look for a new approach, but he must also remind the Soviets of their promises with regard to medium-range missiles. Elimination of these missiles in Europe could give back to the arms control process the trust which the Soviets had disturbed through the SS-20 deployment.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

ADDITIONAL FRG COMMENTARY ON REYKJAVIK

NATO Defense More Complicated

Bonn DIE WELT in German 22 Oct 86 p 2

[Editorial by Ruediger Moniac: "Consequences of Reykjavik"]

[Text] The prospect, no longer only theoretical after the Reykjavik summit, of the withdrawal of all nuclear intermediate range weapons (SS 20 and Pershing II) from the Western and Eastern parts of Europe enormously aggravates NATO's security problems.

For one thing, it would no longer be guaranteed that Soviet soil is also "placed at risk" by U.S. nuclear weapons in Western Europe. For another, the non-nuclear potentials of the Soviets (the conventional armed forces of the USSR are three times, or more, superior to those of NATO in Europe) and Moscow's nuclear weapons with a range of 150 km to 1,000 km, which threaten above all targets in the FRG and the supply harbors at the Channel coast, are gaining a very new military, and thus political-psychological, importance.

After Reykjavik, NATO is faced with the task of developing means to subdue medium-range weapons (SRINF). In this area the Soviet Union has a comfortable superiority of six to one. Two ways are theoretically possible.

One must either negotiate on SRINF systems, also, in the hope that the Soviet Union will reduce them without a Western quid pro quo. This is not very likely. Or, the West can negotiate and try to secure the right of the same upper limits for these weapons. This would result in the West having to develop a new potential of missiles with a range of up to 1,000 km and station them in Europe.

First of all, this would cause gigantic new expenditures--just as a conventional balance would cause enormous additional costs, were all nuclear weapons to be eliminated. Furthermore, a short-range catch-up armament would bring about enormous psychological stress, as is remembered from the autumn of 1963 with its demonstrations against catch-up armament. The West must take these correlations into consideration; the Soviet Union surely has done so, already.

Consequences for Alliance

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 22 Oct 86 p 1

[Editorial by Karl Feldmeyer: "Concern about the Alliance"]

[Text] The waves of excitement which emanated from Reykjavik are gradually ebbing. The boldness of the proposals discussed by Reagan and Gorbachev still fascinates a public stubbornly dreaming of an end to the East-West conflict. Although ultimately nothing was firmly agreed upon, something important has happened. Especially the proposals made—or accepted—by President Reagan will leave their mark on the alliance. A lasting effect is the insight that the two world powers would have been willing to make astonishing agreements, if they could have agreed overall.

Two aspects are significant in this: one, that the U.S. President overrode the agreement reached with his partners on an "interim solution" of 100 nuclear warheads on intermediate-range weapons each, and agreed to Gorbachev's demand for a zero solution; the other, his proposal to not only cut the number of strategic nuclear weapons in half as offered by the general secretary, but to eliminate them entirely over the next 10 years. Is it really Reagan's intent that in the future, in addition to France and England, only countries such as China and Israel, Pakistan and India will possess the "ultimate" weapon, enabling them to have their own way?

But even that is not the decisive aspect for the NATO partners, but rather the question how Reagan's offer tallies with the obligations of the United States vis-a-vis the alliance, and how much value is still placed on NATO in Washington. NATO. The United States is the backbone of the alliance. Without its nuclear arsenal, NATO has neither a functioning strategy nor deterrence capability, nor an adequate defense force.

Without the possibility of deterring a potential attacker with nuclear weapons, the real danger of a war, and thus political pressure through the threat of force, is returning for the West European allies. It is embarrassing, incidentally, that the Western public first learned from Gorbachev in Reykjavik of the disastrous offer made by Reagan to the Russians, which distressingly puts into question the security of Europe (while the United States thinks it can protect itself from the consequences through an SDI defense system).

Reagan's offer hits the alliance in a vital spot: confidence in the predictability of the partners. The bitter insight cannot be denied that Reagan treated NATO as a disposable item when he looked for an agreement which put many things in question, but left the SDI project untouched. That the President is one of those who want to replace the strategy of deterrence with a defense strategy has been known since his speech of 23 April 1983, in which he introduced SDI. The realization of what consequences he is willing to accept in the pursuit of this concept, has only now in Reykjavik become clear in its full extent.

True, the allies cannot reproach him wholeheartedly for getting involved with Gorbachev in the zero solution for Europe, since years ago they themselves urged that such a proposal be presented in Geneva. Later, of course, one recognized (jointly) the risks of a zero solution. The assumption that NATO does not need intermediate-range weapons in Europe if the Warsaw Pact gives up its own, the SS-20, is wrong. Pershing II and cruise missiles are not countermeasures to the SS-20, but rather are to prevent a decoupling of the United States from Europe and, therefore, are more necessary today than ever before.

No less serious than the destruction of the deterrence grid would be the consequences to be expected in case of withdrawal. It would entail the demand to proceed the same way with medium-range nuclear weapons. In fact, public discussion is already focusing on those weapons. After a zero solution for the Pershing II, they could hardly contribute to deterrence any more. Without an intact escalation grid, medium-range nuclear weapons would lose their deterrent value. They would become merely militarily effective weapons.

This shows the magnitude of the risk of initiating a development toward a nuclear-free Europe through a zero solution for intermediate-range nuclear weapons. There is plenty of political interest in it. But it is more than doubtful whether the United States would be willing to leave its troops in Europe under such changed conditions and with such an incalculable risk of conflict: it is improbable. All this should be reason enough for the European NATO partners to present to the alliance a conclusive concept as soon as possible, which would guarantee the deterrence grid of all nuclear weapons, combined with serious disarmament proposals, and would replace the zero solution proposal.

Prudence and speed are needed, for the political condition of the alliance after Reykjavik is worrisome. This must be felt in Bonn in particular, where the alliance was proclaimed as a quasi-constitutive element of the existence of the republic. What future will this country have if the transatlantic alliance should fall victim to alienation and a diminution of joint interests?

Europe Urged to Take Responsibility

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 24 Oct 86 p 1

[Editorial by Christoph Bertram: "The Giants' Dreams"]

[Text] How nice it would have been if the chancellor's visit to the United States this time had been different from the numerous former visits of backslapping geniality. After Reykjavik it would have been important to speak with Reagan in friendship, but openly and clearly. Only thus can it be prevented that the progress to which the U.S. President and the Soviet general secretary agreed in Iceland is not being sacrificed on the altar of visions of the future—Washington's vision, but also Moscow's.

It could be epochal progress, if the President did not cling so stubbornly to his Strategic Defense Initiative. While negotiators as a rule must toil for

years in order to get even a bit of a handle on rampant armament, the two men almost seemed to succeed in two short days to force saddle and reins on the snorting steed. It would have been easy for political pragmatists to bridge the remaining gap. But Reagan and Gorbachev did not want to shake off their dreams. Now utopias, not realities, determine the starting positions of both sides for the new round just begun in Geneva.

Gorbachev is steering toward a world without any nuclear weapons at all. SDI, the Kremlin chief said last week, "does not worry us from a military aspect." The decisive objection is different: "If we enter into a totally new situation in which...the liquidation of nuclear weapons will begin in a foreseeably short time, it is necessary to protect oneself against all sorts of surprises."

Reagan also has his eyes fixed on a world in which nuclear missiles would be powerless. A few days after the Icelandic debacle he said indignantly to young astronauts, "I couldn't just give away your future!" Although he would be willing to destroy all intercontinental missiles and almost all of the intermediate-range missiles, SDI is not to be touched—because it concerns "the future."

If Europeans want to salvage what can be salvaged from Reykjavik, then they must make an effort now to get the world powers back to reality. It has come to this—the dwarfs must remind the giants of the realities of the nuclear age:

--In the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to nuclear deterrence. Europeans above all know this, who in the prenuclear age had to suffer war and destruction time and again; but the Russians ought to know it, too. Only since East and West possess nuclear weapons does an attack mean suicide for both sides. This—and not the illusion of a world free of nuclear weapons—remains the basis for security and detente.

--Arms control is the necessary complement of deterrence. There is no alternative for that, either. Whoever postpones what can be solved today, risks a later failure. That is why it is both dishonest and shortsighted that the Soviet Union, who for more than a year has been advocating a separate settlement for medium-range weapons, now ties the package deal to SDI, for flimsy reasons. Europeans must nail the general secretary down to his words before Reykjavik.

--Arms control does not work without treaties. But the U.S. President acts as if this did not hold true for the United States. Although the 1972 U.S.-Soviet ABM treaty bans the testing, development and deployment of components and systems of missile defense in space, Reagan is not afraid to escape this contractual obligation with questionable lawyers' tricks. Not only the Soviets, but also the West Europeans must not let him get away with it.

The United States' European allies will have to demonstrate more courage and independence than Helmut Kohl did this time in Washington. From the very beginning, the most important governments viewed Reagan's space vision with disguised skepticism; but at the same time they strengthened the President politically with their signature on totally unnecessary agreements on SDI

cooperation. And Mikhail Gorbachev's nuclear-free world they did not want to dismiss as a dream because of public opinion at home; with demands for a zero solution and slogans such as "create peace with fewer and fewer weapons," they also challenged Gorbachev's daring plan of the millenium.

This time, also, the governments of West Europe prefer to criticize symptoms. True, the chancellor carried in his luggage to the United States numerous detailed requests and objections to a few of Reagan's ideas: what will become of us, if everything is eliminated except short-range missiles, in which the East has superiority? But the chancellor again avoided discussions of principles. Thus the allies of the United States get lost in the castles in the air of the big powers--reduced to a state of pedantic philistines who cannot interfere in the grandiose visions of the Kremlin and the White House. Ronald Reagan can hardly be dissuaded from his sleep-walking path through gentle optimism. Whoever wants "to take the Soviet Union at its word," as Kohl did in Washington, must first make himself clear in Washington. Only then would Bonn's word have any weight in Moscow--if Gorbachev should even care much about that word after the chancellor's terrible comparison with Goebbels.

The dream world after Reykjavik is a challenge to West Europeans. So far, however, they show little inclination to take it on. Once again it is easier to let the big powers do their thing and to hope that, in disarmament, initialling [agreements] won't be as quick as dreaming. But here, also, holds true what a high Soviet military officer formulated last week: "Although one can declare a shoe brush to be a mammal, it does not mean that it will have babies." As long as the superpowers go on dreaming, the politics of what is possible is being wasted. Whoever wants to keep it that way, contributes [to the fact] that not much more will remain of the astonishing rapprochement in Reykjavik than the stale aftertaste of missed opportunities.

Summit Seen Contributing to Progress

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 26 Oct 86 p 1

[Editorial by J.B.: "Summit Gleanings"]

[Text] It is probably true to say that confusion still reigns about the summit meeting in Reykjavik between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. The broader public is still not completely clear about the intentions and motives which guided Reagan and Gorbachev in their meeting, nor has any reliable evaluation of the results--or non-results--been made so far.

Initially, critics of so-called summit diplomacy find themselves justified in not thinking much of such meetings between statesmen, if they have not been carefully prepared and, on the basis of previous negotiations, leave only a few points open for a final decision. No such preconditions existed in Reykjavik. Under these circumstances, summit meetings can even have considerably negative consequences. If it turns out at such a meeting that despite previous expectations--not necessarily held by the statesmen, but by the public--no compromises can be achieved, then attributing the blame and disputing the issue can lead to new confrontations which were not at all intended.

The fact that Reagan and Gorbachev saw this possible consequence, at least in retrospect, demonstrates their equally defensive attitude after the summit meeting. Both sides showed themselves disappointed; Gorbachev even spoke of a missed historic opportunity, which immediately made the rounds worldwide as a slogan. Yet both sides stressed the fact that the discussions had been fruitful, that they had created a new basis for further disarmament efforts of the superpowers, and the Soviets on their part added that they had found Reagan to be a serious and serious-minded negotiation partner and that, even after Reykjavik, they could imagine reaching agreements with him.

As a matter of fact, the Reykjavik talks were characterized by imaginative proposals surpassing each other on how to cut in half the two superpowers' present state of armaments within a decade, until the dialogue was ended for the time being by Gorbachev's unequivocal proviso that all disarmament measures discussed were to be tied to a U.S. waiver of development and testing of strategic defense weapons, and Reagan's refusal to make such a commitment.

And this is where the questions set in. First of all, it will not be easy—after the exchange of visionary ideas which were then placed on the tip of the SDI needle—to return to sober negotiations about possible first disarmament steps whose effectiveness would have to create confidence for additional and more consequential measures. That is not impossible; but Reykjavik contributed little to it. Then there is the question of the real expectations held by the two statesmen before the summit. Is it possible that Gorbachev really assumed Reagan would give up SDI during the few hours in Reykjavik? And didn't Reagan really have to anticipate that Gorbachev would attempt such a blow against SDI, so that his own visionary proposals would have to appear as a mere propagandistic camouflage of the continuing unbridgeable dissent?

Optimists will now say that the two statesmen at least discussed a number of measures so far-reaching that it is difficult to imagine they would ever again disappear from the picture. They would develop a dynamism of their own, so that both sides would at least be kept at the negotiating table. But dynamism has its own laws; it does not always develop in the hoped-for direction. In the United States at any rate, and perhaps to both Reagan's and Gorbachev's surprise, the popularity of SDI has grown meanwhile; Reagan's adherence to it finds wide approval. And Gorbachev may find that, by hinging everything on SDI, he actually heightened the importance of this project, namely the "bargaining power" of the United States, in the negotiations.

Incidentally, as for "dynamism:" Reagan, also, must expect undesirable results. Although until now it was the European allies who urged Washington to respond to Soviet disarmament initiatives, particularly in the area of medium-range nuclear weapons, some of the proposals put forth by Reagan have now aroused their concern. Some things proposed by Reagan appear to them to be too much "off the cuff." Suddenly the danger seems closer that the security and needs of the European allies are not sufficiently taken into consideration in the endeavor of the two superpowers to reach agreements on their own security.

In some respects, the Reykjavik talks perhaps clarified matters, at least with regard to the dimensions of the problems standing between the superpowers; on

the other hand, it also camouflaged them, especially with regard to what is actually attainable and possible. For the time being, the goal of total abolition of all nuclear weapons, which surfaces time and again in the declarations of the statesmen, is probably neither attainable nor actually desirable. The existence of nuclear weapons, i.e., mutual deterrence, has averted large-scale wars between the superpowers up to now. Wars must not again become possible by ridding them of the threat of incalculability. What is in the interest of both sides is the reduction of excessive armaments.

In this context, the U.S. SDI project actually raises some difficult problems. The U.S. side points out that the Soviets accepted the idea of larger disarmament steps only after the start of SDI research. On the other hand, unlimited SDI development can also make disarmament more difficult. In case of a far advanced reduction in strategic weapons system, a unilateral breakthrough in SDI could actually change the strategic situation, since SDI could become effective under these circumstances and could give a one-sided advantage to the owner of strategic defense systems. With regard to negotiations, the task would be to bring disarmament measures into agreement with limiting SDI development so that, some day, SDI could really become superfluous or that it would be possible to introduce an agreed-upon "mix" of strategic weapons of deterrence and defense.

The example of medium-range missiles makes it abundantly clear that nuclear disarmament steps, whether global or regional, cannot be taken without considering the overall balance, i.e., not without also including the respective state of armaments with regard to conventional weapons. The conventional imbalances, which would gain greater importance if nuclear weapons were reduced, could actually diminish rather than increase security.

Even this short list shows that ad hoc summit meetings can contribute little to the solution of problems; what is needed are long-term efforts without having the actors appear dramatically on stage.

Little Progress Seen, Predicted

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 8 Nov 86 p 12

[Article by Jan Reifenberg: "The Lesson of Vienna"]

[Text] Whoever believed that the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister, in their talks in Vienna, would overcome the stalemate with which the two world powers ended their hopeful summit meeting in Reykjavik, believed in illusions. For the time being, nothing is moving in the decisive question of how Washington and Moscow can overcome the hurdle, which the SDI project is in Soviet eyes, through an interpretation of the ABM agreement. Shultz and his delegation had brought to Vienna a thoroughly prepared working paper with the intent of clarifying controversial issues and maintaining the elan which had been created in the course of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. The most important point of U.S. clarification attempts and supplements on the subject of reduction of strategic offensive weapons (Start) is a compromise on the lower limit for permissible warheads on long-range missiles: 4,800 instead

of 4,500 as planned in Reykjavik for the first 5-year period. Only 3,300 are to remain for the heavy, landbased rockets, which are the Soviet Union's most important long-range weapons, and only half--1,650--are for the "silo breakers," the SS-18 and SS-19, with more than 6 warheads. Moscow was not to be stripped of its main potential, but it was to be ensured that these most dangerous weapons suitable for a first strike would be reduced. The question would remain open what to do about the mobile land-based long-distance missiles such as the SS-24. The Americans in Vienna were also willing to discuss practical steps with a view to a "zero solution" for medium-range weapons in Europe, and limiting them to 100 each in Soviet Asia and Alaska; in addition, they wanted to discuss improved inspection possibilities for the two "threshold agreements" not ratified by the U.S. Senate as a starting point for a later, comprehensive test-ban agreement. But differing interpretations of the ABM agreement, the only arms limitations agreement in force, again became the stumbling block.

As during their night session in Reykjavik, U.S. experts wrangled for hours with their Soviet counterparts in order to find an acceptable compromise regarding permissible tests in the development of a space-based defense system. Shevardnadze and his colleagues persisted in their demand that any development of such systems, and particularly laboratory testing of its "components," be banned, evidently without spelling out what was precisely meant by that. They did not answer precise U.S. questions and stuck to their claim, widely broadcast to the public in Vienna, that SDI meant the destruction of the bold hope pursued by Reagan and Gorbachev: a world free of nuclear weapons. Shultz did not bend. The President would not be deprived of the right of research, development and testing of SDI because, if all nuclear weapons systems were actually reduced to a large extent, a new form of defense would have to take their place. Shultz listed four pertinent reasons: since it was not known whether all nuclear weapons would actually disappear, one would have to remain capable of defending oneself against them; furthermore, a promising research program for defense in space would remain the strongest incentive for the reduction of strategic systems. If an agreement were reached on this, its continued life would have to be ensured; ultimately, it was a matter of creating an "insurance policy" against irresponsible third parties who knew how to build nuclear weapons. According to U.S. experts, there was already basic agreement in Reykjavik on this point. But in Vienna Shevardnadze was concerned with pillorying the United States and presenting the Soviet Union as an obliging partner before the forum of the follow-up CSCE Conference. On Friday, the Geneva negotiators met in a plenary session, requested by the Soviet Union, where the Soviet side probably largely repeated its version. The sixth round of negotiations will end in a few days. Before the seventh round starts in January, experts of both sides will probably meet in special sessions in Washington or Moscow. So the dialogue continues.

Whoever analyzes what almost happened in Iceland, and knows that in the Geneva negotiations, the devil sits in the details, can actually only breathe a sigh of relief after the soaring flights at the "summit." Because it has become clear meanwhile that Reagan largely entered into Gorbachev's plans, above all from the conviction that he, too, must bring mankind closer to the day of deliverance from the bane of nuclear weapons. With the pragmatism and capacity

for spontaneous renewal which are a major part of the American character, the President began to disregard still existing obstacles. Now everything has returned to the round of sober, long-drawn, tough negotiations. Both superpowers continue to talk; for the first time in the history of "arms control," they want real disarmament. Excessive armament weighs on both of them, for different reasons. Ultimately, neither one must endanger its security, despite tempting plans. So everything will depend on how security can be maintained at a lower armament level. This concerns not only strategic long-range weapons, be they missiles or bombers, but primarily medium-range weapons: their complete abolition in Europe would be meaningful only if at the same time the threat of Soviet short-range weapons, so far without a Western response, would be reduced and ultimately done away with. Just how deceptive a goodly number of the Soviet proposals are becomes clear by the fact that Moscow wants only to "freeze" these systems at their present level, intending to maintain their present threat.

In Vienna, there was no longer any talk about a second "summit." It is entirely uncertain whether it will take place in Washington next year, and whether Reagan will then travel to Moscow for a third meeting, as previously planned in Geneva. Shevardnadze's attitude in Vienna seems to justify the assumption that the Soviet Union is drawing conclusions from the congressional election victory of the Democratic opposition, which may lead to the fallacy that they could wait for the President's successor, particularly since the Senate would wipe out the SDI dream with budget cuts. Does Gorbachev intend to wait? Is he being advised by his military, who were distrustful of the prospects at Reykjavik, to draw out the negotiations and to enter into the "great compromise" only with Reagan's successor? One thing is certain after the Vienna encounter: the Soviet Union will continue its propaganda offensive with tempting offers. It will present to a detente-oriented public in Europe great-sounding proposals on limitation of conventional armament "between the Atlantic and the Ural," so far not backed up in detail by a single concrete, positive step. The aim of splitting off the United States from Europe continues to be pursued.

In Vienna, the United States pushed through a joint declaration by the foreign ministers of the Western countries participating in the MBFR negotiations to the effect that Moscow would first have to make the concessions there for which one had waited in vain for 13 years; then one could expand to a larger area the subject of the ratio of conventional power at the sea/line of the disputes in Europe. France, already skeptical about arms limitations, meanwhile is accelerating the expansion and modernization of its national nuclear force. All these developments can be reduced to a common denominator: continued negotiations by the two superpowers, closest coordination among the allies, renunciation of wishful thinking based on domestic policy goals, and avoiding hasty action stemming from disappointment in the slow progress of the talks.

Return to Normal Relations Expected

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 28 Nov 86 p 1

[Editorial by Fk.: "The End of Reykjavik"]

[Text] The evidence is in, the interim phase is over in which both superpowers kept saying that their negotiation proposals of Reykjavik were still on the table. The truth, which the world does not like to acknowledge, is that after Reykjavik, both sides immediately returned to the everyday politics of arms control. Thereby the traditional difficulties and conflicts of interests have regained all of their importance. The sign from Washington had long been announced and postponed several times: the United States deliberately go above the upper limits set for strategic nuclear weapons in the so-called Salt II treaty.

That is a step which will be registered by the allies with great reserve. The U.S. government can feel justified insofar as it has demanded several times that the Soviet Union cease obvious violations of the Salt II treaty, which was never ratified but observed quietly. These include the testing and deployment of two new land-based, mobile intercontinental missiles, while the treaty allows only one new development of this type, and the prohibited coding of data in missile tests which the Soviet Union is not willing to renounce. It was predictable that, at some point, the United States would react to that.

The political aspect lies in the time chosen. President Reagan, who formerly had a pronounced sense of how to gain public opinion for goals and plans, seems to lack this propensity more and more. He already gave worrisome proof of that in Reykjavik and left the field for effective propaganda appearances to Gorbachev. In a world which measures Soviet infractions with a generous yardstick but examines U.S. mistakes with a magnifying glass, the effect of this action was easily predictable. The Reagan administration assumes the onus of having given another push to the armament spiral. And even the suspicion that this step, as so often in the United States, was primarily motivated by domestic reasons, does not make the matter better, but rather worse. Yet it is neither suitable as a diversionary tactic nor as exoneration of the Teheran weapons deals.

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CSO: 5200/2465

SALT/START ISSUES

MOSCOW PAPER LAMPOONS U.S. PLANS TO PLACE MX ABOARD TRAINS

Moscow GUDOK in Russian 16 Nov 86 p 3

[Article by A. Ananyev under "International Feuilleton" rubric: A Reserved Seat to Eternity]

[Text] It was not so long ago that former air ace John Chain traded the cockpit of his fighter plane for a chair as director of the Strategic Air Command and he very much wanted to demonstrate his energy and initiative. In addition, he, as a person who was not too experienced in figuring out the fine points of presidential eloquence, was seriously concerned by some statements by the head of the White House. The frequently repeated words, for example, about the "dream" of destroying ballistic missiles.

What if the President's dream actually comes true" worried Chain. They might suddenly turn our MX's into scrap metal.

He scrupulously began to analyze the debates in Congress on the appropriation of funds for the next 50 MX intercontinental missiles. And he understood that the legislative fathers had shouted themselves hoarse not because of the extreme danger of these weapons but only on account of the means of their basing.

Why did I not pay attention to this before, said the general. It is clear that they are now blocking the new Pentagon request for the next batch of MX's for the same reason. The members of Congress were demanding right out: the nuclear giants must be mobile....

Mobility...mobility...and what if the missiles are put on railroad flatcars? Chain remembered the February "State of the Nation" speech of the head of the White House, in which Reagan called the national rail transport in the United States a "toy locomotive," which, he says, is so unprofitable that it is simply time to throw it in the dump or at least sell it to private capital.

Wait a minute, Mr President, the national railroads can still serve....

Soon the defender of missiles and new supporter of rail transport gave an interview to the NEW YORK TIMES newspaper.

"My initiative is good," he claimed, "in that the MX's will be invulnerable to an enemy strike. For if they are deployed two on each train made up of freight flatcars and passenger cars for camouflage, then they will detect no missiles either from space or from the earth. In periods of increased tension, these trains can be dispersed throughout the entire territory of the United States within a few hours by order of the national command."

The general was certain that his idea would evoke wild joy on the steel trunk lines. Certainly! Many railroaders laid off as a result of the beginning sale of the railroads did not even dream of returning to work. And now, please, climb back in your locomotives and work for the good of your homeland!

• • •

The progressive public in the United States justly assessed Chain's "initiative" as the latest attempt of militaristic circles to take the country even farther from Reykjavik on trains with a "nuclear filling" and even further from the possibility of agreeing on stopping the arms race and on disarmament. And the workers of the country's steel highways are realizing that the idea of the "benefactor" from the Pentagon is giving them not so much a guarantee of jobs as a guarantee of going to eternity.

P.S. The idea presented by General Chain is being developed further. According to reports just received by the American information service NEWHOUSE, Pentagon strategists intend to use railroad equipment not only for the transport of the nuclear "monsters" but for other purposes as well. Citing informed sources, this agency indicates that it is proposed to establish a number of command centers that could be "transported on trucks, railroad flatcars, ships or aircraft."

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5200/1122

SALT/START ISSUES

CANADIAN EDITORIAL CRITICIZES U.S. SALT II DECISION

Vancouver THE SUN in English 1 Dec 86 p B4

[Editorial]

[Text]

The timing of President Ronald Reagan's decision to break the strategic arms limitation agreement is bizarre and likely to further delay any prospects of real superpower arms control.

The Canadian government's response is weak when in fact Canada has some leverage because it has been allowing cruise missile tests in this country.

Of course, as External Affairs Minister Joe Clark says, the world would be a better place if the United States abided by the terms of SALT II, which Mr. Reagan has now exceeded. It would be a lot better place if something were done about it. Allies such as Canada should be exerting much greater pressure on Mr. Reagan.

Earlier this year Mr. Reagan had signalled that he would abide by the unratified treaty that his country and the Soviet Union had nonetheless observed since 1979, unless the Soviets failed to offer progress in arms control. At Reykjavik and since, the Soviets have indeed offered new terms for arms control but Mr. Reagan has rejected them.

The situation is not merely confusing but dangerous. The stakes on superpower arms control go far beyond the bungling of sales to Iran and the Nicaraguan contras, they are nothing less than the world's survival.

CSO: 5220/21
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CANADIAN EDITORIAL ON U.S., SOVIET ATTITUDES ON SALT II

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 9 Dec 86 p A8

[Editorial]

[Text]

Moscow's decision to remain within the limits set by the SALT II agreement is welcome. By exercising restraint in the face of U.S. provocation, the Soviets are helping the cause of arms control — and scoring a few propaganda points in the bargain.

The Soviet move — even though it applies only "for the time being" — will encourage pro-SALT forces in the U.S. Congress and administration to continue their campaign to get the U.S. back under the treaty's limits. The Americans could do so by retiring a Poseidon submarine, for example.

It should also stimulate Washington's allies at this week's NATO foreign ministers' meeting to press their case for continued SALT II adherence with Secretary of State George Shultz.

The manner in which Moscow's pledge was made leaves something to be desired. Instead of using a scalpel to delicately trace the path of the angels, the Russians used a broadsword, accusing the Americans of trying to upset the military balance to gain military superiority. Coming from a nation that has surreptitiously violated the same treaty several times, that's a bit much.

What provoked the Soviet tirade was the American decision to make one more bomber operational. The Soviets also used the oppor-

tunity accuse the U.S. of planning to scrap the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty in order to pursue Star Wars. Talk about propaganda contingency planning!

Perhaps it was too much to expect the Russians to pass up the opportunity to dump on the Americans. But it wasn't very helpful. In the aftermath of his disastrous secret initiative with Iran, President Reagan is in no mood to appear soft on anything.

The SALT II issue raises a dual question: what is best for Western security and what is best for Western propaganda? Why should the Soviets have a monopoly on all the smart, appealing arms control initiatives? Why should the U.S. always seem to be on the wrong side in the public relations battle?

The self-imposed Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing is another case in point. Moscow will have to decide soon whether or not to continue it. If it decides to do so "for the time being," it will once again be hailed as the only superpower trying to preserve peace and reduce tensions.

So while praising the Soviets for their popular SALT II gesture, we implore President Reagan — as he cleans house and attempts to restore credibility to his policies — to instruct his "new" team to come up with imaginative initiatives on arms control that more than match those of the Russians.

The Western democracies cannot keep losing all the battles for hearts and minds. That's what the East-West struggle is all about.

PRC JOURNAL CITES CRITICISM OF U.S. SALT BREAKOUT

Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English Vol 29 No 50, 15 Dec 86 pp 11, 12

[Article by Xin Li]

[Text]

The US Air Force, on the orders of President Reagan, put into service on November 28 its 131st modified B-52 bomber equipped with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. This means that for the first time in seven years the United States has gone beyond the limits of the US-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), which allows the United States to have 1,320 strategic missile launchers, including 130 cruise missile carrying bombers.

Signed in 1979 by the late Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and former US President Jimmy Carter, SALT II was never ratified by the US Congress but adhered to informally by the US Government, using the power given to the president "to make treaties" by the US Constitution. President Reagan also used this same power to announce his final decision to scrap the treaty at a meeting with his top national security advisers on November 27, to counter the alleged Soviet threat and Soviet violations of the SALT II treaty.

The decision has drawn sharp criticism from leading Democrats. Senate democratic leader Robert Byrd said that as the only superpower to break the SALT II treaty, the United States invites the Soviets to do the same. Byrd also expressed the fear that the US move would hand the Soviet Union "the bonus of a propaganda victory in Europe." Representative Jim Wright, who will become House Speaker in

January, said that the US decision to scrap the treaty is a setback to the cause of nuclear disarmament and a further blow to the credibility of US foreign policy. Describing the decision as "a tremendous mistake," Patricia Schroeder, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, feared that it might be "more profitable" for the Soviet Union because "they can add more warheads to their weapons more quickly than we can." Senator Edward Kennedy said, "There is simply no good reason for the United States to move outside the SALT II limits at this time," and "the further stockpiling of nuclear weapons by both superpowers means an unbridled arms race."

The allies of the US, expressing deep regret over the decision, have called on the US to adhere to SALT II. A spokesman of the British Foreign Ministry said the UK would be holding discussions with the US in the search for a new accord on limiting strategic nuclear weapons. President Francois Mitterrand, regretting the US decision to exceed the limits of the SALT II treaty, said, "It would be very wise and very useful" to abide by the treaty. Though refraining from openly criticizing the United States for putting the over-the-limit B-52 bomber into service, West German government spokesman Friedhelm Ost said that both superpowers should adhere to the agreed upper limits

on strategic nuclear weapons, while insisting that the goal of both superpowers should be to reduce offensive nuclear weapons massively.

Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi wrote a letter to Reagan saying no steps should be taken to violate SALT II even if it is necessary to maintain the nuclear deterrent, and the Italian Government hoped the two sides would reach a more comprehensive treaty on the control and reduction of nuclear arms. In Canberra, the Australian Government has also expressed its deep regret over the US announcement. Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden said in a statement that Australia felt it was very important that the US and the Soviet Union comply with the terms of SALT II. He said the limits that SALT II placed on strategic arsenals added an important measure of predictability to the nuclear balance, and despite the treaty's imperfections, it was the only point from which the two superpowers can begin to discuss significant reductions in their nuclear forces.

Responding to the US announcement, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said in New Delhi that the US decision to exceed the limits of SALT II went against the entire logic of the Iceland summit. It would now be more difficult for both superpowers to find a road to disarmament, he said. ■

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: UK BOWS TO U.S. PRESSURE FOR CW STOCKPILES

PM121347 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Political observer V. Matveyev article: "As If They Did Not Have Enough Barbaric Weapons!"]

[Text] Something about which the British press wrote not so long ago with reservations, as if it were hypothetical, has now become an accomplished fact.

London's THE SUNDAY TIMES wrote on 18 May: "It is evident that the prime minister has to face an embarrassing request by the United States to deploy nerve gas in Britain as a direct result of the NATO decision to approve the production of a new generation of chemical weapons in the United States."

London official circles declared with respect to the press report: Washington has not addressed any such requests to Britain, but if they were received they would be examined "according to the circumstances."

Now it is becoming clear that London and Washington had secretly prepared and struck one more deal, fatal for the vital interests of Britain and of Europe as a whole.

The London newspaper TODAY reported a few days ago that equipment for the new U.S. weapons has already started arriving in the British Isles. This actually involves binary nerve weapons, whose manufacture in the United States, according to President Reagan's 14 November statement, gives "particular pleasure."

Delivery vehicles for these barbaric weapons in the shape of "Big A" air force bombs (used during the U.S. Air Force bombing raids on the Libyan capital, Tripoli) were recently transported from the United States to Britain. They are designed for the U.S. F-111 bombers stationed at U.S. Air Force bases on British territory.

TODAY reports details of this operation, proving how well informed it is. This equipment arrived initially at Greenham Common, where U.S. cruise missiles have been stationed since November 1983, and was later transported to Welford, the largest storage facility for U.S. nuclear weapons in Britain.

British and U.S. spokesmen have refused to confirm or deny this report by TODAY. Higher authorities in Britain have also kept silent hitherto. It appears that they would like to keep the country's public in total ignorance.

Britain is already a bridgehead for U.S. missiles with nuclear combat charges, for U.S. Air Force bombers, and for U.S. nuclear submarines.

For the umpteenth time Whitehall has submitted to unceremonious pressure exerted on it!

This time, pressure was exerted from two directions—from Washington and Bonn simultaneously. U.S. chemical weapons were introduced into the FRG over a prolonged period of time. The very same [day] THE SUNDAY TIMES pointed out that the Pentagon has deployed up to 1,000 metric tons of such materiel on West German territory, and has recently demanded the acceptance of binary weapons.

Bonn's ruling circles made their agreement to this conditional on an identical step by the British Government. Not a single other government in West Europe had expressed readiness to offer its territory for such Pentagon "products!" London and Bonn are thus harnessed in the same team. It is unnecessary to specify who is the team's driver.

Welford, where stockpiles of U.S. binary weapons in Britain are being stored, is no more than 100 km away from London. Combat ammunition for U.S. bomber aircraft, including nuclear weapons, has been stored there since 1954. What is the point in crying over spilt milk?

Official circles in London obviously imagine that they will be able to continue to impose this pernicious course on their people. But even the most shortsighted politicians in Whitehall cannot evade the fact that it is generating growing opposition, and the demand that U.S. bases be withdrawn is becoming an increasingly loud public slogan.

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CSO: 5200/1203

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR'S ISRAELYAN COMMENTS ON CW BAN PROSPECTS IN CD

'Move Forward' Noted

LD171750 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1647 GMT 17 Dec 86

[Text] Geneva, 17 December TASS — A regular round in the multilateral talks on banning chemical weapons took place here over recent weeks within the framework of the Disarmament Conference. At the center of the attention of the conference participants were the new Soviet proposals, put forward at the conference in elaboration of M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986. These are proposals on the verification of the nonmanufacture of chemical weapons by commercial industry and on verifications on demand [proverki po zaprosu].

On the basis of the Soviet proposals there occurred in the course of the round the famous move forward in agreeing on certain key questions in the future convention for banning chemical weapons, although on a number of aspects the United States and other NATO countries continue to create artificial difficulties at the talks. However, it is now clear that the Soviet proposals are opening the way to concluding a convention as early as 1987.

To this end, it is necessary, above all, that the other participants in the talks also demonstrate political will and commitment [zainteresovannost], V.I. Israelyan, head of the USSR delegation, emphasized while speaking to journalists. He called on the other parties to step up the work so as not to let slip the apparent opportunity of excluding forever from military arsenals mass-destruction weapons as terrible as chemical weapons.

The next round of talks will open on 12 January.

Hopeful of Agreement in 1987

LD181132 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 18 Dec 86

[Report by Switzerland correspondent Vladimir Dmitriyev]

[Text] In the Palace of Nations in Geneva the latest round of the multilateral talks on banning chemical weapons went on for almost a month within the framework of the disarmament conference. Our correspondent in Switzerland, Vladimir Dmitriyev, reports:

[Dmitriyev] Questions associated with concluding an international convention on banning these weapons and eliminating existing stocks of them were at the center of

attention of those participating in the talks. The Soviet Union favors the rapid and complete elimination of chemical weapons and the actual industrial bases for manufacturing them. Indeed, it is thanks to the constructive position of the Soviet side that further progress on a number of clauses in a draft international convention was ensured here. The results of the latest round are the subject of comment by the head of the Soviet delegation, Comrade Israelyan:

[Begin Israelyan recording] The Soviet delegation introduced new proposals concerning a number of key problems in the future convention, in particular on banning the manufacture of chemical weapons in the commercial and civil chemical industry, as well as on one of the most acute questions, that is on carrying out on-site verification [proverka] on demand.

In order to ease the talks the Soviet Union accepted as a basis the proposal of the United Kingdom, which is evidence of our flexibility and our desire to conclude the talks as soon as possible.

On the whole the talks, it seems to me, provide a basis for expressing the hope that if there are no negative circumstances, and if the remaining participants in the talks display the same kind of will and interest in concluding a convention on chemical weapons, then it can actually become a reality in 1987 and an important measure for ridding our planet of weapons of mass destruction, one of which is chemical weaponry. [end recording]

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CSO, 5200/1203

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

IZVESTIYA HITS NATO RESPONSE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CURBS

PM151725 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Vikentiy Matveyev "Political Observer's Opinion": "The Halifax Mountain and the Brussels Mouse"]

[Text] It is 6 months since the Budapest conference of the Warsaw Pact States' Political Consultative Committee adopted an appeal to the NATO states and all European countries containing a program for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

At a meeting in Halifax (Canada) the NATO countries' representatives decided to set up a special "high-level" group to study the problem of conventional armaments in Europe. It would also have the job of elaborating a response to the Budapest appeal.

As you can see, it worked for some months. It had to examine the Warsaw Pact countries' quite specific proposals envisaging definite stages of substantial, clearly identified cuts in the ground forces and tactical strike aircraft of the European states and of corresponding U.S. and Canadian forces and facilities in Europe. As well as conventional armaments, operational-tactical nuclear armaments with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers would be subject to cuts.

What is the outcome? It can be judged by the NATO declaration on "conventional arms control" which has just been published and which was adopted at this year's NATO Council session in Brussels. The fact that the term "disarmament" is missing from the very name of the documents is an indication of the nature of the statement.

Apparently, it is the "first report." The NATO Council session participants instructed the Halifax group to "continue its work and in the future submit reports on a regular basis."

It is evident from this that the bloc leaders intend to talk practically ad infinitum, avoiding any practical action in that sphere.

There is no mention at all in the declaration of the proposals contained in the Budapest appeal! As if it never existed!

There is only one explanation for this stance: The NATO bosses have nothing to say on the matter and they balk at anything concrete because they are averse to it and it is at odds with their principles and plans agreed to continuing to intensify the arms race, both nuclear and conventional.

And all this is presented in the Brussels declaration as a "contribution" to some kind of stability on the continent, in the style of an illusionist who presents black as white. I will cite that part of the declaration: "While maintaining effective means of deterrence, including nuclear and conventional forces, we (that is, NATO) are seeking to establish a stable correlation of conventional forces in Europe."

Where is the reduction in conventional forces about which so much noise has been made of late by those circles in Western Europe who want, on the pretext of this ballyhoo, to avoid practical action with regard to ridding the continent of nuclear weapons?

The authors of the declaration were silent on this matter. Judging by their document, they had no wish at all even to discuss the prospects of real steps in the disarmament sphere.

The only thing they are expressing willingness to do is to "elaborate a new mandate for talks on conventional arms control...."

So, first the mandate, then talks, not about the reduction of armed forces and armaments, but about "control"! How else can one interpret the wording of the declaration?

"Every effort should be made to fulfill the commitment to modernizing conventional forces," NATO Secretary General Carrington said at the opening of the Council session in Brussels. These are the guidelines for the bloc participants and they are dictated by the United States. It is just amazing, in that light of them, that Carrington talked of the "great" work done by the aforementioned group, set up in Halifax. The mountain did indeed give birth to a puny mouse!

General Rogers, supreme allied commander, Europe, addressed the U.S. Congress the other day, doing his bit to rule out any possibility of Europe's being made into a safer place. Assessing the Reykjavik meeting, he said that the achievement of an agreement there even on the basis of the U.S. proposals would have caused "considerable damage". Such a step, he claimed, "would undermine NATO's achievements over the past 7 years in strengthening combat might."

It appears that the group which sat after the meeting in Halifax was led by none other than General Rogers. He and his colleagues, personifying the Pentagon's militarist obsession, would like to dictate to Europe their rules and standards, whereby disarmament does not even get a look-in.

The public will certainly draw conclusions from this state of affairs in NATO.

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CSO: 5200/1209

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: REYKJAVIK, LIGACHEV TRIP GIVE NORDIC NFZ 'NEW IMPULSE'

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Nov 86 p 7

[Article by Yu. Kuznetsov under the "Echo of Reykjavik" rubric: "New Impulse for a Nuclear-Free North"]

[Text] The recent weeks have been giving the world, including the inhabitants of Western Europe, a more and more clear understanding of the fact that after Reykjavik a qualitatively new situation has arisen in international affairs. The struggle against the insanity of the nuclear arms race has reached a new high level. Under these conditions, it is becoming more important for there to be persistent efforts by all states, large and small, nuclear and nonnuclear, belonging to military-political alliances or outside of them, to achieve substantial progress in the matter of ensuring the security of nations.

One of the ways to strengthen this security is justifiably considered to be the implementation of the idea of nuclear-free zones. For more than 20 million people living in northern Europe, this idea that has been developing for many years has now become especially timely. It gathered hundreds of thousands and then millions of supporters under its banner. It also has received widespread international recognition. Thus, our country has repeatedly declared its willingness to give the necessary guarantees to a future zone and to discuss other measures relating to the bestowing of nuclear-free status to the region of northern Europe.

In Washington, they reacted differently--nervously and hostilely--to the thought of a nuclear-free European north. There they are trying to spread their own "nuclear patronage" to this region of the world as well. The NATO military maneuvers on the seas washing Scandinavia and in its air space are becoming larger and larger in scope. Washington is trying to revise the official position of its NATO allies Norway and Denmark, essentially carrying out a "creeping deployment" of nuclear weapons there, at times sending military ships and aircraft into their waters and ports and to their airfields for this purpose.

All of this is causing great alarm in the northern countries and their populations are gravitating more and more toward a nuclear-free zone. As Finnish President M. Koivisto recently noted, the idea of such a zone "has in

recent years received rapidly growing support in all northern countries." In explaining this fact, the president pointed out that "the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe would help to strengthen an atmosphere of confidence. Here there is a direct link between the security of northern Europe and the security of the entire continent."

It is precisely in this aspect and this connection that our country is approaching the plans to establish a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe. We believe that such a zone can exercise a considerable stabilizing influence on the general situation in the world. Proceeding from its peace-loving course in foreign policy, the Soviet Union is coming out in support of such constructive initiatives. Its position in this corresponds with the position of most members of the world community, for the idea of a nuclear-free zone has been approved by the United Nations.

The establishment of territories free from weapons of mass destruction in other parts of Europe as well, in the Balkans and the center of the continent, has become an important subject for political dialogue. More and more new "nuclear-free" centers are arising in different areas of the planet. Thus, the striving of people to free themselves from the cancer of nuclear weapons has attained the nature of a movement covering the entire planet. And this has not been without the influence of the initiative for a nuclear-free northern Europe presented almost a quarter century ago by U.K. Kekkonen.

In the countries of northern Europe, realistically thinking political and public persons are undertaking efforts for the practical advancement of the idea of the zone. An interparliamentary commission of northern countries has begun to work on this question. Responsible state and party officials in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway are expressing interest in such a zone. "Through their joint efforts, the northern countries can demonstrate that a nuclear-free zone corresponds to the interests of all states," wrote SUOMENMAA, one of the largest Finnish newspapers, recently.

Under these circumstances, the new Soviet initiatives have evoked great interest in the region, in Europe and in the entire world. In the interests of strengthening security and stability in northern Europe, the Soviet Union considered it possible, in supplementing and developing its own position on a nuclear-free north, to take the subsequent new steps announced in Helsinki by Ye. K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee:

First. We have already taken down the medium-range missile launchers on Kola Peninsula and most launchers for these missiles in the remaining territory of Leningrad and Baltic military districts and have redeployed several divisions of operational and tactical missiles from these districts. This is a specific confirmation of the previously expressed willingness of the USSR to examine the question of several substantial measures applying to its own territory adjacent to the future nuclear-free zone.

Second. In affirming our support for the idea of giving nuclear-free status to the water area of the Baltic Sea in the framework of the realization of the proposal for a nuclear-free north, we could, in the event that an agreement is

reached between the corresponding states in this matter, remove the submarines armed with ballistic missiles from the Soviet Baltic Fleet.

Third. In supporting the idea of possible confidence-building measures in northern Europe and the water area of the adjoining Arctic, Norwegian, Barents and Baltic seas, the Soviet Union is proposing the limitation of the intensity of large-scale military exercises in this region. Such exercises--at a level of 25,000 people or more--should be carried out no more often than once or twice every 1 to 2 years.

Fourth. For the purpose of strengthening confidence-building measures in the naval area, we share the idea of utilizing the positive experience of the 1972 Soviet-American agreement on the prevention of incidents on the open seas and in the air space over them. As everyone knows, the Soviet Union entered into a similar agreement with England in July 1986.

"We assume," said Ye. K. Ligachev at a press conference in Helsinki, "that these new steps of ours will be perceived positively by all those who are interested in strengthening the conditions of peace in northern Europe and I say right out that we expect a countermovement."

Political and public circles and many press organs of northern and other countries highly valued the Soviet initiatives. Finnish Prime Minister K. Sorsa called this specific manifestation of the peace-loving course of the Soviet Union a "bold unilateral gesture." It "strengthens the notion that in Reykjavik the Soviet Union was striving to emphasize a policy of disarmament," notes the newspaper KHYUVYUDSTADSLADET. L. Budts, chairman of the commission on questions of security and foreign policy of the Social Democratic Party, declared that the Soviet Union's support of the idea of giving nuclear-free status to the water area of the Baltic Sea in the framework of the realization of the proposal for a nuclear-free north is very important. Thanks to the new Soviet proposals, writes UUSI SUOMI, "the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe has been further accelerated."

So, one might ask, what is the trouble? The very idea of a nuclear-free north and the new Soviet proposals contributing to its implementation have been received positively, not just in the region but in the neighboring states as well, as was reflected even in some press organs of the FRG. Nevertheless, there are, of course, many difficulties on the way to putting the idea into effect. There are still those opposing it, both in the region itself and especially beyond its western borders.

Washington's reaction is indicative. They are silent there now. It may be said that their silence says a lot. The fact is that the idea of nuclear-free zones, just as the antinuclear movement in the world in general, goes against the basic concepts of the imperial policy of the United States and especially against its favorite child, the nuclear-laser program SDI. For Washington, then, the plans to free the nations from the nuclear threat is a sharp knife.

We say directly and openly: we are interested in finally having a positive solution for this acute problem facing northern Europe. We are for the liberation of the inhabitants of northern, southern, central and all of Europe from a possible nuclear nightmare. We are people of truly good will inhabiting the European land.

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: NORWEGIAN PREMIER ON TEST BAN, REYKJAVIK, NORDIC NFZ

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Nov 86 p 4

[Interview with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland by M. Kostikov; date and place unknown: "Security--A Common Concern"]

[Text] Oslo, November--M. Kostikov, PRAVDA's own correspondent in the countries of northern Europe, appealed to Gro Harlem Brundtland, Norwegian prime minister and chairman of the Norwegian Labor Party (social democrats), with the request that she answer a series of questions.

[Question] How do you, Ms Prime Minister, assess the unilateral moratorium of the USSR on all nuclear explosions, which has already been in effect for more than 1 year?

[Answer] The Norwegian Government views the complete cessation of nuclear tests as an important measure in arms control. Norway is therefore participating actively in international efforts in the United Nations as well as the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in favor of the stopping of nuclear testing.

The Norwegian side has expressed a willingness to support measures that can contribute to the complete cessation of nuclear tests. In our view, such measures can be most effective if they are implemented in an agreement between the interested sides.

[Question] If the United States joined the Soviet moratorium, would it be possible to verify its observance reliably?

[Answer] Norway has considerable knowledge in the area of the verification of a future agreement on the termination of nuclear tests. Recently, at the summer session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, we presented a new working document on seismic verification of the observance of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. In this connection, the Norwegian side noted

with interest that at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament recently the Soviet Union came out in favor of the development of a system for the exchange of data on the configuration of waves as part of a global seismic network. We consider it encouraging that experts of the United States and the USSR will continue to exchange opinions on all matters having to do with nuclear tests.

Recent scientific research in the area of the seismic verification of nuclear tests, in which Norway itself has made a specific contribution and acquired substantial knowledge, has shown that there is now a rather good chance for effective control. The most important technical problems in need of a solution are problems having to do with the registration of low-power blasts and explosions in underground cavities.

[Question] Do you think that the stopping of nuclear tests could be the first step toward the curbing of the nuclear arms race?

[Answer] We believe that the termination of nuclear tests can serve as an important measure in connection with efforts to achieve profound reductions in nuclear arsenals.

[Question] How do you relate to the statement by the United States to the effect that it is essential for it to continue nuclear tests, in particular for the practical implementation of its "star wars" plans?

[Answer] Norway has repeatedly spoken out in favor of the prevention of the arms race in space. In the first place, we have hopes that the bilateral talks between the United States and the USSR in Geneva will produce such a result. The showing of restraint by both sides has great importance in this connection.

[Question] How do you view the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons?

[Answer] The declaration of the United States and the USSR that their long-term objective is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is very important. Of great importance, in particular, is the agreement between President R. Reagan and CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev at the Geneva summit meeting last year to make it their goal to reduce strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent. The work to eliminate nuclear weapons is inherently a lengthy process. A number of important problems are still awaiting solutions. We therefore noted with disappointment that the meeting in Reykjavik did not lead to specific results in the area of disarmament. Nevertheless, so much was achieved in Iceland that there must be a good basis for further negotiations in Geneva.

Although the complete elimination of nuclear weapons can become a real possibility only in the long term within the framework of the existing negotiations, it is the point of view of Norway that an agreement should be reached on significant reductions in strategic arms as well as medium-range missiles.

[Question] What is your attitude toward the proposal on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe?

[Answer] The discussion of the problems of a nuclear-free zone in the north is also part of the further efforts for the reduction of nuclear arsenals in Europe. We on the Norwegian side have stressed that work in this area must be carried out as part of a broader European regulation within the scope of our affiliation with NATO.

[Question] What do you think in regard to the necessity of a new approach to the resolution of international problems and new political thinking presupposing the resolution of these problems by way of cooperation and compromises rather than military confrontation?

[Answer] We share the point of view that problems in the world must be solved through peaceful cooperation and not through military confrontation. In a nuclear age, the security of all states is interdependent. In this connection, I want to stress the importance of the concept that was once put forward by the Palme Commission: mutual security.

In conclusion, I want to say that for the current Norwegian Government, just as for previous governments, the development of relations with our neighbor, the Soviet Union, is an important goal. To establish mutual understanding, which is a precondition for stable relations between neighbors, it is essential to support a broad and regular political dialogue. By the way, I myself am impatiently awaiting my visit to Moscow in December of this year in connection with the upcoming session of the UN Commission on the Environment.

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CSO: 5200/1122

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: NORDIC NFZ IDEA AT VARIANCE WITH NATO STRATEGY

PM121133 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Dec 86 Second Edition p 3

[Article by L. Savanin under the rubric "International Notes": "For a Nuclear-Free North"]

[Text] The Soviet Union's active foreign policy course aimed at building an all-embracing international security system is a very important factor in the struggle for a nuclear-free world. Nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world have an enormous role to play in its formation.

The idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe has been around for some decades now. It was voiced in 1963 by Finnish President U. Kekkonen. The idea has known both periods of active discussion and periods when attempts have been made to muffle it.

A definite trend toward reviving this process has been noticeable in Scandinavian recent years. A regular exchange of opinions among Nordic countries' foreign ministers and parliamentarians has been taking place. The public of the region is also taking an active part in this movement. And no wonder. The appearance of American first-strike nuclear missiles in Europe and the expansion of NATO military preparations influence the strategic situation in the north of the European continent and are generating grave concern among its population.

The Finnish side recently introduced a new element into this idea. Finnish President M. Koivisto, viewing the problem of creating a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe in conjunction with military and political confidence-building measures in the region, stressed the special importance of limiting naval activity there. That initiative evoked a positive response in Sweden, Norway, and other Scandinavian countries. The constructive nature of the proposal also met with understanding in the Soviet Union.

Our country actively supports the proposal to create a nuclear-free north. The USSR has repeatedly stressed its readiness to conclude a multilateral agreement with the countries belonging to the zone or an agreement with each of them individually with a commitment on its part not to use nuclear weapons against them.

Developing the Soviet stance during his visit to Finland, Ye. K. Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, reported on the practical new steps being taken by our country to stabilize the situation in that region. The dismantling of medium-range missile launchpads on the Kola Peninsula and the bulk of the launchpads for such missiles in the rest of the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts and the redeployment of several battalions of operational-tactical missiles away from those districts is concrete confirmation of the USSR's readiness to make this process ongoing in character.

Our country's support for the idea of granting the Baltic Sea nuclear-free status as part of the implementation of the proposal for a nuclear-free north and its readiness, on achievement of an accord on this issue among the appropriate states, to withdraw its submarines equipped with ballistic missiles from the Soviet Baltic Fleet are evidence of the Soviet Union's sincere interest in consolidating stability in the region.

In support of the idea of possible confidence-building measures for the North, Norwegian, Barents, and Baltic Seas the USSR has proposed limiting the intensiveness of major military exercises in the region.

Progressive circles in Scandinavia have seen the Soviet initiatives as opening up new prospects for creating a zone free of nuclear weapons in northern Europe. Prominent figures in Finland, Sweden, and Denmark express their support for the new Soviet proposals.

However, the winds blowing from across the Atlantic, winds whose influence has always been keenly felt on the European seas, quite quickly carried a response in the form of utterances by NATO experts who hastened to describe the Soviet moves as pure propaganda gestures. Allegations that the Soviet Union "will withdraw obsolete arms" which have no "practical application in the region," have been put into circulation. This kind of argument accords very well with U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense R. Perle's statement that "talks" about creating a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe are "pointless." The reason for this stance is clear: The implementation of this idea does not fit in with NATO's nuclear strategy and could set an undesirable (from the Atlanticists' standpoint) example intensifying similar trends in other regions of the world.

But, as is well known, it is difficult to stop the march of history, no matter what obstacles you erect in its path. Today, thanks to constructive Soviet proposals, the idea of a nuclear-free north has begun to resound with new force. However, an enormous amount of work still lies ahead if the idea is to produce concrete results.

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CSO: 5200/1086

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

HIROSHIMA RESIDENTS PROTEST FRENCH TESTS--Hiroshima, Dec. 10 KYODO--A group of 33 residents of Hiroshima, site of the world's first atomic bombing 41 years ago, Wednesday held a one-hour "sit-in" to protest the latest French nuclear test in the South Pacific. The local citizens started the sit-in at noon in front of the park's memorial cenotaph for victims of the A-bomb to protest Sunday's underwater nuclear test. The latest sit-in is the 19th to date this year and marks the 331st such demonstration. The local governments of Japan's two A-bombed cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, have long taken a stance against nuclear tests and the arms race. Two tourists from New Zealand visiting the park offered the protestors moral support, pointing out it was unfortunate that France continued to test nuclear bombs despite protests by their nation. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0709 GMT 10 Dec 86 OW] /6662

CS0: 5260/057

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET MILITARY JOURNAL ON BASIC CONCEPTS OF U.S. POLICY

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 7, Jul 86 (signed to press 9 Jul 86) pp 7-11

[Article by Col B. Putilin, candidate of historical sciences: "What is Behind U. S. National Security Policy"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th Party Congress notes: "Imperialism, due to its social nature, constantly generates an aggressive, adventuristic policy." This is particularly clearly manifested at present, when through its fault there has been a sharp exacerbation of the international situation. The United States is initiating a new spiral in the arms race and is attempting to extend it into space. The American administration ignores, and at times even directly flouts the interests of different countries and peoples, and openly claims the "right" of armed intervention in the affairs of other states, under the pretext of ensuring its "national security." This policy was officially set down back in 1947 in the U. S. National Security Law.

For almost 40 years the policy of "ensuring national security" was continuously supplemented and expanded by virtually all American presidents who followed one another in these years. In its essence this policy represents the theory and practice of the struggle by American imperialism for world domination and to preserve and strengthen the capitalist system. U. S. ruling circles, attempting to conceal its reactionary imperialist essence, emphasize in every possible way the "national" character of the political policy of the most aggressive Western state. They identify the narrow, selfish aspirations of the exploitative class with the fundamental interests of the American people.

U. S. "national security" policy pursues the specific objective of achieving absolute security for the United States, in so doing placing all other countries and peoples in a position of absolute danger. It is distinguished by extreme aggressiveness and expansionism, called upon to secure the global objectives and interests of American imperialism, and its practical implementation is viewed most of all through the prism of coercion. In accordance with this policy, the use of all forms and methods of coercion against other states is envisioned: from "psychological warfare" and economic sanctions to armed intervention and state terrorism.

According to the 1947 law, "ensuring national security" assumes combining efforts in foreign, domestic and military policy to achieve the objectives of American imperialism. However, reliance on force prevails in this process and stipulates the priority of the latter. It also defines the leading role of military doctrine in the whole system of officially accepted views on ensuring U. S. "national security."

American military doctrine has a clearly expressed aggressive nature and serves the interests and objectives of the imperialist circles. Its socio-political aspect has always had a reactionary, anti-democratic thrust and virtually reflects the ideology of the ruling class. Basic in the military-technical side of doctrine is the constant aspiration of American ruling circles to have military superiority over any enemy, which, in their opinion, ensures the "absolute security" of U. S. global interests.

The military-political and military-strategic aims of American military doctrine stem entirely from the provisions of the policy of "ensuring national security," one of the main features of which is U. S. readiness to apply military force in conflict situations which it has created. However, it is emphasized in official documents for propaganda purposes that the armed forces are assigned the functions of "deterrence" and "defense." The former assumes the planned and gradual coercion of an enemy to act under American conditions, under the threat of the use of force. "Defense," according to official U. S. documents, signifies the direct use of armed forces (with and without a declaration of war). Another important feature of the doctrine is the fact that the military departments can be involved in carrying out ideological, economic and political coercion.

The military-strategic aims of the doctrine stem from requirements about the defense of American "national interests." U. S. armed forces are involved mainly in ensuring so-called vital interests and survival. Survival is associated with struggle against the Soviet Union and the "destruction of socialism as a social and political system," which represents, according to ruling American circles, "the greatest military threat to the interests of the United States." Vital interests also include American foreign policy and foreign economic positions, the undermining of which could seriously damage U. S. security and well-being.

At the present stage, the U. S. military and political leadership, taking into account the demands of trans-national monopolies, represent "regional conflicts" as a threat to their "vital interests." The so-called "doctrine of neo-globalism" (also called the "Reagan Doctrine") became the theoretical basis for this change. It envisions whipping up centers of tension and expanding crude intervention, mostly with the use of military force, in the internal affairs of the liberated states.

In accordance with this doctrine, the U. S. "right" to armed intervention is openly claimed, under the guides of combating terrorism, in those areas of the world where Washington sees a "threat to the national interests" of the United States. Declaring terrorism a "type of war, aimed at undermining U. S. national security," the Pentagon leaders and Department of State are

implementing the concept of "counter-terrorism," which includes both open and secret use of armed forces, which could participate in preventive actions against terrorists and their infrastructure, and against the states serving as their guarlians. In fact, crises and conflicts are fertile soil for international terrorism.

In accordance with the policy of "ensuring national security," all countries are divided into enemies and allies of the United States. For more than 40 years already U. S. ruling circles have seen the USSR as the main enemy, the "superpower," to the elimination of which from the world arena all military organizational development and planning are subordinated. With respect to the states of the socialist community and the progressive liberated states, along with direct military intervention in these countries, undermining them from within is envisioned, through the use of armed counterrevolution and the threatened use of force.

U. S. allies are assigned an important place in the struggle for world domination. The American military and political leadership considers military-political blocs and bilateral agreements to be the main instrument for uniting them on an anti-communist and anti-Soviet basis. Washington places priority importance on four multilateral groupings. NATO; the Rio Pact, uniting the countries of Latin America; ANZUS (U. S., Australia and New Zealand) and SEATO, which virtually ceased to exist in 1975, but which retained its political foundation. The U. S. has bilateral "security treaties" with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, as well as agreements and commitments of a military nature with approximately 30 other countries.

In the late 1970s the principle of "partnership" was placed at the foundation of coordination with allies. Accordingly, the Pentagon promised to provide a "nuclear shield" for its allies, and the latter were to be prepared to wage conventional wars using their own forces, with military and economic support from the United States.

Implementing a policy of total confrontation, the Reagan Administration is striving to replace the principle of "partnership" with that of "strategic partnership with the leading role of the United States." Washington's efforts to establish new, regional military and political blocs along the eastern and southern borders of the Soviet Union became more active. For example, the "Pacific community" could become the eastern equivalent of NATO. In the south the Reagan Administration is trying to turn the cooperative council of Persian Gulf Arab States into yet another military and political bloc, which would be aggressive in nature. An important element of "strategic partnership" is the further development of cooperation with "strategic allies" in the area of the liberated states. These include, in particular, Israel, Pakistan, the UAR and Honduras. The "leading role" in the framework of "strategic partnership" assumes complete subordination of the allies to the United States. Even their closest NATO allies must, Washington believes, be subject to strict discipline, established and zealously maintained by the current U. S. administration.

Military theoreticians, classifying wars and defining their nature, begin from a so-called "general theory of conflict," which lumps together all possible

forms of abstractly understood social conflicts: a clash of individuals; fights between monopolistic competitors; the struggle of the workers against capital; civil wars, putsches and coups, and wars between states, irrespective of their specific historical and socio-political nature. In accordance with this theory, war is merely a stage, a level of conflict, and its emergence the result of the "escalation" of conflict. Recent statements by U. S. leaders emphasize that U. S. "national" policy for the long term is oriented on "the most varied conflicts, which occupy an intermediate position between large scale war and general peace." In accordance with the general theory of conflict, wars are classified by scale (general and limited), weapons used (nuclear and conventional) and intensity of military operations (high, medium and low intensity).

Since the early 1980s official American military sources have distinguished five types of war: general (nuclear and conventional); limited (nuclear and conventional within a theater of war, usually in a TVD [Theater of Military Operations] or a limited region of a TVD). According to level of intensity, nuclear wars are high intensity conflicts and general conventional wars and conventional wars within a theater of war are medium intensity conflicts. Conventional war in a TVD and the participation of American troops in internal conflicts of other countries are elements of "low intensity conflicts." Sometimes the latter imply a situation in which opposing groupings are struggling for political control, combining military and political actions.

The nature of limited wars, according to American military theory, is determined by limitations which are supposedly introduced by the U. S. military and political leadership in terms of the objectives, weapons used, objects of destruction and geographic scope. In "low intensity conflicts," according to a statement by U. S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, American armed forces have only one mission — total victory over the enemy.

The defense of U. S. "national interests" presumes the need to maintain armed forces which must accomplish total "deterrence" and "defense." Moreover, it stipulates the deployment of forward groupings of American troops and naval forces in various areas of the world, most of all along the borders of the Soviet Union (the concept of "forward lines"), the creation of a powerful strategic reserve and increasing the capabilities for rapid reinforcement of forward groupings of armed forces or the deployment of new groupings in areas where there is no continuous American military presence.

Throughout the entire post-war period (and especially at the present stage) a clear tendency can be traced in the organizational development of the U. S. armed forces toward the creation of more modern weapons than those of the enemy and toward their maximal use for the achievement of military-strategic objectives. The Reagan Administration is devoting particular attention to improving strategic offensive forces and to creating conditions for "guaranteed survival" in case of nuclear war. The capabilities of all strategic offensive force components to make a first "preemptive" strike are being supplemented in every possible way by deploying intermediate range nuclear weapons (Pershing-2 IRBMs and cruise missiles) in Western Europe. What is in fact a new component of American offensive forces is being created

along the USSR borders, which may become the main means of conducting nuclear strikes within the theater of war.

U. S. general purpose forces, besides being equipped with a growing number of nuclear weapons and high-precision conventional weapons, are being improved qualitatively and increased quantitatively. Light divisions are being developed in the U. S. Army and divisions, brigades and regiments are being equipped with air-transportable armored vehicles and various helicopters, which significantly improve their mobility. The allocation of part of the strategic reserve into the "rapid deployment force" and planned changes in the correlation of "light" and "heavy" divisions have significantly increased the ability of U. S. Armed Forces to participate in "low intensity conflicts." The development of a more powerful Navy (up to 600 combatant ships) will make it possible, in the opinion of the U. S. Navy command, to conduct successful combat operations in any area of the world's oceans. Besides the growth of the U. S. Air Force tactical aircraft fleet, the appearance in inventory of more modern multi-purpose fighters, increased intensity in the use of aircraft and improvement in the command and control system are having a substantial influence on increasing their military capabilities.

The aggressive and adventuristic nature of American military doctrine is manifested with particular force in its aims of unleashing war by surprise. As B. Brody, the American military theoretician, wrote, in this case "the attacking side may reduce to a permissible minimum the damage caused to it, while at the same time inflicting militarily irreparable damage upon the enemy." In his opinion, such an outcome portends total victory to him who attacks first. As can be seen from foreign press reports, in the practice of operational and military training of the armed forces of the U. S. and its allies, the most probable methods of unleashing wars are: surprise attacks by combat ready groupings in peace time or transition to military operations following secret mobilization.

A "lightning" preemptive strike, in the opinion of the American command, is the main content of the initial operations in any type of war. It makes it possible to seize and hold the strategic initiative. Combat operations can be waged successfully only under conditions in which the problems of the comprehensive defeat of the enemy and the increasing spatial scope of offensive operations are solved. In connection with this, the Pentagon approved a new concept, the "air-ground operation (battle)."

With the introduction of the new FM 100-5 field manual in 1982, the principle of tactical mobility in the organization and conduct of military operations has taken on special importance. Under conditions in which the enemy is struck throughout the full depth of his operational formation, maneuver by forces and weapons will make it possible, in the opinion of American military specialists, to achieve success in an operation by moving to the enemy flank and rear and thereby crushing his will to resist. As a result of this, the main strike must be made against the most vulnerable places, the so-called "operational windows," which arise as the result of destruction in depth.

In recent years certain changes have been noted in American military doctrine on questions of preparing the country for war. A policy has been implemented

toward ensuring the capability for waging a protracted general nuclear and conventional war. According to "studies" which have been made it has been determined that the United States can survive a nuclear conflict with permissible losses (up to 40 million people) and, thereby, "win" the war. To reduce losses in such a war it has been recognized as advisable to continue to develop passive population protection measures, in connection with which \$4 billion was allocated for the construction of bomb shelters.

Fundamentally new in this posing of the question (winning the war) was the doctrinal aim of the Reagan Administration to create space strike weapons. One of the most important steps in this direction was the adoption of the "star wars" program. Even former U. S. Secretary of Defense MacNamara acknowledges that a large scale space based system will become an addition to the huge arsenal of offensive weapons which exists in the U. S. Such a system is aimed at maintaining the most important enemy targets constantly in sight and ensuring U. S. invulnerability after it makes a first nuclear strike.

The ideological preparation of the U. S. for war is determined by the doctrinal requirement of ensuring popular support for military actions and achieving "national unity." It is based on the idea of the exclusiveness of the "American social system," as well as on intensified militarization of the political thinking in the country. To ensure popular support for the Pentagon's military ventures, it is considered necessary to emphasize in every possible way the ideological incompatibility with the probable enemy (the socialist countries), as well as the unavoidability of the use of American armed forces. This resulted in the appearance in speeches by American officials of such expressions as a "crusade against communism," "the USSR — the evil empire," etc. Chauvinistic campaigns on various pretexts are regularly conducted in the country. These pretexts include the opening of the monuments to American soldiers killed during the aggression in Vietnam; the celebration of the anniversary of "victory" of Grenada, etc. The mass media also promotes militarism in all layers of the population.

The more the course of historical development saps the positions of imperialism, the more hostile the policy of its most reactionary forces is becoming to the interests of the peoples. The policy of "ensuring national security" reflects most fully how far militarization of political thinking in the United States has come. Soviet military theory, in contrast to American, is entirely based on a policy of peace. The party is doing everything possible to halt attempts and plans by U. S. militarism to solve militarily the historic dispute between the two opposing social systems. This defines the thrust of Soviet military doctrine. "The CPSU," it is stated in the Party Program, "will make every effort to see that the USSR Armed Forces are at a level which prevents the forces of imperialism from attaining strategic superiority."

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR; U.S. C-3 SYSTEM MAKES ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR POSSIBLE

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 7, Jul 86 (signed to press 9 Jul 86) pp 11-13

[Article by I. Kulikov: "Unauthorized Nuclear War is Possible"]

[Text] The catastrophe of the American Challenger spacecraft showed that plans for deploying weapons systems in space are fraught with deadly danger to mankind. At the same time, it again attracted attention to the question of the reliability of the latest technical means of command, control and communications. Many American political figures, as well as specialists, note that difficulties and interruptions in these systems may cause an unauthorized nuclear war to arise. This problem is examined in Daniel Ford's book, "The Button. The Pentagon's System for Command and Control of Strategic Forces," published in 1985 simultaneously in the U. S., Great Britain and Australia. Its author is a scientific associate at Harvard University.

The book brings out numerous facts, documents and statements by American political, public and military figures and scholars about the structure, operating mechanism, capabilities and "weak points" in the strategic forces command, control and communications system. Ford had the opportunity to visit personally a number of command posts and see for himself that the "nuclear trigger" is imperfect. To prove this the author brings up a number of recent examples.

Early in the morning on 3 Jun 80 a signal suddenly passed through technical communications means of the North American Air Defense Combined Command: "Soviet ballistic missiles are approaching the U. S." The Strategic Air Command Headquarters immediately ordered B-52 bomber crews to take off. Minuteman missiles were brought to immediate launch readiness. A corresponding report was sent to Washington. And suddenly the marks for "approaching Soviet missiles" on the display disappeared as suddenly as they appeared.

This time the "nuclear trigger" did not work. It was established that difficulties in one of the elements of the detection and notification system had occurred. But, the author emphasizes, there have been many such false alarms. In particular, the book brings up a case when U. S. reconnaissance satellites "located the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile in the

USSR." Soon it became clear that this was a gas flareup at one of the oil fields in Western Siberia.

In the past (720) years 630 nuclear weapons incidents have been registered in the U.S. A report prepared by a Senate Congressional commission indicated that from January 1979 through June 1980 alone false alarm signals occurred approximately 150 times. The British newspaper GUARDIAN wrote: "In 1983 every three days an average of two false signals about the initiation of nuclear war occurred."

The present U. S. military command and control system, Ford concludes, does not ensure reliable control over the employment of the country's nuclear forces. In other words, mankind may be plunged into nuclear catastrophe as a result of an error in the functioning of American technical command, control and communications systems or as a result of an incorrect interpretation by officials of strategic military information obtained through technical means. When the author received permission to visit a command post near Colorado Springs he was initially amazed at the grandiose scale of the subterranean facility and the numerous latest model apparatuses located therein. However, an attempt by the general on duty to communicate with Washington, at Ford's request, was not successful.

According to an assessment by former U. S. Assistant Secretary of Defense W. Perry, American leaders are not completely confident that the existing detection and notification system "will not give false alarms." Doctor D. Steinbruner, director of the Brookings Institution Center for Foreign Policy Studies, came to the conclusion that "it is doubtful that anyone will be able to control" this technical system in an emergency. In the opinion of Lt Gen N. Dickinson, much time and effort will still be required in order to eliminate the "weak points" in the system, of which there are "so many."

Ford's book brings up information which indicates the imperfect nature of technical means of command, control and communications between the Pentagon and nuclear missile submarines, especially of the special TAKAMO system communications relay aircraft. Due to the technically imperfect system of strategic command and control, American physicist G. York believes the deployment of such great nuclear power in the world's oceans "without reliable control," entails obvious danger. It does not exclude the possibility of a missile launch unauthorized by the President.

Thus, Ford asserts in the concluding chapter of his book that the condition of the American "nuclear trigger" must give serious cause, all the more so in that some military personnel — war hawks — have an exaggerated idea about the advantage of a preemptive nuclear strike. The author includes statements by a number of representatives of the U. S. high command, which make clear that the idea of a preemptive strike has always been part of U. S. military doctrine.

The tragedy, the author writes, is in the paradoxical split which has long existed in this country. The political leaders in Washington publicly express "defensive doctrines," but the generals are in practice preparing to make a first strike. As D. Meyer emphasizes in his review of this book (contained in

ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, July 1985), Ford has succeeded in convincingly disclosing the obvious "vulnerability" of technical systems and in proving that the U. S. President may even be unable to make a decision, for war may arise without his will and participation. And if one considers that the American "nuclear trigger" is imperfect, then people are justified in fearing the possibility that an unauthorized nuclear war may arise.

One must agree with this. You see, the truth is that the chimerical plans of American "hawks" to secure U. S. strategic military superiority over the USSR stimulate the arms race. A huge, far-flung system of strategic command and control has been created in the country, which suffers from technical imperfection that increases the possibility that the "nuclear genie" may get out of control of the U. S. political leaders and push the world to the brink of catastrophe.

Ford's book reflects the mood of that part of healthy minded America which ever more loudly and persistently favors negotiations with the USSR to limit and reduce strategic weapons and create a reliable international system of weapons control. At the same time, the book has been written and published from funds and in the interests of military industrial corporations which manufacture electronic equipment. Its true objective is to prove to the American public the inadequate effectiveness of U. S. systems for military command and control of nuclear forces and to justify the need for a sharp increase in expenditures to improve them. Critical statements concerning the Pentagon leadership, which is developing plans for a preemptive strike against the USSR, give the appearance of authenticity to the information brought out by the author. The popular depiction in the book of such complex military-technical issues is calculated to make them accessible to the American public at large and to enlist its support in the development of new militaristic programs.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR REPORTS, COMMENTARY ON NATO MEETINGS IN DECEMBER

Weinberger on Defense Ministers' Meeting

LD051556 Moscow TASS in English 1526 GMT 5 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 5 TASS — By TASS Military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

The United States is taking further measures to fasten West European countries to its "Star Wars" program and make them accomplices in violations of the 1972 Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems. Speaking in Brussels following a meeting of the NATO countries' defense ministers, Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger announced that orders had been placed with a number of industrial companies to develop a missile defense system for Western Europe. The U.S. defense secretary said that all NATO countries should work together to provide such a defense for Western Europe. The Soviet-U.S. ABM treaty, in the meantime, prohibits the parties, in no uncertain terms, either to transfer ABM systems or components to other countries or to deploy them outside their national territories. No "broad" or "narrow" interpretations of the treaty, which have gained currency in Washington, can cast even a hint of doubt on the meaning of its Article 9. Weinberger did not dare do this either, although he doesn't usually stand upon ceremony with treaties and is in the habit of casuistically interpreting U.S. commitments in the field of arms limitation and reduction.

Commenting on the Pentagon chief's announcement in Brussels Western analysts pointed out the fact that the combined worth of the American orders connected with a missile defense for Western Europe is 12 million dollars, or 300 times less than the sum set aside this fiscal year to develop an ABM defense for the United States itself.

It is crystal-clear that Washington's latest move is purely political and aims not to protect U.S. allies from a mythical "threat of a missile attack" but make certain that West European countries will support the U.S. "Star Wars" program. U.S. obstructionist actions in the field of arms limitation and reduction, including the renunciation of the SALT-2 treaty, the continued deployment of American first-strike medium-range missiles in Western Europe, the crash effort to develop strategic offensive arms and the refusal to honor the promise made in Geneva to prevent an arms race in space, make it clear that the Pentagon continues to abide by an aggressive strategy. Its purport is best expressed by this formula: "An antimissile shield for the United States, a limited nuclear war for Europe".

Special Consultative Group Meeting

LD112106 Moscow TASS in English 1846 GMT 11 Dec 86

[Text] Brussels December 11 TASS — By TASS correspondent Albert Balebanov:

NATO's special consultative group today held a meeting here as part of a session of the bloc's Council, devoting it to the "European aspect" of Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms.

A statement by the group's chairman, U.S. Ambassador Allen Holmes, which was issued after the meeting, stressed that the Pentagon would continue deploying American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe as scheduled.

The group's position on the integral Soviet package of inter-related proposals put on the table in Reykjavik is based on recognition of just one part of the package, which concerns medium-range missiles and missiles with a range of under 1,000 kilometers. The other proposals are ignored.

Chernyshev Hits 'Flexible Response'

LD121757 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1645 GMT 12 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow, 12 Dec (TASS) — TASS Observer on military issues, Vladimir Chernyshev, writes:

The session of the NATO Council in Evre, where the foreign ministers of the member-countries of the bloc assembled, demonstrated that the main aim of the political meetings is to secure a diplomatic cover-up of decisions worked out by the military leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance the day before, and which bear witness to the intention to continue the buildup of conventional weapons and maintaining considerable nuclear arsenals.

A perfect opportunity arose after Reykjavik to enter on a realistic path to free Europe and the whole world from the danger of nuclear annihilation. However, the Atlanticists not only failed to make use of that favorable moment, but also did everything possible to cancel out the positive aspects of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, and to set up additional obstacles on the path toward a nuclear-free world. Using somewhat modified phraseology, the NATO leadership remains committed to its nuclear strategy of "flexible response."

Blindly following Washington's policy lead, destroying the very basis of military detente, the majority of NATO countries did not have the courage to condemn the U.S. Administration's rejection of SALT II and its attempts to cancel the ABM Treaty. Only the representatives of two countries — Greece and Denmark — demonstrated political boldness, in adopting a special position with regard to the problems of the militarization of space.

Out of the Reykjavik "package of accords" the NATO Council session "pulled out" only that on which militarism may "warn its hands." While understanding full well the indissoluble linkage [svyaz] of the elements of the package, the authors of the documents of the session mention only the 50-percent reduction of the strategic weapons of the USSR and the United States and the removal of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe.

It is perfectly clear that with differences remaining between the USSR and the United States on the issue of strengthening the conditions of the ABM Treaty, such steps would not help to support the security of the USSR. Evidently the Atlanticists are calculating on precisely this outcome. In particular, in the event of a separate resolution of the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe, figures such as the FRG Defense Minister Manfred Woerner for example have their own aggressive "logic."

He stated directly, in the wings of the session, that in the event of a "zero solution" for medium-range missiles, NATO would still have aircraft and "it will still be possible to effect nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union" from the territory of Western Europe.

While expressing willingness to start discussions "between the East and the West" with the aim of working out a new mandate for talks on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals -- the NATO session here also erects a barrier in good time in the form of a statement about the "asymmetry and disproportion" which allegedly exist. This is the very same artificial barrier which for 13 years has been keeping the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe firmly at an impasse. Such an approach can hardly testify to some kind of willingness on the part of NATO to facilitate the success of new talks.

Conventional Arms Lead Denied

LD140136 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 13 Dec 86

[Text] In Brussels the final stage has ended [words indistinct] the session of the NATO Council just as the preceding meetings of NATO's (?Nuclear Planning Group) [words indistinct] took place amid claims of an alleged Soviet superiority in conventional armaments. Here is what our defense correspondent Aleksandr Vasilyev writes in this connection:

The prospects of a nuclear-free Europe, a nuclear-free world, that opened up and were discussed in principle in Reykjavik have frightened NATO leaders and made them once again resort to the false claims about an alleged Soviet military menace, this time [words indistinct] in the superiority of the nonnuclear force [words indistinct].

NATO strategists are trying to convince the public that without nuclear weapons the West will come to face the overwhelming superiority of Moscow in conventional weapons, especially tanks.

We must say that the NATO leadership is not playing fair. It juggles with figures and facts for selfish purposes. As a result of this play the defense ministers of the NATO Eurogroup decided a few days ago to step up conventional armaments and put into service next year 275 tanks, 170 planes, new warships, and so forth. It would seem that there is no need to return to what was proved a long time ago, namely that there is a military-strategic parity between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and that equality in conventional armaments is an inseparable component of this parity. However, in the light of the latest claims made by NATO we are forced to do so, though it is not very easy to determine the exact correlation of forces in conventional armaments.

The comparison of combat-ready divisions can give a certain idea of this. Such divisions are capable of entering hostilities without additional time for preparation.

It is true that the total number of such divisions of the Soviet Union is greater than that of the United States. But this is determined by the geographic and strategic location of the Soviet Union and the necessity to guarantee a balance in different regions bordering on it not only in Europe. The land borders of the Soviet Union are over 20,000 kilometers long. However, in Europe 94 NATO divisions are confronted by only 78 divisions of the Warsaw Treaty countries. It should also be borne in mind that in the number of personnel an American or West German division is almost twice greater than a division of the Warsaw Treaty nations. As for tanks, NATO leaders count only those controlled by the joint command of the allies and don't take into account the ones under national command of NATO member-countries. Neither do they include the tanks kept in arsenals that can be brought into action fast. As a result, instead of the actual 25,000 NATO tanks only 12,000 are named. Besides, NATO is known to be superior in anti-tank weapons.

There are a number of examples of seemingly Soviet superiority in other conventional armaments, for example, in tactical planes and helicopters, in artillery and warships. But a serious analysis makes it quite clear that the general balance of forces remains the same and this has been admitted by Western experts. NATO leaders point to the seeming inequality but silence the proposals of Warsaw Treaty countries on the reduction of conventional arms such as cuts by 100 - 150,000 men on both sides in 1 or 2 years. Then, in the early '90s the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries could further reduce their land forces and tactical aviation by 25 percent as compared with the present level. Such reductions would affect over half a million men on each side. But so far NATO has not responded to these initiatives.

Deterrence Strategy Reapproved

PM181121 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Dec 86 Second Edition p 3

[Captain Second Rank V. Kuzar commentary: "NATO Versus Europe"]

[Text] Among the vast multitude of tasks facing mankind, the most complex and, at the same time, the most urgent is that of preventing a nuclear catastrophe and preserving civilization.

Does everyone understand the seriousness of the stage we have reached? Is everyone prepared to think in a new way, without which it will be impossible to resolve the main problem of our nuclear age? Let us be frank. This is by no means true of everyone. This was made clear by the recent conferences in Brussels involving the leading military and political organs of the North Atlantic bloc. The meetings lasted a whole 10 days. On 3 December there were sessions of the Eurogroup and the bloc's Military Committee. On 4-5 December there was a session of the Military Planning Committee, and on 11-12 December the NATO Council met.

The West German newspaper KOELNER STADT-ANZEIGER wrote that no one was expecting "stunning disarmament proposals" from the NATO sessions. There were hopes, however, that the participants in these sessions would show some degree of good sense and demonstrate a willingness to soberly assess the situation which has taken shape on the European continent and in the world as a whole.

These hopes had been engendered by a number of factors favorable to discussion about ending the arms race and eliminating nuclear arsenals. These factors are: the set of Soviet peace initiatives aimed at removing war from the life of society; the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, which showed that there is a possibility of creating a qualitatively new situation opening the way to a nuclear-free world; the unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions; and the Warsaw Pact states' initiatives regarding a substantial reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. It has also been proposed to the North Atlantic bloc that a meeting of NATO and Warsaw Pact working groups be held, as well as a meeting between Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Kulikov and General B. Rogers, and between the general secretaries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The continent's public expected all these circumstances to have a beneficial effect on the course and results of the NATO sessions.

However, instead of seeking a constructive response to the new situation in the world and showing readiness to contribute to intensifying the all-European process, the Atlantic bloc members once again demonstrated their loyalty to the policy of force. Conceding to pressure from across the ocean, they approved Washington's obstructionist course aimed at wrecking the Reykjavik accords and gaining military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. After reading the final documents of the NATO conference, one cannot help wondering what the people who signed them were thinking about. Are they fully aware of their responsibility for the decisions they have taken? Because these documents are literally steeped in the spirit of militarism and hatred of the Soviet Union and socialism. Not a page of the published communiques is without either an appeal for an arms race, or the enumeration of specific measures to step up the arms race, or vile speculation surrounding the Soviet peace initiatives.

In fact, the NATO "deterrence strategy" was reapproved in Brussels. What does this signify in practice? It means that the NATO members still consider the first use of nuclear arms to be possible. True, the NATO military and political leadership says that it is agreeable to slightly reducing strategic offensive weapons, but it does not intend to scrap them completely. What is more, the Eurogroup spoke in favor of U.S. medium-range missiles remaining in Western Europe.

It is typical that these very same ideas were heard at the Western European Union Assembly Session in Paris on 2 December. Addressing the session, French Prime Minister J. Chirac set out a plan to draw up some kind of "charter of West European security principles." This charter would be based, to quote Chirac, on the principle of nuclear deterrence, which is allegedly the "only remaining means of effectively preventing a war in Europe." Citing the Soviet Union's notorious "superiority" on the European continent in terms of conventional weapons, the French prime minister said that "security interests will require the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Western Europe for some time to come."

It should be noted that this development of events was to be expected. There was literally a "generals' revolt" a few days after Reykjavik, when

high-ranking NATO officials voiced their dissatisfaction because the United States had "not consulted" them beforehand with regard to its stand at the talks. Then the FRG, French, and British Governments spoke out against ridding Europe of nuclear weapons. And, finally, "European alarm" at the prospect of a nuclear-free continent found expression in the NATO resolution.

What is happening here? Until quite recently representatives of West European countries' ruling circles were trumpeting the "zero option" for all the world to hear, but today, when this option is proposed to them, they refuse to have anything to do with it. The explanation is quite simple. All these years West European governments have been playing to the gallery. They have never been ready for nuclear disarmament. The total elimination of mass destruction means simply does not fit in with their "security concepts" based on nuclear arms. This is why they have not supported the accord reached in Reykjavik to eliminate Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe.

Washington's influence is clearly apparent in the Eurogroup decision. Frightened by the historic prospects of Reykjavik, the American "hawks" deliberately urged their West European partners in the bloc to reject the "zero option"--a rejection that will now be used by the United States to justify its departure from the accords reached in principle. This was also evidenced by the speech delivered at the NATO Military Planning Committee session by Pentagon Chief C. Weinberger. As if wishing to reassure the allies, he said directly that the deployment of American medium-range missiles on the European continent will be steadily continued.

Not wishing to take account of the fact that Europe is already bursting with mass destruction weapons, the Atlanticists intend to replenish their arsenal with new types of nuclear arms. Thus FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner has frankly said: "Fortunately, there are still aircraft, and reequipping them does not come under any agreement on eliminating all medium-range missiles. This means that it will still be possible to launch nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union from West European territory." The newspaper FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE writes that NATO is now thinking of equipping more than 150 F-111 fighter-bombers with cruise missiles. "This could mean the bombers at present deployed in Britain," the newspaper points out. "Each of them could be equipped with eight cruise missiles."

In addition to this, the Eurogroup spoke in favor of the additional deployment of operational-tactical nuclear missiles on the territory of West European countries--evidently at the West German defense minister's prompting. NATO ministers have justified their stand on this matter with fabrications of a "growing threat to NATO from Warsaw Pact tactical ballistic missiles." Let us note in this connection that the Atlanticists have simply ignored the Soviet Union's readiness in resolving the issue of medium-range missiles to freeze its missiles with ranges of less than 1,000km and immediately begin talks about their future.

Describing the Atlanticists' demands for increased numbers of operational-tactical missiles, some Western observers have even begun talking about a "second upgrading." As is well known, the "first upgrading" was NATO's decision to introduce Pershing-2 and cruise missiles to the European continent.

Europe therefore faces a new threat of a destabilizing nature. The deployment of additional operational-tactical nuclear missiles will complicate the possibility of arms control and increase the danger of a nuclear conflict.

Another point must be made. The NATO sessions talked a great deal about the bloc's determination to "secure the introduction of a global ban on chemical weapons as soon as possible." Yet on the very day the NATO Military Planning Committee communique was signed, a remarkable report came from Britain. According to the newspaper TODAY, equipment for new American chemical weapons had begun to arrive in the British Isles. What we are talking about here is "Big Eye" aerial bombs carrying binary neuroparalytic weapons. One wonders how one should judge the real intentions of the NATO military committees: by their words or by their actions?

This same question can be asked with regard to NATO's attitude to conventional weapons. In one way or another the Atlanticists justify all their statements on the need to preserve their nuclear potential with the same old argument about the Warsaw Pact's being "superior" in terms of conventional weapons. However, neither the Eurogroup communique nor the NATO Military Planning Committee communique makes any mention of the socialist countries' proposal to reduce armed forces and conventional arms in Europe--as if the proposal had never been made. As for the NATO Council session, it approved a "declaration on conventional arms control." However, apart from vague phrases concerning its willingness to begin talks between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, this declaration contains no constructive proposals.

Meanwhile, the NATO Military Planning Committee has approved its latest long-term plan for conventional weapons, to cover the period 1987-1991. It outlines specific efforts by NATO countries to create and produce a new generation of conventional weapons approximating in yield terms to tactical nuclear weapons. The Eurogroup in turn decided to supply the armies of the bloc's European countries in 1987 with 275 "Leopard-2" and "Challenger" tanks, 150 new armored personnel carriers, more than 170 fighter planes--chiefly "Tornados" and F-16's--and almost 14,000 antitank missiles, as well as submarines, patrol vessels, fast launches, and other modern weapon systems. At present the armed forces of the Eurogroup countries number 2 million ground troops, 270,000 naval personnel, and 350,000 air force personnel.

The results of the NATO conferences are convincing evidence that certain circles in the West are deliberately trying to make the arms race irreversible. With this aim in mind, a rigid course has been set toward disorganizing and torpedoing international efforts to curb this insane race. These actions show the particular danger of the present military and political situation on the European continent--a danger by no means lessened by the Atlanticists' decisions in Brussels.

The NATO military and political leadership has no wish to recognize the fact that in the present conditions no state or group of states can build its own security and welfare on a policy of dictating its will to other countries and peoples by means of military might. European security, however, can be achieved--but only by ridding the continent of the mountains of arms it has

accumulated, and primarily its mass destruction means. This is the imperious demand of the time. The peoples of Europe and the whole world must enter the 21st century free of their dangerous burden of nuclear weapons.

'Response' to Arms Proposals

PM161738 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

[Ye. Nikolayev article: "A Response, or an Evasion?"]

[Text] Another NATO Council session ended the other day. And although it was a routine session, the results were awaited not without interest by the whole of political Europe.

At last, after 6 months of all kinds of studies and examinations, the North Atlantic bloc was to give a response — at least, so it was promised — to the Warsaw Pact countries' concrete proposals on limiting armed forces and armaments in Europe, put forward in June of this year. This delay in replying might have been justified to some extent if it had been due to the interests of the cause: The Warsaw Pact countries' proposals are a major initiative-making provision for substantial, precisely scheduled reductions of ground forces and tactical strike aircraft on the European continent, as well as reductions in operational-tactical nuclear arms. Such serious proposals naturally required a serious response.

But now the so-called response is ready. Verbose, widely publicized documents are adopted. And what do we see? The unsophisticated might even form the impression, from the declaration and communique adopted by the NATO Council, that their mood is businesslike. There is a mention of the need for a broad approach to conventional arms from the Atlantic to the Urals. It appears that some of the Warsaw Pact countries' ideas on this score have been taken up, too. But if you look more carefully it becomes obvious that the NATO documents do not propose any solutions. Moreover, not only do they lack concrete responses to the questions of where, when, and how to conduct talks on reducing armed forces and conventional arms from the Atlantic to the Urals, but there is not even any mention of the proposals contained in the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Hypocrisy, unfounded assertions, and gulfs between words and deeds have long been the usual tactics used by Western states to avoid responding to any concrete, businesslike proposals from the socialist countries on lessening military confrontation and on disarmament in Europe. The results of the NATO Council session are only one example of this approach by the North Atlantic bloc to the most acute problems of the European continent's life.

In this light there is nothing surprising about the fact of a 6-month delay in issuing documents which are not about disarmament, but about some abstract philosophy of "conventional arms control," or about the fact that they are planning to prolong such verbal exercises almost endlessly, envisaging putting the preparation of documents of this kind onto a regular footing in the future.

The reluctance to begin concrete talks on this problem is also indicated by the NATO countries' refusal to establish direct contacts between corresponding working groups of NATO and the Warsaw Pact concerned with this question, by the reluctance of General B. Rogers, commander in chief of the North Atlantic bloc's forces, to respond to our

proposal and meet with Marshal V.G. Kulikov, commander of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, and by the refusal of NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington to hold the proposed discussions with Warsaw Pact plenipotentiary representative G. Krolkowski.

Much was said in the NATO countries about the "Soviet military threat" in the sphere of conventional armed forces and about the impossibility of nuclear disarmament in the conditions of the preservation of high potentials in the conventional arms sphere. However, when it came to the point of discussing and adopting concrete measures to reduce conventional arms, it turned out that the West's interest in reducing them receded.

The philosophy of so-called conventional arms control set forth in the documents of the NATO Council session also looks odd. The impression created is that just in case talks really do start on this score, the NATO states would like to "prepare the ground" now, in the form of all kinds of barriers and obstacles which could be used to thwart the adoption of any concrete decisions at the talks.

It emerges from the NATO documents that the North Atlantic bloc sees it as the main objective to eliminate the supposed lack of equilibrium in conventional arms in Europe, and basically to bring about a unilateral reduction in the armed forces and armaments of the Warsaw Pact countries while preserving its own potential in this sphere. Moreover a preliminary condition is set: The Warsaw Pact countries must "acknowledge" their supposed superiority.

NATO's so-called response to the Warsaw Pact countries' Budapest proposals shows clearly that the NATOites are trying to keep the problems of ridding Europe of nuclear weapons and lowering confrontation here in the conventional arms sphere confined within a vicious circle. The attainment of the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons in Europe is blocked by references to the lack of measures in the sphere of reducing conventional arms, while impassable barriers made up of artificially adduced linkages, conditions, and stipulations are erected in the path of conventional arms reduction.

The competent Soviet organs and departments are carefully studying all the relevant documents from the NATO Council session. Of course, there will also be consultations on this question with the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies, after which an official response will be given to the documents of the December NATO Council session. It is clear, however, that progress is resolving the problem of reducing armed forces and conventional arms still depends on the NATO countries' sincere readiness to seriously to tackle this matter.

/9274

CSO: 5200/1205

RELATED ISSUES

USSR REPORTAGE ON ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE IN JAPAN

Ryzhkov Sends Message

LD301901 Moscow TASS in English 1826 GMT 30 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 30 TASS — Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers sent a message of greetings to participants in the 5th round-table conference of representatives of the Soviet and Japanese public which is to discuss the role of the Soviet and the Japanese public in ensuring peace and security in the Asian-Pacific region.

"The present meeting of representatives of the Soviet and Japanese public is to promote the consolidation of good neighbourly relations, mutual understanding between our two nations and the development of cooperation among all the Asian and Pacific countries. The Soviet Union regards as important the active drawing of this vast region into the general process of the creation of the system of international security", the message noted.

"The purpose of our proposals is to work step by step, through pooling efforts with countries and peoples of the Asian-Pacific region, for its turning into a zone of peace and security, of equitable and mutually advantageous cooperation".

"The Soviet Union attaches much importance to the development of relations with Japan. We positively assess the recent signs of the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations and believe that there exist extensive potentialities of their further expansion in many areas. Provided there is good will and the striving for a dynamic and realistic policy, these potentialities can find their expression in mutually advantageous agreements and understandings", the message said.

Text of Ryzhkov Message

PM080857 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Dec 86 First Edition p 1

[Message by Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolay Ryzhkov to Soviet-Japanese Roundtable]

[Text] To the participants in the Fifth Roundtable of Representatives of the Soviet and Japanese Public:

I greet the representatives of the Soviet and Japanese public taking part in the Fifth Roundtable Conference on the theme "The Role of the USSR and Japanese Public in Ensuring Peace and Security in the Asian and Pacific Region."

The problems submitted for discussion by the conference are prompted by life itself. Their formulation indicates the growing disquiet of the Soviet and Japanese public over the fate of the world and reflects a desire on the part of the peoples of the USSR and Japan to establish genuine, good-neighborly relations.

Nuclear energy, which through human genius has been extracted from the microworld, has proved to be clad in a sinister covering of nuclear weapons, which threaten life itself on earth. The people of Japan were the first to experience these weapons' destructive force. There are still witnesses of the terrible events in Hiroshima and Nagasaki alive, and it is the task of all peace-loving forces to prevent this happening again. If a new tragedy were to occur, it would be a catastrophe not just for one city or one people but for all the inhabitants of the world. The cause of saving civilization affects everyone today and must become the concern of everyone.

In the nuclear weapons age, no one can ensure security for himself by relying on the threat of force and encroaching on other peoples' security. The Soviet Union has put forward an extensive program for phased reduction of nuclear weapons and their elimination by the beginning of the 21st century and a package of other specific proposals designed to provide all peoples with reliable guarantees of peaceful development. In order to bring these goals nearer, our country has taken a major practical step — for almost 18 months now it has adhered to a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

The Soviet Union's sincere desire for a world free of nuclear and space weapons was convincingly confirmed in Reykjavik, which marked a qualitatively new step in the struggle for a world free of nuclear weapons. We now know that it is possible to dispose of nuclear weapons even within this generation's lifetime. Our proposals were not accepted in their entirety by the Americans, but they remain in force. The Soviet Union's honest and just stance enjoys a positive response among the peace-loving public of all countries.

The present meeting of representatives of the Soviet and Japanese public is designed to contribute to strengthening good-neighborliness and mutual understanding between our peoples and to promote the cause of developing cooperation among all the countries of Asia and the Pacific. The Soviet Union considers it important that this extensive area be actively involved in the general process of creating an international security system. Our proposals are directed toward ensuring that Asia and the Pacific be gradually turned into a zone of peace and security, a zone of equal and mutually beneficial cooperation, through the concerted efforts of the countries and the peoples of that region.

The Soviet Union attaches great significance to developing ties with Japan. Positively evaluating the signs of improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations that have emerged, we consider that there are quite a few potential opportunities to further expand them in many areas. Given goodwill and a desire for a dynamic and realistic policy, these opportunities can be realized in mutually beneficial agreements and accords.

I wish conference participants successful and productive work. I voice the hope that your noble activity will contribute to creating an atmosphere of mutual understanding in Soviet-Japanese relations and will help strengthen peace in Asia and the Pacific.

N. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Talks Open

LD011833 Moscow TASS in English 1759 GMT 1 Dec 86

[Text] Tokyo December 1 TASS — By TASS correspondent Vladimir Kuchko

The fifth Japano-Soviet round-table conference opened today. Its topic is "The Role of the Public in the U.S.S.R. and Japan in Ensuring Peace and Security in Asia and the Pacific Region."

Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan addressed messages to the delegates.

Addressing the opening ceremony, Tadashi Kuranari, the Japanese foreign minister, said that some positive tendencies had made themselves felt in Japano-Soviet relations in recent time. He came out in favor of promoting mutual understanding and cooperation between the two countries.

At the same time he tried once again to link progress in bilateral relations with the meeting of illegal territorial claims made on the Soviet Union.

"The existing international situation imperatively demands a new approach to security problems," said Avgust Voss, the head of the Soviet delegation, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities (one of the two equal chambers) of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. (Parliament). He called the attention of the delegates to a series of recent major Soviet initiatives.

"The Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik signifies a qualitatively new stage in the campaign to safeguard peace," he said. "The implementation of the Soviet proposals, if they had been adopted, would have marked the beginning of the process of elimination of nuclear weapons. Effective actions by all states are required now for the benefit of stronger international peace."

"The Soviet Union would like to regard Japan above all as a partner in common effort to ensure security the world over and in the Asian and Pacific region. The Soviet Union and Japan, cooperating with each other, could make a valuable contribution to stronger peace, promote the lessening of tensions and the development of positive political processes," Avgust Voss went on.

"The Soviet proposals set forth in the Vladivostok speech by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, are designed to attain these aims. They make it possible to secure the inclusion of the Asian and Pacific region into the common process of establishing a comprehensive system of international security," the head of the Soviet delegation said.

Voss Meets Nakasone, Parliamentarians

LD03008 Moscow TASS in English 2257 GMT 2 Dec 86

[Text] Tokyo, 2 Dec (TASS)—Avgust Voss, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, had a meeting here today with Masaaki Fujita, speaker of the House of Councillors of the Japanese Diet, and a group of deputies of the parliamentary chamber.

Voss, who is heading a Soviet delegation to the "round-table" conference currently under way in Tokyo, drew the Japanese parliamentarians' attention to the USSR's large-scale proposals advanced at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik.

He set out the Soviet Union's principled assessment of the U.S. "Strategic Defence Initiative."

The sides examined questions of expanding ties between the parliaments of the two countries, including a colloquium of Soviet and Japanese parliamentarians.

On the same day Voss met with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. The Soviet side expressed the USSR's consistent course towards developing all-round relations with Japan and readiness for their further expansion if the Japanese side showed a similar approach.

The Japanese prime minister pointed at the substantial possibilities for deepening ties between the two countries.

First-day Session

OW040203 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 2 Dec 86

[By Tokyo correspondent Pavel Potapov]

[Text] As has already been reported, the Fifth Japanese-Soviet Roundtable Conference opened in Tokyo on 1 December, attended by representatives of various circles of the Soviet Union and Japan. Our station correspondent in Tokyo, Pavel Potapov, makes the following report on the first-day session of the conference:

The first roundtable conference was held in Tokyo in 1979. The theme of the fifth conference is the Japanese and Soviet peoples' role in ensuring peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

The first plenary session of the conference was held on Monday afternoon, 1 December. The session was held at the Tokai University Friendship Hall on the 33d floor of the Kasumigaseki Building and attended by over 400 people, including politicians, scholars, representatives of social organizations, and reporters of the two countries. A message from Soviet Premier Ryzhkov was read. Messages from Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone and Foreign Minister Kuranari were also read at the session.

The gist of speeches given at this plenary session by the heads of the Soviet and Japanese delegations was that the current turbulent international situation requires us to step up efforts for world peace and restraining the nuclear arms race. Mr Voss, head of the Soviet delegation and chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, called the attention of the participants to recent Soviet peace proposals. He pointed out that Japan can make a great contribution to totally abolishing nuclear arms and resolving the issue of preventing space militarization.

He said: As a sufferer from atomic bombings, Japan has a moral right to express its own independent view on this issue, which has a life-or-death significance to the Japanese people as well as all mankind. It is Japan's historical responsibility to fully tap its potential and exercise its rights in order to establish a world free of nuclear arms and to prevent space militarization. There can be no mutual understanding

if one does not open up his mind. Frankly speaking, the Soviet Union feels misgiving about Japan's agreement to participate in the U.S. Star Wars plan. We believe that Japan's participation in Star Wars will contribute to strategic military instability both on a global scale and in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan's participation is likely to encourage others, who are willing to use force to settle issues, to harbor unfounded and dangerous expectations. This will consequently lead to impairing the security of Japan and the United States.

Mr Voss, head of the Soviet delegation, then contended that the Japanese and Soviet peoples should cooperate for detente in Asia and the world.

Dietman Sakurachi, chief of the Japanese delegation and chairman of the Dietmen's League for Japanese-Soviet Friendship, noted the great significance of the roundtable talks and stressed that a positive task today is to lead the present world toward detente.

The roundtable conference will hold discussions in five subcommittees on 2 December. At these subcommittees, the two sides will discuss various important issues including the peace struggle and promotion of political dialogue, economic exchange, cultural interchange, and city-to-city sisterly ties between Japan and the Soviet Union.

Roundtable Joint Communique

PM100943 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent Yu. Vdovin report: "In a Spirit of Mutual Understanding: Roundtable Conference of Soviet and Japanese Public Has Finished Work"] ..

[Text] Tokyo, 3 Dec — The participants in the fifth roundtable conference of the USSR and Japanese public, which has ended in Tokyo, have called for further efforts to bring about a rapprochement between the two countries' views, to deepen mutual understanding, and to develop truly good-neighborly relations between them. The further development of friendly relations between the two neighboring countries, they stated, is of great significance for strengthening peace in the Asian and Pacific regions.

The 3-day conference's main theme was "The Role of the USSR and Japanese Public in Ensuring Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region." More than 400 representatives of the two countries — USSR Supreme Soviet deputies and Japanese dietmen, politicians, businessmen, activists of various social organizations, scientists, and journalists — took part in the meeting. The roundtable has been held since 1979 on behalf of Japan by a number of social organizations advocating the development of relations with the USSR in the most diverse spheres and on behalf of the Soviet side by the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the "USSR-Japan" Society. [paragraph continues]

During the discussions, held in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding, participants discussed problems of the international political situation in the Asia-Pacific region and Japanese-Soviet relations in the political, economic, cultural spheres as well as the activity of social organizations in the struggle for peace, to prevent nuclear war, and to strengthen friendship and good-neighborliness between the USSR and Japanese peoples. In a joint communique approved today, conference participants rated highly the possibility of achieving an accord on principle on questions of nuclear disarmament which emerged during the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik. They indicated the need to mobilize international public opinion to end the nuclear arms race and to use space solely for peaceful purposes.

The conference welcomed the various proposals aimed at reducing tension and ensuring security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and urged that every opportunity be used to achieve the further development of dialogue among the region's countries.

The participants in the meeting, the communique says, expressed readiness to help overcome the difficulties hindering fruitful economic and technical cooperation between the two countries and considered an exchange of opinions on new forms of such cooperation useful.

Expressing satisfaction at the positive changes in Soviet-Japanese relations, the conference advocated the expansion of bilateral political contacts and the development of long-term mutually beneficial cooperation in the spheres of the economy, science, and technology, the search for new forms of trade and economic ties, and a broadening of exchange in the spheres of culture, education, and sport.

It has been decided to hold the next roundtable conference of the Soviet and Japanese public in Moscow in 1988.

voss Interviewed on Roundtable

PM221357 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 5

["IZVESTIYA Interview" with A.E. Voss, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by A. Shalnev: "A.E. Voss: We Have Begun To Understand Each Other Better" — first two paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] The general opinion was that the conference had been successful and had made it possible not only to gain a better understanding of each other's viewpoint but also to identify similar positions and determine new ways to ensure the further rapprochement of views on the questions under discussion.

But the central issues at the conference — the Fifth Soviet and Japanese Public "Roundtable" Conference — were those of war and peace. And although the subject of this forum, held recently in Tokyo, was formulated as "The Role of the USSR and Japanese Public Ensuring Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region," the discussion was about the fate of the planet as a whole. The Soviet delegation was headed by A.E. Voss, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Today's IZVESTIYA interview is with him.

[Shalnev] Avgust Eduardovich, this was the fifth such forum. How was it distinguished from the previous ones?

[Voss] It was distinguished by the broad range of people represented. On the Japanese side, five large organizations were the initiators and enlisted approximately 400 people to take part in the meeting; including a large group of parliamentary deputies not only from opposition parties but also from the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, representatives of scientific, business, and religious circles, education and press workers, and people from the worlds of art and sport. Thirty different organizations were represented on our side, including organizations from Leningrad, Kiev, the Baltic republics, Siberia, and the Far East. The level at which we were received was high — we had meetings with the prime minister, the foreign minister, the chairman of both chambers of parliament, and the leaders of the main parties.

[Shalnev] Was this in addition to the meetings actually held as part of the conference?

[Voss] Yes. In other words, we had the opportunity to expound in detail our viewpoint on the most topical problems of the international situation. We were particularly persistent in stressing the point that the present alarming situation in the world requires increased effective efforts and collective actions by all countries and peoples — including those in the Asia-Pacific region — aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons, preventing the militarization of space, and ending nuclear tests.

The conversations and discussions both at the conference itself and behind the scenes were frank — mutual understanding is impossible without frankness — and we plainly said that the Soviet public is really very concerned at official Tokyo's position on SDI. Participation in implementing the "Star Wars" program, we stressed, could, in our opinion, lead to destabilization in the strategic military sphere on a global level in the Asia-Pacific region in particular, and could also give rise to unsubstantiated but dangerous calculations among those who favor solving problems by force.

[Shalnev] What did the Japanese side have to say on this score?

[Voss] Many said that the "Star Wars" program has aggravated the situation in the world and has become a factor of tension. At the same time, the idea was heard in several speeches that SDI is useful because it may be a spur to the development of science and technology. We did not keep count, of course, of the number of times this was said, but one cannot fail to notice that the unanimously adopted conference communique notes the need to "mobilize international public opinion for the sake of ending the nuclear arms race and using space exclusively for peaceful purposes."

[Shalnev] The communique highly appraises the "possibility of reaching a principle accord on nuclear disarmament issues that emerged during the talks in Reykjavik."

[Voss] This was a key aspect of the discussion. The overwhelming majority of speakers stressed that the USSR not only showed initiative in organizing the summit in the Icelandic capital, but also proved by its specific proposals that it sincerely desires peace and is ready to compromise for the sake of achieving accords on the main problem — the problem of removing the threat of nuclear war.

At the same time, ideas were put forward which seemed to mimic those which official Washington uses in setting out its own "vision" of the results of the Reykjavik meeting.

[Shalnev] Let us go back to the basic theme of the Tokyo conference — peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

[Voss] Speeches by Japanese participants in the conference confirmed that the speech made by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in Vladivostok aroused vast interest in the Land of the Rising Sun. Many Japanese delegates spoke with great sympathy and profound satisfaction of the proposals contained in this speech, which were dictated by concern for peace and security in the region. These attitudes were also reflected in the final communique.

The constructive nature of the Delhi declaration recently signed by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi as an important and specific manifestation of a new type of thinking conducive to the search for ways of resolving conflicts in this region was also stressed.

[Shalnev] And how did the discussion of issues relating to bilateral relations go?

[Voss] I would like to remind you that the conference was convened in the year of the 30th anniversary of the restoration of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations. The

objective situation of our countries is such as to require intensified cooperation on a healthy basis, in a calm atmosphere unburdened by the problems of the past. This has begun. The sides agreed that an important task is to continue political dialogue and to continue talks, primarily on issues on which accord can be reached. There was a lively exchange of opinions on the problems of developing trade and economic ties. The proposals contained in M.S. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech were supported as opening a new page in this sphere.

[Shalnev] What is your general appraisal?

[Voss] The forum in Tokyo was, of course, an important event. It was constructive and, we hope, productive. [paragraph continues]

The criterion of productivity, in our opinion, is the level of activity by representatives of the two countries' publics in resolving the problems facing both the USSR, Japan, and the world as a whole. What is more, we hope that many of the specific proposals made at the conference — on the development of bilateral cooperation in such spheres as culture, trade, and education, for example — will be realized, and that we will be able to sum up the initial results at the next "roundtable" conference, planned for 1988 in the Soviet Union.

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CSO: 5200/1205

RELATED ISSUES

PRC FOREIGN MINISTER ON CHINA DISARMAMENT STAND

OW310254 Beijing XINHUA in English 0244 GMT 31 Dec 86

[Text] Beijing, December 31 (XINHUA) -- Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian said here today the adoption of China's two proposals on nuclear and conventional disarmament by the United Nations General Assembly at its 41st session shows China's stand accords with the common wish of the people of various countries for disarmament and world peace.

"China's stand on disarmament is quite reasonable and realistic," he added.

Wu, who is also a U.N. councillor, made these remarks during an interview with XINHUA here today.

"The basic idea of China's proposals," Wu explained, "states clearly the United States and the Soviet Union have special responsibility for the arms race and therefore disarmament, and they should take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear and conventional arsenals."

He welcomed the U.S. and Soviet endorsement of the two proposals.

"We wish even more that they truly respect the common wish and demand of the people of various countries and take action to follow the two U.N. resolutions," he said.

He reiterated, "The Chinese Government opposes the arms race and expansion of this race to outer space."

"We stand for final realization of a total ban and destruction of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as a drastic reduction of conventional arms," he said.

He continued, "Countries, big or small, have their right to speak on disarmament; bilateral and multi-lateral efforts for disarmament should complement and promote each other; and any disarmament talks and agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union should not harm the interests of other countries."

"At the same time, 'hotspots' in the world should be eliminated and aggression and expansion stopped," he added.

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END

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